


The Outlook of Society 2022

POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY





THE OUTLOOK OF SOCIETY

POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY

Editor: Elyesa Koytak



FIELD MONITORING REPORTS

İLKE PUBLICATION NUMBER: 178
FIELD MONITORING REPORTS: 14

THE OUTLOOK OF SOCIETY 2022: POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY

Project Coordinator: Lütfi Sunar

Project Advisor: Nihat Erdoğan

Editor: Elyesa Koytak

Writers (First Section): Elyesa Koytak, Büşra Özen

Analysis Writers: Abdullah Uçar, Elyesa Koytak, Lütfi Sunar, Mahmut Hakkı Akın, Taner Atmaca

Perspective Development Commission: Cenk Beyaz, Hüseyin Kaya, İbrahim Hakan Karataş, İsa Yılmaz, Lütfi Sunar, Mahmut Hakkı Akın, Nihat Erdoğan, Yunus Kaya

Data Collection and Visualization: Büşra Özen, Enes Kuru, Mustafa Emre Kızılca, Şüheda Nur Uzuntaş, Büşra Arslan

Publication Coordinator: Mehtap Nur Öksüz

Translator: Zeynep Tanrikulu

Proofreader: Ahsan Shafiq

© İLKE Foundation for Science Culture and Education, Istanbul 2023

E-ISBN: 978-625-8350-49-4

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/air14>

Graphic Design: Seyfullah Bayram

Printing: Limit Offset

Litros Yolu 2. Matbaacılar Sitesi ZA13 Topkapı-Zeytinburnu/İstanbul
Tel: 0212 567 45 35



Foundation for science, culture and education

ILKE Foundation is a non-governmental organization that produces knowledge, policies and strategies on social issues, conducts research to guide decision-makers and contributes to the formation of the necessary perspective for the future.



RESEARCH CENTER FOR SOCIAL THOUGHT AND POLICY

The Outlook of Society 2022: Post-Pandemic Society report has been prepared by the Research Center for Social Thought and Policy (TODAM). TODAM produces ideas and strategies to realize the goal of a just, equitable and prosperous society.

Address: Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Mah. Türbe Kapısı Sk. No: 13 Üsküdar/ İstanbul Telephone: +90 216 532 63 70 E-mail: todam@ilke.org.tr Web: ilke.org.tr

© All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced electronically or mechanically without the written permission of ILKE Foundation for Science, Culture and Education. The views expressed in the articles are those of the author and do not bind the ILKE Foundation for Science, Culture and Education.



Sosyal Veri (Social Data) platform presents the social outlook of Türkiye in light of extensive data. We offer data and analyzes in many fields, from family to work, economy to law, and education to culture. Sosyal Veri platform consists of 13 main categories, more than 200 analyzes, and over 1000 graph and visualisations. It makes it possible to observe social issues with comprehensive data-based analyzes.



13
Categories



235
Analyzes



+1000
Graphics

TÜRKİYE'S SOCIAL DATA PLATFORM

*Hundreds of graphics,
comprehensive analyzes*

sosyalveri.net

Contents

Foreword	8
Introduction	9
Key Findings	11
Policy Recommendations	14

TÜRKİYE AT A GLANCE

Demography	18
Households	20
Family	22
Social Groups	24
Education	26
Economy	28
Labor and Employment	30
Work and Professions	32
Wealth and Inequality	34
Health	36
Law	38
Cities	40
Rural Areas	42
Migration	44
Life and Culture	46
Media and Communication	48

POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY

Healthquake of the 21st Century: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Lessons Learned, <i>Abdullah Uçar</i>	52
Pandemic and Family: Old Trends, New Challenges, <i>Mahmut Hakkı Akın</i>	60
Education after the Pandemic: Opportunities, Risks and Inequalities, <i>Taner Atmaca</i>	68
Work and Professions in the Pandemic, <i>Elyesa Koytak</i>	75
Socioeconomic Inequalities in Türkiye, <i>Lütfi Sunar</i>	85
Conclusion	99
References	102
About the Authors	106

Abbreviations

ADNKS	Address Based Population Registration System
BDDK	Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
TCMB	Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
EBA	Educational Informatics Network
ECDC	European Center for Disease Control and Prevention
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ERG	Education Reform Initiative
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFF	Institute of International Finance
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMM	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
İSKİ	Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration
İGDAŞ	Istanbul Natural Gas Distribution Inc.
İŞKUR	Turkish Employment Agency
LGS	High School Entrance Exam
MEB	Ministry of National Education
MERS	Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
NEET	Youth not in Education, Employment, or Training
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RTÜK	Radio and Television Supreme Council
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
TEDAŞ	Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation
TİAK	Television Audience Measurement Committee
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TOKİ	Mass Housing Development Administration
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USA	United States of America
WHO	World Health Organization
YÖK	Council of Higher Education

Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate (‰, 2010-2019)	19
Figure 2. Population Ratio by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)	19
Figure 3. Level of Satisfaction with Household Income (% , 2010-2021)	21
Figure 4. Rate of Loans (% , 2015-2021)	21
Figure 5. Number of Divorce Cases Filed and Number of Divorced Couples (Thousand, 2010-2021)	23
Figure 6. Rate of Dissatisfaction with Marriage by Gender (% , 2010-2021)	23
Figure 7. The Number of Children, Youth, and Elderly (Million, 2010-2021)	25
Figure 8. Female Employment Rate in Türkiye and OECD Countries (% , 2010-2021)	25
Figure 9. Ratio of Female MPs in Turkey and OECD Countries (% , 2010-2021)	25
Figure 10. Female Employment Rate and Proportion of Women in Managerial Positions (% , 2010-2021)	25
Figure 11. Net Enrollment Rate by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)	27
Figure 12. Number of Universities (2010-2021)	27
Figure 13. Gross Enrollment Rate in Higher Education (1970-2020)	27
Figure 14. Number of Placed Students and Ratio of Placed Students to Applicants in University Entrance Exam (% and Million People, 2000-2022)	27
Figure 15. Number of Quotas and Vacancy Rate in Public and Private Universities (Thousand people and % , 2010-2021)	27
Figure 16. Share of Sectors in GDP (% , 2010-2021)	29
Figure 17. Rate of Top Three Expenditure Items of the Government (% , 2010-2021)	29
Figure 18. Annual Growth Rate of Imports and Exports in OECD Countries and Türkiye (% , 2014-2021)	29
Figure 19. Rate of Imports and Exports (Billion USD and % , 2013-2021)	29
Figure 20. Share of Sectors in Employment (% , 2010- 2021)	31
Figure 21. The Number of Employed Persons Aged 15 Years Old and Over by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)	31
Figure 22. Average Monthly Gross Wage by Education Level (Thousand TRY, 2010-2021)	31
Figure 23. Share of Occupational Groups in Employment (% , 2010-2021)	33
Figure 24. Average Monthly Gross Wage by Occupational Groups (TRY, 2012-2021)	33
Figure 25. Percentage of Permanent Staff in the Public Sector and the Share of the Public Sector in Employment (2011-2021)	33
Figure 26. Annual Average Income by Employment Status (TRY, 2010-2021)	35
Figure 27. Level of Happiness (% , 2010-2021)	35
Figure 28. Number of Physicians, Nurses and Beds Per Thousand People (2010-2020)	37
Figure 29. Total Number of Deaths from COVID-19 (Thousand People, September 2021)	37
Figure 30. Number of COVID-19 Cases (2020-2022)	37
Figure 31. Number of COVID-19 Intensive Care Units (2020-2021)	37
Figure 32. Number of Lawyers and Number of Graduates from Law Faculties (2010-2021)	39
Figure 33. The Ratio of the Number of Cases Adjudicated in the Courts of First Instance to the Total Number of Cases (2010-2021)	39
Figure 34. Average Investigation Time in Chief Public Prosecutor's Offices, Criminal Courts and Civil Courts (Day, 2010-2021)	39
Figure 35. Proportion of Convicts by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)	39
Figure 36. House Price Index Average prices per square meter in Istanbul and Türkiye (2010-2022)	41
Figure 37. The Unit Price of 1 m ³ of Natural Gas and 1 kWh of Electricity (TRY, 2012-2022)	41
Figure 38. Satisfaction Rate from Municipal Services (% , 2011-2021)	41
Figure 39. Distribution of Rural Population by Age Groups (% , 2010-2021)	43
Figure 40. Annual Production of Milk, Red Meat and Chicken Meat (Million Tons, 2010-2021)	43
Figure 41. Number of Migrants from Rural to Urban Areas (1975-2000)	45

Figure 42. Immigrant Population (Thousand people, 2016-2019)	45
Figure 43. Age Pyramid of the Syrian Population	45
Figure 44. Number of Public Libraries, People Benefiting from the Library and Books in Libraries (Thousand, Million People & Million Pieces, 2017-2021)	47
Figure 45. Number of Licensed Athletes (2010 - 2018)	47
Figure 46. Individuals using the Internet (% of population, 2010-2020)	49
Figure 47. Proportion of Households with Broadband and Fixed Broadband Internet Access (% , 2011-2021)	49
Figure 48. Number of Social Media Users and Ratio of Users to the Population (A million people and %, 2019-2021)	49
Figure 49. Proportion of Internet Purchases (% , 2010-2021)	49
Figure 50. Market Share of Digital Broadcasting Platforms in Türkiye (% , Q1 2021)	49
Figure 51. 10-Year Change of the Time Spent Listening to Radio on Weekdays (% , 2009-2019)	49
Figure 52. 10-Year Change of the Time Spent Listening to Radio on Weekends (% , 2009-2019)	49
Figure 53. COVID-19 Deaths (Per Hundred Thousand People When the Human Development Index of OECD Countries is Adjusted to 1 Point	54
Figure 54. Annual Consultations Per Physician, 2019 (or sooner)	55
Figure 55. Rate of Unavailable Health Services, 2021	56
Figure 56. Statement of "My family relationships have become stronger" by income group (min. 1 – max. 5)	61
Figure 57. Statement of "Communication problems within the family increased" by income group (min. 1 – max. 5)	62
Figure 58. Crude Divorce Rate in Türkiye (‰)	64
Figure 59. Crude Marriage Rate in Türkiye (‰)	65
Figure 60. Proportion of Countries with Support Policies for Parents in Home Learning in Income Groups	69
Figure 61. GDP Shares of Employees and Businesses (2018-2022)	76
Figure 62. Ratio of Individuals' Annual Income at Main Job to Average Income by Education Level (2006-2021)	77
Figure 63. Registered Unemployed by Education Level (Million people, 2017-2021)	78
Figure 64. Young People Neither in Employment nor in Education or Training (aged 15-29, %, 2017-2021)	79
Figure 65. Education Level of Young People Neither in Employment nor in Education or Training (aged 15-24, %, 2021-2022)	79
Figure 66. Monthly Employment and Unemployment Rate of Young Population (aged 15-24, %, 2017-2022)	80
Figure 67. Gini Coefficients of Countries (2021)	86
Figure 68. Change of Gini Coefficient in Türkiye	86
Figure 69. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable income by ordered quintiles in Türkiye (% , 2006-2021)	87
Figure 70. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable income by deciles ordered by equivalised household disposable income (% , 2006-2021)	88
Figure 71. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable incomes by vigintiles ordered by equivalised household disposable income (% , 2006-2021)	89
Figure 72. Ratios of Top and Bottom Income Groups' Shares of Income to Each Other in Türkiye (% , 2006-2021)	89
Figure 73. Distribution of Household Disposable Income by Income Types in Türkiye (% , 2006-2021)	90
Figure 74. Distribution of Labor by Employment Status in Türkiye (% , 2000-2022)	91
Figure 75. Change in Income of Occupational Groups (2012-2021)	92
Figure 76. The Variation Ratio from the Average of Income Increase Rate by Occupational Groups (% , 2012-2021)	92
Figure 77. Ratio of Minimum Wages to Average Income at Main Job (% , 2012-2021)	93
Figure 78. Division of Wealth between the Richest 10% and the Remaining 90% in Türkiye (2000-2020)	94
Figure 79. Economic Growth in the World and Türkiye (%)	96
Figure 80. Per Capita Income in Türkiye (USD, 2000-2021)	96
Figure 81. Poverty Rate Calculated Based on Equivalent Household Disposable Income (Living Below 60% of Median Income, %, 2006-2021)	97
Figure 82. General Unemployment Rates (% , 2006-2021)	97

Tables

Table 1. Persons Seen as Sources of Happiness (%)	63
Table 2. Cities with the highest and least increase in the number of divorces from 2020 to 2021	65
Table 3. Annual Average Income at Main Job of Household Members by Main Occupational Groups (2012-2021)	91
Table 4. Share of Income and Wealth Groups	94

Foreword

İLKE Foundation for Science, Culture, and Education aims to observe the different dimensions of social dynamics on the basis of knowledge and to bring solutions to social problems on the axis of common value and benefit. At Research Center for Social Thought and Policy (TODAM), we carry out our activities from a realistic perspective and constructive approach to social issues important to Türkiye. Thus, we act as a bridge between researchers, decision-makers, and civil society and advance the possibility of enhancing independent knowledge about the social world.

The Field Monitoring Reports we have published since 2020 cover five main areas: society, economy, education, law, and civil society. We adopt a data-based, inclusive, and participatory approach in these annual reports. We aim to bring together the depth of academic research and the dynamism of civil society and turn them into valuable ideas and proposals.

The dynamics that constitute the society must be systematically followed through data and interpreted clearly. In this context, the first report of the Outlook of Society project, which we carried out within TODAM, was published in 2021. The original value of the first report was that it included ten years of retrospective data and focused analyzes on almost every aspect. Along

with the report, we shared hundreds of graphics and analyzes with our users through the Sosyal Veri (Social Data) platform.

In the Outlook of Society 2022 report, we focus on a highly current issue and have developed a comprehensive perspective on the theme of “Post-Pandemic Society.” In the first part, we have depicted the view of society under 16 different categories through significant indicators, graphics, and comparisons. While the medical dimension of the pandemic is withdrawing from our lives, its social dimensions continue to be effective in all areas. For this reason, we decided to discuss what kind of social landscape we are facing in the transition to the post-pandemic period and what we should learn from the pandemic experience. In the second part of the report, we present the articles of experts evaluating the issues of health, family, education, working life, and inequalities from this perspective.

We hope this report will be a timely and multi-layered evaluation of the pandemic process, an unforgettable period in human history, as well as a contribution that includes enlightening findings and recommendations for the future.

Lütfi Sunar

Chairman of ILKE Foundation’s Executive Board
Coordinator of Field Monitoring Reports Project

Introduction



Watch the editor's
interview

Since 2020, all humanity has had a common agenda: the pandemic. The pandemic, referred to as COVID-19 in the literature, has dramatically affected all components of the social world, from economy to family life, and from politics to education. According to the statistics from the World Health Organization, more than 650 million cases were recorded in total, and 6 million 645 thousand people died by the end of 2022. Many aspects of life, from going out to work routines have been disrupted, governments have come up with packages of measures to mitigate economic damage, and millions of children and youth have been denied education. The pandemic, which involved more people than the two great world wars in the last century, has spread to the finest points of daily life.

Scientific research and publications dealing with the pandemic's medical, social and economic dimensions have increased rapidly throughout the process and are still surfacing. How social life will be shaped after the pandemic (post-pandemic or post-covid) is being discussed more and more in the world. The question is simple but challenging: While the pandemic, which changed everything for a while, is slowly ending, will there be an order just like before? Which of our pre-pandemic habits undeniably revealed and pointed out what needs to change? What have we learned from the pandemic, and what should we learn?

In times of great crisis, the probability of revealing the latent tendencies and dynamics in the social structure increases. To the extent that crises disrupt the current social functioning, they reveal what is not working or is working incorrectly. First of all, we have seen that countries' health systems have gone through a difficult test. The initial shock of the pandemic was even more devastating in countries that have already witnessed marketization in terms of health infrastructure and human resources since the 1980s.

In education, the inclination of institutions, measurement and evaluation systems, educators, and families to face-to-face education was insufficient. In working life, the working conditions of manual labor became difficult, and people lost their jobs. Insecure workers,

low-income households, and vulnerable social groups suffered financially. Along with family dynamics, tendencies to marry, have children, and divorce, as well as local cooperation and solidarity forms were tested.

The pandemic showed that a virus that is much more secret than the potentially fatal effect of the coronavirus disease on the human body, the virus of inequality, has taken a firm place in society. In addition to income and life chance inequalities, the intersectional effect of migration, gender, education, and status inequalities has also become evident. A virus is never just a biological thing, it is also a social entity, relationship and influence. The COVID-19 pandemic is not just a medical phenomenon. The reaction of the virus to the existing social structures and dynamics brings with it the task of considering the medical and social aspects together.

One of the common convictions in social science literature is that no phenomenon can be attributed to a single cause. On the contrary, social phenomena should be considered with multiple causes and effects. It is unrealistic to think of the two-year pandemic as the cause of everything. It would not be appropriate to evaluate the pandemic in isolation from other political and economic issues. The pandemic affected the masses living in the metropolises severely because this pandemic took place during the most intense period of urbanization in the history of the world. During the pandemic, the impoverished social classes faced great difficulties in accessing fundamental rights such as food, shelter, and education. In addition, the enormous increase in the profits of the largest global companies is a clear manifestation of the capitalist world system. Again, the pragmatic alliance of some scientists with lockdown policies during the pandemic and the transformation of science into a military surveillance-control discourse point to the deep-rooted problems in the hierarchical relationship of scientific knowledge with public benefit. Uncontested rise of pharmaceutical and vaccine companies, fed by structural inequalities between Global North and Global South, is also part of this problem.

The two macro dynamics that are intertwined with the pandemic were the rise in global inflation from mid-2021 and Russia's operation to invade Ukraine in February 2022. It can be said that the second event accelerated the first process. Food supply chains, energy costs, and regional tensions started running negatively at this point. In the case of Türkiye, the current economic policy is going through an extended test: The exchange rate of USD, which has been on the rise since 2018, increased very rapidly in late 2021. As a result, foreign investments decreased, and the current account deficit rose. For now, devastating outcomes such as the bankruptcy of 24 banks, the bankruptcy of thousands of businesses, and the borrowing of loans from the IMF with high interest, as it was in the 2001 crisis, is not on the table. However, it is clear that economic problems are intertwined with the pandemic's social and psychological cumulative effects, creating anxiety and uncertainty throughout society.

Uncertainty has become one of the most accurate words to describe this pandemic experience. People have remained in the shadow of this uncertainty in their educational preferences, their plans to move, their intention to get a job, their tendency to marry and have children, and their relationships with their close circles. The uncertainty of the possibility of catching a disease while meeting with a friend after months, the uncertainty of the possibility of accessing food products a week later, and the uncertain possibility of losing home with the melting purchasing power were intertwined. It would be an ambitious task to predict precisely where the pandemic's medical, economic, social and political consequences will lead in the long term. However, it is possible, rather obligatory, to assess the situation despite the uncertainty.

In this context, The Outlook of Society 2022 report carries the theme of "Post-Pandemic Society." We have scanned and compiled data from national and international sources in the first part of the report. Comparisons through figures and tables have been presented. We have created 16 different categories: Demography, Household, Family, Social Groups, Education, Economy, Labor and Employment, Work and Professions, Welfare and Inequality, Health, Law, Cities, Rural Areas, Migration, Life and Culture, Media and Communication. We have evaluated the prominent indicators under these topics, each of which is a separate research field, with short analyzes. Thus, we have furthered the agenda of the first Outlook of Society report, published in 2021. We have also updated the last two years' data. Dur-

ing the preparation of the report, we held a perspective development meeting with experts from different fields to determine which dimensions should be emphasized in the context of the post-pandemic society, and we included the outcomes of the meeting in the analyzes.

The second part of the report includes comprehensive analyzes written by experts under the theme of "Post-Pandemic Society." In his analysis titled "Healthquake of the 21st Century: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Lessons Learned", Dr. Abdullah Uçar examines the dimensions of health systems in being unprepared for the pandemic, governance of pandemic and infodemic. An important lesson from the pandemic experience is that medical branches and social sciences need to talk to each other more. In his analysis titled "Pandemic and Family: Old Trends, New Challenges," Prof. Mahmut Hakkı Akın evaluates family dynamics, children's socialization difficulties, and marriage and divorce tendencies during the lockdown period. Assoc. Prof. Taner Atmaca discusses education, one of the most talked-about topics during the pandemic, in his article titled "Education after the Pandemic: Opportunities, Risks, and Inequalities." Learning at home, digital tools, and the main challenges posed by the pandemic to education systems, especially disadvantaged groups in accessing education, are among the critical topics of his analysis. In the analysis of "Work and Professions in the Pandemic," Dr. Elyesa Koytak examines how the increase of wage earners in labor markets has expanded exponentially during the pandemic and how established hierarchies between professions are manifested. Lastly, Prof. Lütfi Sunar analyzes how the distribution of income and wealth was shaped before and during the pandemic in his article titled "Socio-Economic Inequalities in Türkiye."

There is still more research waiting to be done about the post-pandemic society. City life, urban transportation, housing sector, community relations, use and misuse of urban spaces, and local government services to take precautions against crises are issues that deserve to be evaluated on their own. Hopefully, this report will serve as a basis for a discussion of the post-pandemic society issues by policy makers, experts and researchers, non-governmental organizations, employers and professional organizations, and the wider society.

Key Findings

Türkiye's population growth rate is declining. The tendency of couples to have children is decreasing, and life expectancy is improving. As a result, Türkiye is transitioning to a demographic structure that is not getting younger but gradually aging. The median age rose to over 33 in 2022. Considering that the share of urban population is over 90%, it is necessary to see that the social, economic, and cultural needs of middle-aged and older people who are concentrated in big cities are now diversifying.

Family structure is slowly changing. While the proportion of households consisting of five or more people is gradually decreasing, the proportion of families composed of a lone-parent and children is increasing. This is a dynamic that can change traditional patterns of relationships, values, and habits. Although the family is a strong and established norm in the society, we are entering a period of uncertainty about the economic, moral and cultural roles expected of the family, especially with urbanization and increased participation in employment.

The child's position in the family and people's perspectives on the child is changing. The number of children in Türkiye has been around 22 million and 700 thousand since 2010. Although there is a significant decrease in infant and child deaths thanks to the recent expansion of health services, the child population rate decreased to the lowest in the history of the Republic in 2021. Therefore, the social meaning of the child is changing. The child is no longer the labor force that will guarantee the continuation of the family lineage and will work in agriculture but an actor who is expected to advance the family's economic and cultural capital and embody the search for social status within urban life. This requires reconsidering issues related to children, especially education.

Women's participation in education and employment is increasing. The late but rapid expansion of higher education in the last two decades has made it much more possible for the younger generation of women

to access education. This has also raised expectations for work and employment. The age at first marriage and the age at first childbearing among women are rising. Since family and work are two central social institutions, women are exposed to role conflicts between these institutions. The invisible labor requires regulating these social institutions on the axis of justice and welfare. However, problems persist regarding the active participation of women in education and work, income equality with men, and fair competition in career and promotion processes.

Access to education by large strata of society is increasing rapidly. Participation at all levels of education has increased over the past decade. Pre-school educational institutions quickly expanded, indicating a change in the social meaning of the child. Net enrollment rates at secondary and tertiary levels have continued to increase. A more serious expansion is happening in higher education. Türkiye, which did not differ from the world average until the 2000s in terms of gross enrollment rate at this level, yet surpassed both OECD and EU averages in the 2010s. Therefore, the quality of trainers and instructors, adequacy of tools and infrastructure, minimum quality of learning outcomes, and skill development have become critical issues at all levels of education.

The purchasing power is waning. In the current inflation environment, the purchasing power of households for their basic needs, such as food and clothing, is waning. Moreover, the fact that the long-term goals of the middle classes, such as home and car ownership become unrealistic deepens uncertainty, anxiety, and pessimism. While the high level of indirect taxes renders the informal economy unresolved, it causes also consumption inequality for large strata with lower incomes. The increase in exports and imports should be transformed into social welfare and spread to the lower social strata. The inflation rate was recorded as 85% in November 2022 according to TURKSTAT data. However wages are not increasing at the same rate.

The number of wage earners is increasing. Working life in Türkiye is not like forty years ago, which was a world dominated by self-employed tradespeople, craftsmen, and agricultural activities. Intertwined with urbanization, the share of the service sector in employment is 55% now. Moreover, 7 out of 10 employees are wage earners today. It means that, on the one hand, the low-level jobs in the service sector have increased considerably. On the other hand, due to the weakening of unionization, waged labor has shifted to a more fragile and passive status.

GDP per capita is below the world average. GDP per capita in Türkiye has been below the world average since 2017. While the world average was 12,000 dollars in 2021, it was 9500 dollars in Türkiye. It is due to the current account deficit and the slower growth rate. The external debt stock of both the public and private sectors is increasing. The ratio of public external debt to GDP has exceeded 20%. As of September 2022, the banks' total net interest income increased by 216% compared to the previous year and reached 497 billion Turkish liras (25 billion USD). Therefore, it is observed that a successful path has not been followed in spreading welfare to large segments of society in an egalitarian manner.

The share of labor in GDP is declining. According to TURKSTAT data, the percentage of labor payments in GDP decreased to 29% in 2020 and 27% in 2021 during the pandemic process. It fell to 23% in the first two quarters of 2022. Contrarily, the net operating surplus increased. Therefore, increase of wage earners in employment also means loss of income. Employers' income at main job, on the other hand, is rising. The number of poor population has been over 17 million for the last three years. The poverty line of 24,185 Turkish lira is more than an university professor's monthly salary. Household spendings and debts for basic needs increase faster than household income.

In the service sector, both low-skilled and professional occupations are becoming crowded. Service and sales staff such as cashiers, clerks, and waiters, which cover the low-level unskilled jobs of the service sector, accounted for 12% of employment in 2010, now 18% in 2021. Its total rate is 33%, including "unskilled workers" in all sectors. The young population that has just come to the employment

is getting crowded within low-level jobs. Besides, the rate of professional occupations in the employment increased from 7% in 2010 to 12% in 2021. With the rise of educational capital throughout society, we have a more competitive world on the one hand. On the other hand, young generations are more compelled to jobs with low wages and incompatible with the education they receive.

The tension between the increasing demand and work capacity of health system is growing. Although the reforms implemented since 2003 have made it possible for almost everyone to access essential health services, the system's structural problems are at the point of blockage. The health services' infrastructure is not in bad shape, as seen in the pandemic. However, there is a significant asymmetry between the number of consultations to a physician per person and per year and the number of physicians per capita. Türkiye needs more healthcare professionals, primarily physicians. Still, this need deepens in the division of labor in the organization of healthcare services, planning, hospital structure, supply of materials and medical drugs, information and trust governance, more importantly than numerical size. The increase in violence and complaints regarding health services during the pandemic is the alarm of this blockage.

The workload and social expectations from the legal system are increasing. Türkiye is a country where the legal system has expanded like never before, and has become the scene of social demands. In 2021, the number of new cases brought to the courts of first instance exceeded 8 million. However, the work capacity of judicial professionals is far below this demand. As a result, investigation and decision-making times have increased in recent years. Although mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation, and online trial have a positive effect, they are not at the desired level overall. In the current context, where social relations are rationalized and economic transactions are increasing, the fact that social disputes are brought to the judiciary more and more brings the issue of the social efficiency of the judiciary. It is of course intertwined with the problem of trust in the judiciary.

Especially in large cities, the housing market is evolving into a compelling structure. Although housing has been defined as a constitutional right, it is difficult for households to their own houses due to the fluctuations in the construction sector and the decline in purchasing power. The rate of tenants across the country had decreased to 20% ten years ago, and it increased to 27% by 2021. Due to the rising rent and sales prices, low-income groups' life opportunities and expectations, especially in big cities, are severely damaged. Access to livable housing suitable for a family and resistant to disasters such as earthquakes is an issue at the center of social inequalities in this sense. The housing problem includes vital dimensions such as access to urban resources, proximity to educational opportunities, and more advantageous participation in employment for the lower and middle classes.

The aging is rising in the rural areas. The proportion of the elderly in the rural population approached to 20%. It is predicted that the number of young people in the rural population will gradually decrease due to the scarcity of education and employment opportunities. The increase in the elderly population in rural areas means increased demand for health, care, cooperation, and socialization resources. However, to what extent these resources are organized in terms of infrastructure and staff in rural settlements and to what extent they are harmonized according to the citizens' demands is highly doubtful. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the need for active aging and aging in place in the rural context.

Migration between cities continues. Türkiye is a country where internal migration from small villages to provincial and district centers, or to big city centers, is still happening. The two main motivations behind internal migration are education and work, as well as the highly asymmetrical distribution of regional economic and social resources, turning the direction of internal migration to metropolises in the west. However, the net migration rate in Istanbul has been negative in recent years. In other words, there are more emigrants from Istanbul than immigrants in Istanbul. It is a direct result of the increase in prices in the housing market and the difficult living conditions due to the effect of the pandemic.

The issue of integration of Syrian refugees continues. As of 2021, there are 3 million 650 thousand Syrians living under temporary protection in Türkiye. It is not difficult to estimate that the real number of refugees is higher when we take into account those who come from other countries and those who are not registered. As the proportion of the Syrian population increases, we see that it becomes the material of political tension and a sensitive issue in the short term with the rising nationalism. In particular, the density of the child, youth, and female population among Syrians requires long-term planning regarding education, socialization, and participation in employment.

Access to cultural goods and services is in a contradictory situation. On the one hand, the number of public libraries and the number of users is increasing in Türkiye, and on the other hand, book prices are rising. It is related to the decline of individual purchasing power as the public resources of access to books expand and the crisis that the publishing sector has entered in the current economic situation. In addition, cultural sectors such as theatre and cinema took a significant damage during the pandemic. However, the number of TV series and movies released online increased in 2022. Considering that the young student population is high, Türkiye needs to adopt an approach to expand access to cultural resources and products as much as possible.

As the digital infrastructure expands, the use of social media and the intensity of communication increase. As of 2021, the number of mobile subscriptions is over 86 million. People of all ages are increasingly using fiber internet and smartphones. In addition, the net income of information and communication technology companies is increasing rapidly. However, it is clear that strict control is required on the quality of the service provided, the protection of customer rights, and pricing. The average internet speed in Türkiye is below the world average. On the other hand, consumption goods such as clothing and food are mainly carried out from online platforms during the pandemic process. This situation shows that the society is on the verge of an essential transformation in shopping habits.

Policy Recommendations

Aging as a social phenomenon should be included in the main social policy agenda. The fact that the demographic structure becoming more middle-aged will deepen the need for active, healthy, and in-place aging both in rural and urban areas. Therefore, the possibilities and inclination of the elderly population to use urban spaces should be considered on a multidimensional level. In addition, the social security system, elderly care, health services, and working life need to be revised in line with this demographic transition.

Households' income and living conditions should be carefully monitored, and detailed support programs should be prepared. The direct tax burden on households whose livelihood is dependent on the work of one person and who have incomes at the minimum wage level deepens the loss of welfare in times of crisis. Therefore, reducing household debts and providing housing and transportation rights at minimum standards, especially in big city centers, should be at the center of every economic policy. In addition, household types should be evaluated regarding the number of people and the potential for participation in education and employment and nurturing social relations opportunities.

The effect of social inequalities on the socialization of children should be prevented. While the average number of children is decreasing and most of the families with children live in metropolitan centers, the effect of the economic and cultural capital of the family is reflected on the children as both a burden of expectations and an inequality. Therefore, urban planning, educational institutions, local relations, and institutional services must ensure that children grow up in healthy, safe, and qualified socialization. In addition, it is essential to establish environments focused on skill development, increasing the belief that social life operates on the axis of justice and merit and facilitating peer learning.

There are rising challenges at all levels of education. While preschool education is expanding rapidly, it is questionable to what extent the educators, administrators, environmental conditions and content of these institutions are subject to quality, standards and supervision in accordance with the best interests of the child. New hierarchies are emerging among private schools, which have become widespread at all levels of education, from primary to high school. The regional differences in the ratio of students per classroom and teacher in public schools should be reduced. The loss of faith in the education system due to working and making a living, especially at the high school level, and the multiple causes of dropout should be explored and be the subject of policies that are not just about inner dimensions of school.

The standard quality and permanent efficiency of higher education programs should be improved. All over the world, the phenomenon of higher education is now being discussed in terms of employability, skill development, and skill matching. As educational capital increases in Türkiye, the vertical social mobility and career prospects expected from a degree are likely to remain unfulfilled due to the insufficient expansion of existing employment markets. What skills higher education programs develop and what they can offer, especially to new generations from disadvantaged social backgrounds, makes detailed supervision and planning essential. It requires attention that the issue is not the number of universities or graduates but the closedness of the employment markets for the new labor force and unequal stratification within the professional worlds.

Active employment policies should include higher education graduates. Türkiye has witnessed a late but rapid increase in the labor force with higher education graduates in the last decade. One side of the issue is related to the content

of the education given at the university, and the other side is how prepared the employment markets are for this expansion. We see that the rate of higher education graduates has increased among unemployed groups in İSKUR records, but the employment rate remains low. For this reason, particular employment policies are required to determine which jobs will be more productive for the young labor force from different fields of higher education.

Income and wealth inequality should be considered of prime importance. Studies need to focus on how income and wealth inequality shapes the social structure. Social protection payments and assistance activities of official institutions and NGOs can save more than 17 million poor population from misery during the crisis period. However, it is necessary to think multi-dimensionally to eliminate structural inequalities. Impoverishment also creates a cycle of poverty by intertwining with violence, crime, exclusion from education, inability to participate in employment, and working in informal jobs. It is essential to monitor inequalities in Türkiye's increasingly stratified social structure from a scientific perspective.


The internal structure of health services should be planned according to the long-term public benefit. The workload of healthcare professionals, especially physicians, has increased during the pandemic. We have seen that some medical branches and units entered into a very tiring work schedule. Türkiye now needs to plan which region needs how many specialist physicians from each branch with data-based projections. Healthcare workers' working conditions, wage gap and division of labor need to be regulated within the framework of public benefit and equity. However, there is a need for large-scale projects on health literacy, health rights, and responsibilities so that the citizens have minimum knowledge and confidence about medical knowledge and processes. In addition, basic indicators such as wage structure and specialization distribution of the medical profession should be systematically recorded and presented, starting with the ratio of female physicians, which is not included in the annual statistics of the Ministry of Health.

The legal services market and the functioning of the judiciary must keep pace with societal needs. Legal profession is undergoing a significant transformation in Türkiye. The profession is stratified

in terms of wages and working conditions. Professional skills and relationships with clients are also diversifying. In this sense, it is necessary to realize the corrosive effects of marketization and proletarianization dynamics within the legal profession so that citizens can access the services they need. The negative impact of prolonged judicial proceedings on the pursuit of rights, the acute situation of enforcement offices, and the regional and social distribution of crime types require special regulations. There is a need for reforms in law and health on the axis of common knowledge and trust between institutions and society.


Special research committees should be established on violence and crime, and application-oriented projects should be developed. Children driven to crime, violence against women, and the crime cycle that young people excluded from education fall into are the unchanging realities of Türkiye waiting for a solution. It is clear that crime and violence increase in times of economic crisis and uncertainty. Therefore, the deterrent effect of judicial decisions, protective institutions, and preventive mechanisms should be designed in cooperation with civil society. In addition, the fundamental rights and freedoms of children and women, especially the right to a decent life, should be firmly ensured. There is a need for research that will encompass multiple factors, such as family, education, and employment, rather than explaining violence with psychological and political causality.

The housing market should be regulated on the basis of that housing is a constitutional right. Housing loan campaign for first home buyers initiated by TOKİ in 2022, received more than 8 million applications. It shows that the demand from lower and middle-income groups living in city centers to having their own houses is increasing. Therefore, housing loan applications, mass housing planning, and the construction sector must be regulated by considering the public benefit. Furthermore, housing policies need to be formed based on data by researching the purchasing power variations and the types of needs within and between the cities. Otherwise, the right to housing can become a crisis in which social inequalities are experienced most concretely, continuously, and tensely.



TÜRKİYE

AT A GLANCE



Demography

The demographic structure of a country is a key indicator for understanding its social change and determining policies at country level. By the end of 2021, the total population of Türkiye had reached 84 million 680 thousand. The population growth rate, which started to decline in the 1980s, was 15.9 per thousand in 2010, and this rate decreased to 12.7 per thousand in 2021. The lowest population growth rate was recorded as 5.5 per thousand in 2020.

The number of births in Türkiye is gradually decreasing. Similarly, the fertility rate, the average number of children a woman can give birth to in the 15-49 age group, which is considered as the fertile period, decreased from 2.08 in 2010 to 1.7 as of 2021. This number is the lowest level in recent history and is below 2.1, accepted as the population replacement rate in the literature. Changing living and working conditions have a significant impact on this. Women began to become mothers at later ages. The average age of mothers giving birth has now risen to 29.1. The fact that more women attend education, especially higher education, is effective in this result.

It is essential to carefully monitor infant deaths and deaths under the age of five by primary healthcare institutions and to reduce child mortality. While the infant mortality rate was 12 per thousand in 2010, it decreased to 9.1 per thousand in 2021. The child mortality rate also shows a similar decrease. All these indicators can be accepted as indicators of the right strategies followed in health services in Türkiye, as well as the positive global progress in the health sector.

The number of deaths and deaths per thousand people (crude death rate) have been increasing since 2010. On the other hand, life expectancy at birth has increased by 3.4 years since 2010. This period is longer among women than men. Similarly, life expectancy increased in individuals aged more than 60 years. Therefore, it is observed that life expectancy at birth in Türkiye is above the world average. In parallel, the median age has increased from 29.2 to 33.1 since 2010. This indicates that although the society has a young population, it gradually evolves into a middle-aged structure.

The increase in the dependent elderly population, which is an important social issue, is remarkable. There is a steady increase in the elderly dependency ratio. In the next quarter century, Türkiye will be in the category of “very old countries.” This reminds us that new plans and strategies in the social security system are of vital importance. If the demographic transition is not managed in line with these predictions, the burden and cost of the social security system will increase considerably. In this respect, it is vital to structure public and private services according to the possible needs and demands of elderly citizens regarding care, socialization, work, and daily life.

While the rate of the population living in urban and district centers was 76% in 2010, it is over 93% in 2021. With the pandemic, the observations about the tendency of people to move away from the city centers and settle in the peripheries and rural areas have increased. If similar population growth continues in small settlements, problems will inevitably arise in many aspects, such as infrastructure, roads, sewerage, health, and education. In addition, although it is likely to stimulate the local economy in the first stage, the possible new competitive environment may harm the local relations in the long run.

Although it is a fact that most of the population did not continue their education after high school, there is a significant change in this situation. While there is no substantial change in the ratio of high school graduates, the percentage of pre-high school and higher education graduates differs inversely. The rate of the population who graduated from higher education, which was 11.5% in 2010, increased to 23% by 2021. On the other hand, the rate of the population who did not have a high school degree, which was 70% in 2010, decreased to 54.4% in 2021. This change is a vital indicator of the increase in the education level of the labor force thanks to the expansion of higher education nationwide and its accessibility to large public strata.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Total Population (Million people)	73,7	74,7	75,6	76,6	77,7	78,7	79,8	80,8	82,1	83,2	83,6	84,7	
Population Growth Rate (%)	15.9	13.5	12.1	13.7	13.3	13.4	13.6	12.4	14.7	13.9	5.5	12.7	
Fertility Rate	2.08	2.05	2.11	2.11	2.19	2.16	2.12	2.08	2.01	1.88	1.76	1.70	
Number of Births (Million people)	1,26	1,26	1,29	1,31	1,35	1,34	1,32	1,31	1,26	1,19	1,12	1,08	
Crude Birth Rate (‰)	17.2	16.9	17.2	17.1	17.5	17.1	16.6	16.2	15.4	14.4	13.4	12.8	
Average Age of Mothers Giving Birth	27.7	27.8	28.1	28.3	28.4	28.5	28.6	28.7	28.9	28.9	29.1	29.1	
Average Age Mothers at First Birth							25.9	26.1	26.2	26.4	26.5	26.7	
Number of Deaths (Thousand)	367	376	377	373	391	406	423	427	426	436			
Crude Death Rate (‰)	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.3			
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)	74.5	74.9	75.4	75.8	76.2	76.5	76.9	77.2	77.4	77.7	77.9		
Life Expectancy of Individuals Aged 60 (Years)				21,9	21,9	21,8	21,8	21,7	21,9	22,1			
Median Age	29.2	29.7	30.1	30.4	30.7	31.0	31.4	31.7	32.0	32.4	32.8	33.1	
Elderly Dependency Ratio (+65) (%)	10.8	10.9	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.2	12.3	12.6	12.9	13.4	14.1	14.4	
Rate of Population in Urban/District Centers (%)	76.3	76.8	77.3	91.4	91.8	92.1	92.3	92.5	92.3	92.8	92.9	93.2	

Sources: TURKSTAT Address Based Population Registration System, Birth Statistics, Death Statistics, Elderly Statistics, General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, World Bank

Note: Since the death statistics of TURKSTAT for the years 2020 and 2021 were not published yet as of 12/22, relevant data could not be included here.




Figure 1. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate (‰, 2010-2019)

Source: TURKSTAT, Death and Causes of Death Statistics




Figure 2. Population Ratio by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, National Education Statistics Database

Household

The total number of households in Türkiye have reached 25.3 million. As of 2021, 3.2 people live together in an average household. Although this rate is still high compared to European countries, it has been on a decreasing trend since 2010. In other words, the rate of sharing the same house is slowly decreasing in Türkiye.

The proportion of single-person households increased from 7.5% in 2010 to 18.9% by 2021. This is a rapid increase. Remarkably, about 19 out of every 100 people in Türkiye live alone; this rate increases by about 1 point yearly. Living alone's dynamics, needs, and problems may differ in urban centers and rural areas. On the other hand, while the rate of crowded households consisting of five or more people was 21% in 2019 and 2020, this rate decreased to 20.39% in 2021. Now family planning is shaped by the participation of more people in education and working life. This transformation in household size also affects traditional relationships, values, and habits.

In this context, it is necessary to observe how the dynamics of the family structure affect the household structure. The proportion of nuclear families consisting of a parent and children is increasing steadily. In 2021, the rate of nuclear families of lone parents and children increased to over 10%, an increase of 3.93 compared to the previous year. There is a transition from the extended family to the nuclear family, and the ratio of lone-parent families has increased within the nuclear family category. On the other hand, the rate of couples without children has been around 13% for the last three years. In addition, the age to have children is increasing.

Household is also an economic unit. Household members in Türkiye primarily share their financial income and expenses. The direct tax burden on households whose income depends on the work of a single person, especially those with an income at the minimum wage level, increases the household's welfare loss. In 2021, the annual average household disposable income increased by 10.64% compared to the previous year and reached 76,730 TRY (3950 USD). This increase is not surprising considering that wages have increased this year with

the severe rise in inflation and that minimum wage earners are exempted from some taxes.

When the average monthly expenditure per household is calculated with fixed prices, there is a decrease of 2.91 in 2019 compared to the previous year. In 2019, the average monthly expenditure per household was 2121 TRY (109 USD). A similar decline is observed in the ratio of household debt to disposable income. As of 2021, ratio of household debt to disposable income is 43%. Therefore, low household debts will prevent impoverishment and the deepening of the social problems in times of economic crisis.

The phenomenon of debt has many components. However, housing, vehicle, and consumer loans can be examples of debt's most dominant components. The loan ratio among household liabilities has consistently been above 95% since 2015. The number of people using loans increased significantly in 2019 and 2020. In 2019, there was an increase of more than 3 million compared to the previous year. In 2020, it increased to 16 million 440 thousand people, an increase of about a quarter compared with the year earlier. The fact that this level remained the same in 2021 indicates the possibility that households whose economic problems have increased due to the pandemic are taking loans. On the other hand, the fact that this increase started in 2019 indicates that the economic trend has structurally led to using credit cards.

The level of satisfaction with household income is a significant indicator. The evolution of these rates since 2010 is fascinating. While the total ratio of satisfied and very satisfied with their household income had been rising until 2016-17, it is clear that this ratio has declined in the last five years. The proportion of completely dissatisfied with their household income almost doubled from 2016 to 2021. The year in which the total rate of dissatisfied and completely dissatisfied was the lowest was 2016. While it was around 32% in 2016, it increased to 43% in 2021. These indicators show that households are in an increasingly challenging economic cycle.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Total Number of Households (Million Household)	19.3	19.7	20.2	20.5	21.1	21.7	22.2	22.7	23.2	24.1	24.6	25.3	
Average Household Size	3.84	3.76	3.69	3.63	3.57	3.52	3.48	3.45	3.41	3.35	3.31	3.23	
Proportion of Single-Person Households (%)	7.5	7.9	8.6	8.9	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.4	16.1	16.9	17.9	18.9	
Proportion of Crowded (Five People and Over) Households (%)	26.4	26.1	24.3	23.5	24.8	24.1	23.6	23.1	22.7	21.9	21.5	20.4	
Proportion of Nuclear Families of Single Parents and Children (%)	5.5	5.9	6.3	6.3	7.6	7.8	8.9	8.5	8.9	9.2	9.7	10.1	
Proportion of Nuclear Families Without Children (%)	14.4	15.1	15.3	16.3	14.1	14.3	14.2	14.2	14.1	13.9	13.5	13.5	
Annual Household Average Disposable Income (Thousand TRY)	22.1	24.3	26.6	29.5	32.1	36.1	41.4	46.1	51.4	59.9	69.4	76.7	
Ratio of Household Debt to GDP (%)	17.3	19.1	19.9	20.1	19.2	20.1	17.1	17.3	14.8	15.2	17.4	15.1	
Ratio of Household Debt to Disposable Income (%)	41.2	51.7	48.1	53.1		52.1	48	44	43	45	52	43	
Ratio of Loans Among Household Liabilities (%)						97	96.0	96.2	95.6	96.6	97.1	96.5	
Number of People Using Credit (Million People)	8	9	9	11,2	10,7	10,5	10	10,8	9,6	13,2	16,4	16	

Sources: TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey, Statistics on Family, TCMB Financial Account Reports, The Banks Association of Türkiye




Figure 3. Level of Satisfaction with Household Income (% , 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Life Satisfaction Survey 2021




Figure 4. Rate of Loans (% , 2015-2021)

Source: The Banks Association of Türkiye, Consumer and Housing Loans

Family

It is frequently emphasized that the most critical change in Türkiye due to modernization and rapid urbanization has occurred in the family structure. Although the spread of education, the expansion of higher education, and rising living standards have significant effects on the family structure, it would be too quick to interpret this change as deterioration and corruption because the changes on the surface may prevent seeing the ongoing continuities and structures in the deep. For example, the rate of married people in the total population has not changed significantly in the last 11 years and is around 47%. This indicates that the marriage as a social institution still has a firm place in the social structure.

On the other hand, it is necessary to follow the dynamics of slow but meaningful change. For example, the average age at first marriage of women tends to rise. While this age was 23.7 in 2010, it increased to 25.4 by 2021. Similarly, although the average age at first marriage for men has increased, this increase is not as rapid as for women. In particular, the spread of access to higher education to the lower social classes extended the course of education overall. It also increased the proportion of women in the number of students enrolled in higher education. In addition, as women's participation in working life increased, the age at first marriage and the average age at marriage increased. While the average age at marriage was 24.9 for women in 2010, it was 28.9 for men. In 2021, this rate increased to 27.4 for women and 30.6 for men.

The proportion of households with children has been decreasing over the years. While 45.71% of households had children in 2014, this rate dropped to 40.82% in 2021. When the TURKSTAT data showing the distribution of these households by province were examined, it is observed that the province with the highest proportion of households with at least one child in the 0-17 age group is Şanlıurfa, with 71.6%, while the provinces with the lowest ratio are Sinop and Tunceli, with 30%. In other words, regional differentiation is still effective for households with children. Even if the fertility rate shows a decreasing trend, it can be said that the child population is still high. The presence of children in the household also has an integrating effect on marriage, work, and social life.

The established social place of marriage also manifests itself in the level of marital satisfaction. In the last 11 years, the total rate of those who are satisfied and very satisfied with their marriage is consistently over 90%. Moreover, while satisfaction with marriage decreased in 2020 with the possible effect of the pandemic, it rose again in 2021. The rate of those dissatisfied with their marriage or not at all has never exceeded 3.5%. However, it is seen

that women are less satisfied with marriage than men. As of 2021, while the rate of men who are not satisfied with their marriage and not at all is 1.5%, this rate has doubled to 3% for women. Therefore, it is essential to determine the factors that weaken women's satisfaction in the division of labor within the household and the distribution of roles within the family.

The common social opinion about divorce in Türkiye is negative. However, it is possible to say that this opinion has weakened with the increase in women's participation in public life and their inclusion in education and employment. In this context, it is seen that there has been an increase in divorce cases over the years. While 247 thousand divorce cases were filed in 2020, this number increased to 280 thousand in 2021. A parallel increase was also observed in the number of divorces. In 2020, the number of divorces decreased due to the interruption in legal proceedings due to the pandemic's effect and the increase in couples' tendency to cooperate. However, with a serious increase in 2021, 174 thousand 90 couples got divorced. Therefore, while the pandemic reminds us of the importance of the family as an institution, it seems that the relationships between couples have gone through a tough challenge. To better measure the impact of the pandemic on family structure and marriage patterns, it will be necessary to wait for the coming years.

Custody is the most prominent issue in divorces. It is known that mothers were given custody of the children in general. The number of divorced persons given custody in Türkiye has increased. In 2010, 64 thousand 560 people were divorced by giving custody. In 2021, this number exceeded 107 thousand. The number of children given custody increased by 72.10% compared to 2010 and reached 165 thousand 900. It is known that the relations of divorced couples with their children are difficult and painful for both adults and children within the framework of the current legal regulation. In this context, seeking new solutions regarding the place, routine, and quality of divorced couples' relationships with their children is vital.

The absence of regular and reliable data on violence against women and femicide is a serious neglect. According to the Family Structure Survey conducted in 2016, 36.4% of women and 2.5% of men mention beating/maltreatment as the reasons for divorce. This difference is extremely important. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that the side of domestic violence against women in ongoing marriages is the invisible part of the iceberg.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Number of Marriages (Thousand)	583	593	604	600	599	603	595	569	554	542	488	562	
Average Age at First Marriage for Women	23.7	23.8	23.9	24.1	24.2	24.4	24.5	24.6	24.8	25.1	25.1	25.4	
Average Age at First Marriage for Men	26.9	27.1	27.2	27.3	27.3	27.5	27.6	27.7	27.8	27.9	27.9	28.1	
Average Age of Marriage for Women	24.9	25.2	25.4	25.5	25.6	25.8	26.1	26.2	26.5	26.9	27.1	27.4	
Average Age of Marriage for Men	28.9	29.1	29.3	29.4	29.4	29.6	29.8	29.9	30.2	30.3	30.4	30.6	
Proportion of Married in Total Population (%)	47.61	47.73	47.85	47.87	47.92	47.91	47.89	47.85	47.63	47.38	47.29	46.94	
Proportion of Households with Children (%)					45.7	44.8	43.9	43.4	42.3	41.9	42.1	40.8	
Those Who Are Satisfied and Very Satisfied with Marriage (%)	92.7	93.5	92.5	93.9	93.7	93.4	93.6	93.1	93.1	92.1	90.2	92.1	
Number of Divorces in Marriages Lasting Less than One Year (Thousand)	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.4	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.1	4.2	4.1	3.0	3.9	
Number of Divorced Persons Given Custody (Thousand)	65	67	69	70	73	75	72	73	84	93	83	108	
Number of Children Given to Custody (Thousand)	96	99	101	102	107	110	107	108	126	141	126	166	

Sources: TURKSTAT Address Based Population Registration System, Family Structure Statistics, Life Satisfaction Survey, Marriage and Divorce Statistics




Figure 5. Number of Divorce Cases Filed and Number of Divorced Couples (Thousand, 2010-2021)

Source: Ministry of Justice Forensic Statistics 2021 & TURKSTAT Divorce Statistics 2021




Figure 6. Rate of Dissatisfaction with Marriage by Gender (% , 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Life Satisfaction Survey 2021

Social Groups

It is necessary to follow the course of children, youth, women, and the elderly as the main socio-demographic groups to describe the outlook of society. The multidimensional changes of these groups, sometimes on their own and sometimes in intertwined matters, are both influenced by and affect the economic and political structures.

The number of children is not increasing in Türkiye. Undoubtedly, the increasing participation of women and the adult population in education and employment has a role in this. By 2021, the proportion of children in the population dropped below 27%, reaching the lowest rate in the Republican era. The meaning of the child for families also changes since child deaths are extremely low. Especially families living in urban centers prefer to have fewer children as they prioritize making financial and social investments in certain subjects, especially education. The child is no longer seen simply as someone who will ensure the continuity of the generation or become an unpaid family worker in agricultural production. The child is the person who will carry the economic and cultural capital of the family higher and carry the parents' search for social status.

The number of young people aged 15-24 is similarly stable. Although there has been a slight increase in the last five years, it is tough to say that the young population ratio in Türkiye will rise above 16% again in the future. On the other hand, youth continues to constitute the first issue of cultural and political debate. It can be said that Türkiye is a society very prone to pretending to think about its youth. Although the term "Generation Z" attributed to young people is a highly flimsy and unscientific expression, it spreads as a collective symptom of the enthusiasm for thinking, interpreting, and labeling youth. The truth is that young people in Türkiye want to establish a unique relationship with many fields, from religion to finance, education to politics. It has been revealed that this unique and new search for relationships stems from being a rapidly transforming society in all respects.

A vital indicator in the issue of youth, of course, emerges at the intersection of employment and education. About a third of young people are employed. Due to the compulsory high school education and the expansion of higher education, the duration of education in this age group is getting longer. However, the critical phenomenon is the proportion of the 15-29 age group who are neither in education nor employment. Türkiye is a country with a very high rate of NEET: while the

OECD average is 14.5%, it is 28.8% in 2021 in Türkiye. In other words, in the most dynamic group of the population aged 15-29, approximately 3 out of every ten people cannot find opportunities to participate in the production and cannot benefit from social integration channels. Therefore, instead of manipulations on youth at the cultural and symbolic level, it is necessary to review the structural conditions in the education and work sectors openly to the qualified participation, benefit, and contribution of the youth.

Although Türkiye lags behind OECD countries in data such as female employment rate and female parliamentary ratio, it is clear that women are increasingly involved in social life. We see that the female employment rate is rising, even if it is relatively low. Moreover, more women are now entering the labor force, graduating from high school and higher education. This means that the historical gap between men and women will likely close in the short run. In addition, we see that the proportion of women in managerial positions has increased, even slightly. As of 2020, we see that there are 114 women for every 100 men among those enrolled in associate and undergraduate programs of universities. However, it is not difficult to say that the disadvantages faced by women in terms of wages, personal rights, autonomy, and social opportunities reproduce themselves structurally, no matter how close their qualifications and skill levels are. In this sense, it is necessary to closely follow the layered dynamics and obstacles of feminization in every profession and every sector, especially in the most skilled professional jobs.

Türkiye is now an aging society. Contrary to the number of children and young people, the number of older people is rising. Therefore, the proportion of elderly dependent on the active population is also increasing. Moreover, there is an increase in the ratio of elderly poor people. At the intersection of femininity and old age, we see that poor older women have a higher rate. The increase in the proportion of the elderly in both urban and rural populations requires a comprehensive approach to providing basic social rights and needs. Although the number of nursing homes affiliated with the Ministry of Family and the number of older people staying in nursing homes have increased, it is essential to examine and supervise elderly care as a sector and to establish decent standards.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Child Population Ratio (%)	30.8	30.4	30.0	29.7	29.4	29.1	28.7	28.3	28.0	27.5	27.2	26.9	
Child Dependency Ratio (%)	38.1	37.5	36.9	36.3	35.8	35.4	34.9	34.7	34.5	34.1	33.7	33	
Child Poverty Ratio (%)	33.7	32.3	32.7	32.6	31.7	31.8	31.4	30.2	32.1	32.4	32.1	32.6	
Labor Force Participation Rate at the Age Group of 15-17 (%)	17.1	17.6	16.9	16.7	18.1	18.1	18.1	17.4	18.2	17.2	13.7	14	
Youth Population Ratio (%)	17	16.8	16.7	16.6	16.5	16.4	16.3	16.1	15.8	15.6	15.4	15.3	
Youth Employment Rate Between Aged 15-24 Years (%)	30.1	32.1	31.5	32.2	33.5	34.2	34.1	34.3	35.1	33.1	29.2	32.2	
Youth Unemployment Rate Between Aged 15-24 Years (%)	21.7	18.4	17.5	18.7	17.9	18.5	19.6	20.8	20.3	25.4	25.3	22.6	
Percentage of Youth not in Employment, Education and training (%)		32.7	31.7	29.3	28.4	27.9	27.8	27.5	27.6	29.5	32.1	28.8	
Female/Male Ratio in New Enrollments in Higher Education		96	97	89	93	89	99	104	103	109	114	111	
Elderly Dependency Ratio (%)	10.8	10.9	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.2	12.3	12.6	12.9	13.4	14.1	14.4	
Elderly Poverty Ratio (%)		17.1	18.7	17.9	18.3	18.3	16.1	15.5	16.4	14.2	16.7		
Number of Retirees Aged 65 and Over (Million)					1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5		
Number of Nursing Homes Affiliated with the Ministry of Family and Social Services	97	102	106	115	124	132	141	144	146	153	158	165	
Number of Elderly in Nursing Homes Affiliated with the Ministry of Family and Social Services (Thousand)	8	10.6	11	11.3	11.7	12.3	13.3	13.7	13.9	13.9	14	12.7	

Sources: TURKSTAT Child Statistics, Regional Statistics, Elderly Statistics, Eurostat, Yükseköğretime Bakış 2021, Eğitim-Bir-Sen




Figure 7. The Number of Children, Youth, and Elderly (Million, 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Child Statistics-Demographic Characteristics, Youth Statistics & Elderly Statistics




Figure 9. Ratio of Female MPs in Turkey and OECD Countries (% , 2010-2021)

Source: World Bank, TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics & Women Statistics




Figure 8. Female Employment Rate in Türkiye and OECD Countries (% , 2010-2021)

Source: World Bank, TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics & Women Statistics




Figure 10. Female Employment Rate and Proportion of Women in Managerial Positions (% , 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics & Women Statistics

Education

Education in Türkiye has always been a mechanism that carries the expectation of social mobility. Education still functions as a carrier for large sections of the population to gain socio-economic status. It also ensures the inheritance and preservation of existing capitals for the upper-middle class. As the average duration of education increases, the effect of economic capital in education becomes more evident, and bifurcations occur in educational capital.

In this context, an ever-expanding phenomenon is preschool institutions. The number of students enrolled in preschool education institutions has been increasing continuously since 2013. The only exception is 2020 when all schools were closed due to the pandemic, and families avoided enrolling their children in school due to the risk of contagion. However, the social demand for preschool education has undoubtedly increased in the long run. In addition, the rising demand for preschool increased the share of private institutions. As a result, among all education levels, the rate of students in private schools is at the highest at the preschool level. In this context, it is necessary to increase the quantity and quality of the service provided by public schools.

The number of students in pre-primary education is higher than the increase in all education levels. There are many social reasons for this. First, families care more about socialization, peer learning, and basic knowledge and skills provided by preschool education than in the past. Secondly, the fact that public schools offer education at this level ensures that families likely to have difficulties allocating financial resources for preschool education are not deprived of this education to a certain extent. Third, the increasing participation of women in employment makes it necessary for mothers with children to apply for preschool education. Finally, a distant reason may be that preschool education institutions fill the social gap created by urbanization and the relative weakening of the local social bonds and environments in which children would spend time until they reach primary school age. For all these reasons, it can be predicted that the number of students in preschool education will increase in the coming years.

We see that the number of students per teacher in primary school decreased below 20 for the first time in 2013 and has been around 17-18 since then. Considering that this rate is 14 in high-income and 24 in middle-income countries according to World Bank data, it should be said that Türkiye is not at an alarming level but has not reached the expected level yet. On the other hand, there is a regional differentiation within the country: For example, the number of primary school students per teacher in the Southeast Anatolia Region is the highest and is above 20. Again, for example, this num-

ber is around 8 in private primary schools across the country. Therefore, in identifying possible disadvantages and inequalities at the primary school level, it is necessary to address regional and sectoral differentiations.

Net enrollment rates in primary and secondary education have generally been high since 2010. In 2022, 1 million 236 thousand students applied to LGS (high school entrance exam), which provides the transition between two levels. Of these, 951,703, or 95%, were placed in one of the schools they preferred. Therefore, accessing primary and secondary education in Türkiye is not a quantitative problem. However, the issue of which type of high school students from which social origins go through this examination has become an issue that produces inequalities that manifest themselves both in the later stages of the education system and the context of work and professional life. Although the schooling rate is increasing, school dropout, which occurs predominantly at the high school level, requires further research within the framework of internal and external reasons such as financial pressure, cultural factors, neglect, and bullying.

In higher education, we see that Türkiye is a latecomer country. The current expansion wave that started in the 1990s and has been experienced since the late 2000s, both in terms of the number of universities and quotas, has rapidly increased the net enrollment rate in higher education. By the end of 2021, more than 8 million students were enrolled in a university program. However, the fact that half of this amount consists of non-formal programs reduces the efficiency and quality of higher education. One of the main problems in formal programs is the institutional and collective dispositions of the current academic staff, which are unsuitable for providing the skills and development levels needed by the younger generations coming to the university.

In terms of total gross enrollment rate in tertiary level, Türkiye was at the level of the Middle East and North Africa until the 2000s. Since the 2010s, it has exceeded the EU and OECD average. In other words, there is a late but rapid societal demand for higher education. It would not be wrong to say that this demand triggered a significant transformation from labor markets to family structure in several fundamental issues. The expansion of higher education means more than just numbers. It means opening professions and sectors to younger generations from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, female participation, and a more dynamic human capital. Considering the rapidly increasing number of foreign students coming from all over the world over the years, higher education in Türkiye has a strong potential for scientific research and public benefit, which must overcome its administrative, financial, and local handicaps.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Mean Years of Schooling (Years)	6.5	6.7	7.3	7.5	7.7	7.6	7.8	8.0	8.1	8.1		
Number of Students in Pre-School Institutions (Million)	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.9
Number of Students in Primary Schools (Million)	10.9	10.9	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.4	4.9	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.4
Average Number of Students Per Classroom (Primary School + Secondary School)	31	30	30	29	27	25	24	24	24	24	23	23
Average Number of Students per Teacher (Primary School)	21	20	20	19	18	18	17	17	18	17	17	18
Percentage of Students in Private Pre-Schools (%)								15.8	16.5	17.8	15.8	20.2
Percentage of Students in Public Schools in Primary Education (%)			97.1	96.7	96.3	95.7	95.7	95.4	95.1	94.8	94.9	93.9
Percentage of Students in Private Schools in Primary Education (%)			2.9	3.3	3.7	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.1	6.1
Number of Students in Secondary Education (Million)	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.6	6.3	6.5
Percentage of Students in Public Schools in Secondary Education (%)	97.3	97.1	96.9	97.3	95.9	91.9	91.3	90.2	89.7	90.1	91.5	91.4
Percentage of Students in Private Schools in Secondary Education (%)	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.7	4.1	8.1	8.7	9.8	10.3	9.9	8.5	8.6
Number of Students in Public Universities (Million)	3.5	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.6	6.1	6.6	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.6	7.6
Number of Students in Private Universities (Thousand)	196	228	287	410	434	534	554	596	605	619	645	680
Number of Foreign Students in the Higher Education (Thousand)	25	31	43	48	72	87	108	117	154	185	224	260

Sources: Ministry of National Education Formal Education Statistics, Council of Higher Education Statistics




Figure 11. Net Enrollment Rate by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)

Source: Ministry of National Education Formal Education Statistics & Council of Higher Education, Higher Education Statistics




Figure 13. Gross Enrollment Rate in Higher Education (1970-2020)

Source: World Bank Education Statistics



Figure 12. Number of Universities (2010-2021)

Source: Council of Higher Education, Higher Education Statistics




Figure 14. Number of Placed Students and Ratio of Placed Students to Applicants in University Entrance Exam (% and Million People, 2000-2022)

Source: Student Selection and Placement Center, Numerical Information on Placement




Figure 15. Number of Quotas and Vacancy Rate in Public and Private Universities (Thousand people and %, 2010-2021)

Source: Student Selection and Placement Center, Numerical Information on Placement

Economy

The Turkish economy has continued to grow over the years, but it has been observed recently that this growth lags behind countries of similar scale. As a result, GDP in USD terms has been falling since 2017. According to IMF data, Türkiye is the twentieth largest economy in terms of GDP as of 2021. While it was relatively high in the previous years, the main reason for the recent decline is the depreciation of the Turkish lira. Therefore, it is the 11th country when it is calculated according to the purchasing power parity without the effect of the exchange rate. This result shows that the economy is going through a tough test in the exchange rate and inflation cycle.

Expectations about when the current economic model will yield positive results are becoming increasingly pessimistic. As a basis for this, GDP per capita is constantly decreasing. Between 2006 and 2016, when many macro indicators were positive, Türkiye's GDP per capita was above the world average. But it has remained below average since 2017. In 2021, the world average was at the level of 12 thousand USD. In Türkiye, it is 9.5 thousand USD. The goal to raise GDP per capita above 10 thousand USD depends on a multidimensional application of a sustainable development program.

It is seen that the ratio of government expenditures in GDP, which expresses the share of the government in the economy in macro indicators, increased until 2020 and decreased in 2021. However, the most striking data of the last two years is about banks. While the banks' total assets have grown relatively low over the years, they have achieved a massive increase in recent years. For example, in 2020, banks' total assets grew by 39% and exceeded 6 trillion liras (315 billion USD). Interestingly, as of September 2022, when the problem of exchange rate and inflation was the most intense, the banks' total assets exceeded 13 trillion liras and increased by 86% compared to the previous year.

Moreover, banks' net interest income is at its highest level in two decades. Banks' net interest income, which was 28 billion liras in 2010 (1,5 billion USD), increased continuously and exceeded 100 billion in 2018 (5,2 billion USD). As of September 2022, this number reached 497 billion liras, rising by 216% compared to the previous year. The total increase rate in the 11 years since 2010 is 453%. In this sense, it is difficult to say that the current crisis negatively affected banks. On the contrary, they seem to have made an enormous profit from

the general course of the economy. On the other hand, the external debt stock of the public and private sectors is increasing rapidly. In particular, the ratio of public external debt to GDP has exceeded 20%. It essentially means that 1/5 of the national product consists of foreign debts.

Household purchasing power is decreasing. One reason for this is the vast increase in the exchange rate. The USD rate, which was close to 6 TRY by the end of 2019, increased to 13.3 at the end of 2021. As of November 2022, it was 18.5 TRY. While the currency crisis increases production costs rapidly in every sector, from agriculture to industry, it has become a problem that can be felt widely in terms of daily life and consumption. Similarly, while inflation rate was 36% by the end of 2021, it was 85% in November 2022, according to TURKSTAT data. Despite the increase in export revenues throughout this process, it is clear that the access of large lower classes to necessities and goods such as housing and vehicle has been structurally damaged.

According to TURKSTAT data, the average gasoline automobile price increased by 130% in 2021 compared to the previous year and reached 436 thousand liras (23 thousand USD). Unfortunately, we do not have up-to-date price information for 2022, as TURKSTAT has stopped publishing the average price of the goods included in the basket in the inflation account in detail since April 2022. However, we encounter a negative result when calculating the average automobile price ratio to annual household income in the 11 years from 2010 to 2021. For example, in 2010, a household in Türkiye needed 1.6 times its annual revenue to buy a car, while in 2021, it needed 5.7 times.

It is possible to think that the same situation applies to housing prices. The dramatic decrease in purchasing power spreads the belief that access to desirable goods such as houses and cars is no longer possible in society. Despair grows as it becomes impossible for large segments of the lower and middle-income groups to move out of the rental house to move into their own home or to get a car for families with children. One reason is that indirect taxes do not fall below 60% of total tax revenue. The problem of the informal economy remains unsolved due to indirect taxes on consumption and commercial transactions. On the other hand, a deep consumption inequality emerges for the large low-income strata of society.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Annual GDP (Current Prices, Trillion TRY)	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.6	3.1	3.8	4.3	5.1	7.3	
Annual GDP (Billion USD)	777	839	881	958	939	864	869	858	778	761	719	815	
GDP Per Capita (Current prices, USD)	10,629	11,289	11,675	12,582	12,178	11,085	10,964	10,696	9,793	9,195	8,599	9,592	
GDP Annual Rate of Change (%)	17.5	6.2	3.4	7.8	-3.2	-8.9	-1.1	-2.5	-8.5	-6.1	-6.5	11.5	
Annual Per Capita Income (Constant Prices, Thousand TRY)	15.9	18.9	21.1	23.9	26.6	30.1	33.1	39.1	46.2	52.2	60.5	86.1	
Ratio of General Public Expenditures to GDP (%)	35	33.3	33.5	32.4	32.2	31.9	33.8	35.1	34.6	35.5	35.8	33	
Total Assets in Banks (Trillion TRY)	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.4	2.5	3.1	4.2	4.3	6.1	7.1	
Net Interest Income of Banks (Billion TRY)	28.5	27.6	37.3	43.1	47.3	56.3	66.9	82.2	107.6	113.9	165.6	157.5	
Year-End USD/TRY Rate (Purchase price)	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.9	3.5	3.8	5.3	5.9	7.4	13.3	
Inflation rate (%)	6.4	10.5	6.2	7.4	8.2	8.8	8.5	11.9	20.3	11.8	14.6	36.1	
PPI Increase Rate (%)	8.9	13.3	2.5	6.9	6.4	5.7	9.9	15.5	33.6	7.4	25.2	79.9	
Average Gasoline Car Price (Thousand TRY)	34	39	42	46	45	51	58	80	97	120	190	436	
Ratio of Average Car Price to Annual Household Income	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.7	5.7	
Ratio of Total Government Expenditure to GDP (%)	25.2	22.4	22.9	22.4	21.8	21.5	22.2	21.6	22.1	23.2	23.9	22.2	
Amount of Taxes Collected (Billion TRY)	211	254	279	326	353	408	459	537	622	674	833	1.165	
Ratio of Taxes Collected to GDP (%)	18	18.1	17.6	17.9	17.2	17.4	17.5	17.1	16.5	15.6	16.5	16.2	
Rate of Indirect Taxes (%)	68.1	67.4	69.9	67.5	68.9	68.1	67.4	63.2	62.9	65.9	62.3		
Gross External Debt Stock (Billion USD)	308	357	405	416	402	405	450	426	415	432	432	442	
Ratio of Public Gross External Debt to GDP (%)	11.5	11.4	12.1	12.4	12.9	13.5	14.2	15.9	17.9	21.2	24.9	22.2	
Current Account Deficit (Billion USD)	-44.6	-74.4	-47.9	-55.9	-38.9	-27.3	-27.1	-40.9	-21.7	5.3	-35.5	-13.6	

Sources: TURKSTAT, BDDK, TCMB, Presidency of Strategy and Budget, World Bank




Figure 16. Share of Sectors in GDP (% 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Annual Gross Domestic Product




Figure 17. Rate of Top Three Expenditure Items of the Government (% 2010-2021)

Source: Presidency of Strategy and Budget, 2021




Figure 18. Annual Growth Rate of Imports and Exports in OECD Countries and Türkiye (% 2014-2021)

Source: World Bank & TURKSTAT, Foreign Trade Statistics




Figure 19. Rate of Imports and Exports (Billion USD and %, 2013-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Foreign Trade Statistics

Labor Force and Employment

The labor market in Türkiye, the qualities of those participating in the labor force, and the distribution of employment are critical fundamental issues in understanding the change in the social structure. The active population involved in economic production by working in a job has increased since 2010, approaching 25 million by 2021. However, taking into account the child population, the young population in education, and the growing elderly population, it is seen that the increase in the active population from year to year is not at a sufficient level. It means that participation in employment remains below demographic and educational potential.

The labor force participation rate first fell to a pre-2014 level in 2020 due to the pandemic. In 2021, this rate did not rise enough due to inflation and currency-based employment problems. In other words, in terms of labor force participation, by 2021, Türkiye is not ahead of 2015. However, considering the young population who graduated from higher education programs in the last six years, it is clear that much more employment opportunities should be created. In this regard, it is necessary to see that the unemployment rate was 12% in 2021, and this rate has been at its highest level since 2010 in the last three years. Therefore, active employment policies should be established against unemployment. In addition, positions and jobs suitable for new qualifications and skills in the labor market should be created.

An important phenomenon is a gradual increase in female labor force participation. In particular, being a higher education graduate has become the main difference among female labor force. While the labor force participation rate of high school graduate women was around 30%, the labor force participation rate of higher education graduate women exceeded 65%. Suppose the required quantity and quality of employment is created as a result of women entering the labor market with a higher education capital than in the past, the female unemployment rate, which was 15.6% as of 2021, is expected to decrease in the coming years. Sectoral distribution of employment is a key indicator of social change. The employment share of agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry sectors is at its lowest level in history. The prominent indicator is the share of service sectors. The percentage of services in employment, which reached the highest level in history by exceeding 56% in 2019, has decreased in the last two years, even if it is relatively low, as the pandemic and economic crisis affected small and medium-sized service enterprises the most. Skill mismatching, expertise underdevelopment, and low value-added skill rates within service sectors are central problems.

The workforce in Türkiye corresponds to an increasing education capital. The labor force participation rate of both lower-secondary and high-school graduates is declining. While the labor force participation of higher education graduates was around 79-80% until 2019, it dropped to 75% by showing a severe decline in the last two years. The fact that higher education graduates are not sufficiently included in the employment is a phenomenon that will undermine new generations in terms of social integration, harmony, and welfare. Of course, being a higher education graduate always makes a difference in the monthly average gross wage. But graduates who have newly joined the labor force are more likely to be forced to receive salaries that do not differ much from the minimum wage, mostly in clerical and service jobs.

When it comes to the labor market, a chronic phenomenon in Türkiye is informal employment. According to the official estimations, informal employment has declined since 2010 and dropped to 29% by 2021. This is still a high rate and means loss of personal rights, insecurity, and potential for employee abuse. In the long run, it brings weakness in tax, planning, and policy for businesses and institutions. Although the Ministry of Labor and Social Security has not yet announced the work permit data given to foreigners for 2021, it is remarkable that it has exceeded 100 thousand as of 2018. Considering Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye or those coming from different continents and countries, it should not be forgotten that the migrant labor force mainly works informally in specific sectors, especially manufacturing and construction.

The point where the increase in wage earners meets with income inequality is essential. The ratio of employers' main income at job to wage-earners' income is increasing. This rate, which was 2.4 in 2011, increased to 3 in 2021 and reached the highest level. In other words, in terms of income at main job, a large part of the working population fell far behind the employer (or manager, partner, investor, etc.). In this context, an inflationary economy not only erodes purchasing power for low-income households. It also erodes life opportunities, access to social and educational resources, and chances of gaining status. The same social and emotional damage may not be felt for high-income employers, as inflation is experienced by this group as an economic loss only at the scale of certain investments and goods. Although the annual inflation in 2021 is 36%, a higher increase in the minimum wage essentially offered by the government expresses the acceptance that inflation has more destructive effects than the numerical rate, especially for low-income workers and households.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Active Population (Million People)	16.2	17.4	18.4	18.9	19.8	20.8	21.1	22.3	22.1	22.3	23.3	24.8	
Labor Force Participation Rate (%)		47.4	47.6	48.3	50.5	51.3	52	52.8	53.2	53	49.3	51.4	
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%)		28.3	28.9	30.1	30.2	31.5	32.5	33.5	34.1	34.1	30.9	32.8	
Unemployment Rate (%)		9.8	9.2	9.7	9.9	10.3	10.9	10.9	10.9	13.2	13.1	12.1	
Female Unemployment Rate (%)					11.9	12.6	13.7	14.1	13.9	16.5	15.1	15.6	
Informal Employment Rate (%)	43.3	42.1	39	36.8	35	33.6	33.5	34	33.4	34.5	30.6	29	
Number of Work Permits Granted to Foreigners (Thousand)		17.5	32.3	45.8	52.3	64.5	73.6	87.2	115.8	145.2	123.6		
Rate of Unionized Workers (%)					9.7	11.2	11.5	12	12.8	13.8	13.7	14.1	
Ratio of Collective Bargaining Agreements of Unionists (%)			68.9	79.9	73.5	66.3	70.4	84.3	60.9	64.1	67.1		
Net Increase Rate of Minimum Wage (%)		10.1	10.3	9.4	18.3	30.1	7.9	14.7	26.1	15.1	21.6	50.6	
Average Annual Income at Main Job of Wage Earners (Thousand TRY)		14	15	18	19	21	24	27	30	34	42	46	
Average Annual Income at Main Job of Employers (Thousand TRY)		33	35	39	44	47	67	83	88	95	125	136	
Average Annual Income at Main Job of Women (Thousand TRY)	10.1	11.4	12.4	14.4	15.7	17.9	20.7	24.1	25.4	28.2	35.8	40.1	
Average Annual Income at Main Job of Men (Thousand TRY)	13.2	14.9	15.9	18.1	20.1	22.8	26.4	29.7	32.6	37.1	45.7	50.7	

Sources: TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics, Income and Living Conditions Survey, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, SSI, ILO




Figure 20. Share of Sectors in Employment (% 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics

Note: The construction sector has been evaluated within the industrial sector.




Figure 21. The Number of Employed Persons Aged 15 Years Old and Over by Education Level (% 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics




Figure 22. Average Monthly Gross Wage by Education Level (Thousand TRY 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey

Work and Professions

Working life in Turkey is undergoing a significant transformation. The main dimension of this transformation is that waged work is becoming the dominant form of work. While 60% of the active population was wage earners in 2010, this rate has increased continuously in the past 11 years and reached 70% by 2021. In other words, 7 out of 10 employees are paid employees. The way of working for a wage forms the basis of the social structure as the basic working regime. Accordingly, the family structure, lifestyle, education, and cultural life are also shaped.

The increase in wage earners is mainly due to the decline of two groups: self-employed and unpaid family workers. Both groups fell to their lowest level in history regarding employment rates in 2021. The decrease in the share of the self-employed indicates that the younger generations who have newly joined the labor force are turning to wage earning labor, primarily through higher education. Likewise, in predominantly rural households, the share of family members who traditionally participate in the family's agricultural or farm works for free has decreased below 10% for the first time in the last two years. In other words, the new generations showed less interest in the fields, vineyards, orchards etc., which were inherited from the previous generations of the family and still carried out by the elders of the family. Instead, they turned to wage-earning in the service sector's unskilled jobs, mainly concentrated in the cities.

It also applies to the distribution of occupational groups in employment. "Service and sales personnel" such as cashiers, clerks, and waiters, which cover low-level unskilled jobs in the service sector, accounted for 12% of employment in 2010, now 18% in 2021. The "unqualified employees" rate from every sector has exceeded 15%. Twenty years ago, the combined ratio of these two groups did not exceed 20%. Today it's 33%. The young and dynamic population that has just come to the working life is getting crowded with low-level jobs. The occupational group that has shrunk significantly in the same period is those who work in jobs such as "qualified agriculture." The employment rate of this group, which was 36% in 2001 and 20% in 2011, dropped below 13% in 2021 for the first time.

Therefore, Turkey is now a country where the share of agriculture in rural areas and the jobs of single tradespeople and craftspeople in urban employment have decreased. Contrarily, low-level jobs in the service sector are getting crowded fast. However, at a relatively slower rate, top-level businesses are also expanding.

The expansion of higher education to all segments of society since the 1990s, but especially after 2010, is obvious in the employment share of professionals and technicians. The proportion of employees with at least one bachelor's degree, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, increased from 7% in 2010 to 12% in 2021. However, it is doubtful how sufficient this ratio is. While the rapid increase in the rate of university enrollment deepens the competition among the graduate labor force, on the other hand, the fact that the graduate labor force is forced to more low-level jobs points to the reality of being over-educated or a quality mismatch.

Average monthly gross wages of occupational groups can provide meaningful insight into the inequalities in the emerging new wage regime. The first striking indicator is that the gross wages of employees in managerial positions have a higher rate of increase than all other groups. The ratio of the monthly gross salary of managers to professionals was 1.3 in 2012 and 1.6 in 2021. The ratio of managers' wages to service personnel's wages increased from 2.6 to 2.9 in the same period. Therefore, it can be said that managerial positions have increasingly come to the fore in income inequality in the last decade.

Moreover, professionals' wages have converged to lower-level jobs over time. The ratio of professionals' gross monthly wage to service workers fell from 1.9 in 2012 to 1.8 in 2021. The ratio to unskilled workers at the bottom decreased from 3.3 to 2.6. This ratio shows that the new generations, especially university graduates, are far from the high income that their profession promised. The increase in the complaints of new generations about insufficient income, especially in the medical and legal professions is a symptom of the fact that the average income level of these professions is getting closer to lower-level jobs. Education as a form of capital is no longer identical to the opportunities for material gain traditionally enjoyed.

Ultimately, working life in Türkiye continues to evolve into a structure dominated by the service sector and wage earning. In this process, the number of professionals who make up the upper middle class increased with the service sector's unskilled jobs, which constitute the lower middle class. The wage gap between these two groups also weakened. The young and educated population, especially concentrated in city centers, moved away from agriculture and became wage earners in the service sector. This situation created a transition between the new middle-class layers. It also caused fragile household budgets in times of economic crisis.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Ratio of Wage Earners in Employment (%)	60.9	61.7	62.9	64.1	66.1	67.1	67.6	67.3	67.9	68.4	69.8	69.9	
Ratio of Employers in Employment (%)	5.3	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	
Ratio of Self-Employed in Employment (%)	20.1	19.4	18.9	18.7	17.3	16.8	16.7	17.1	17.1	16.8	16.5	16.1	
Ratio of Unpaid Family Workers (%)	13.6	13.7	13.2	12.6	12.2	11.8	11.2	11.1	10.5	10.3	9.2	9.4	
Number of Newly Established Companies (Thousand)	51.9	54.4	39.8	49.9	58.7	67.6	64.5	73.8	86.4	85.3	102.8	111.1	
Number of Closed and Bankrupt Companies (Thousand)	13.4	14.5	16.1	17.4	15.9	13.7	12.3	14.7	13.6	14.1	15.4	17.2	

Source: TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics, TOBB Established and Closed Companies Statistics




Figure 23. Share of Occupational Groups in Employment (% 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics




Figure 24. Average Monthly Gross Wage by Occupational Groups (TRY, 2012-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics




Figure 25. Percentage of Permanent Staff in the Public Sector and the Share of the Public Sector in Employment (2011-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics

Wealth and Inequality

How social and economic welfare is distributed among different strata of society is a vital issue. Increasing inequalities in the distribution of wealth undermine the belief that the social order is just and equitable. It also affects the level of life satisfaction and hopes for the future. The greater the inequality, the weaker the social cohesion. Shared norms and collective values lose their power to integrate social life when the inequality is high. For example, the depreciation of personal savings due to inflation has only economic and, therefore, compensable consequences for those in the high-income group. On the other hand, this situation can lead to severe losses in fundamental social rights and life opportunities such as education, health, and housing for large segments of the population.

The Gini coefficient, frequently used in the literature to measure income inequality, is higher in Türkiye compared to similar countries. This pre-tax coefficient has increased significantly since 2013, but it seems to have fallen below 0.4 as of 2021 with taxes. In other words, although the tax policy in Türkiye affects reducing income inequality at first glance, the fact that 65% of the collected tax is indirect tax indicates leads us to think that it is necessary to look at consumption inequality and income. However, given the absence of a analytical calculation of consumption-based inequalities in official statistics, further research is needed.

Credit Suisse's Global Wealth Report provides meaningful indicators of wealth and income distribution. From 2020 to 2021, there is a 24.3% decrease in household wealth in Türkiye, and Türkiye ranks first in the world in terms of the rate of decline in household wealth. Türkiye is among the countries with the highest rate of adult persons with personal assets less than 10 thousand dollars with the rate of 68.4%. In the average of European countries, we see that personal wealth is distributed relatively evenly, at 30%, in three groups: below 10 thousand USD, between 10 thousand USD and 100 thousand USD, and over 100 thousand USD. In other words, there is a heavy accumulation in subgroups regarding personal wealth in Türkiye. According to the same report, the richest 10% in Türkiye owns 70.8% of the national wealth.

Of course, the fact that more than 70% of those who participate in employment are wage laborers has a share in this. The share of labor and capital in GDP is gradually developing against labor. The share of payments to the workforce decreased to 29% in 2020 and

27% in 2021. In the first two quarters of 2022, it fell to 23%. In other words, it is below the 2010 level. While the share of labor has increased gradually throughout the 2000s, in the pandemic and current inflationary environment, the share of labor is decreasing and the share of capital is increasing. The average income at job of wage earners tends to decrease continuously compared to the average of all employment. In other words, the earnings of wage earners in terms of income at main job have been gradually falling below the general average since 2010. On the other hand, the income at main job of employers is increasing. While the ratio of employers to the average was 2.11 in 2010, it has increased continuously to 2.92 in 2020. Therefore, the increase of wage earners means that wider classes receive a lower share of the national income.

The poor population is increasing and has been over 17 million for the last three years. According to calculations, the hunger threshold in October 2022 is 7425 TRY, which is approximately 2 thousand TRY above the minimum wage. The poverty line for a family of four person is 24,185 TRY (1245 USD). This limit is above the average professor's salary in public universities. One dimension of the problem is persistent poverty. In other words, the proportion of the population has remained below the poverty line in at least two of the last three years. While this rate was low in 2018-19, it increased again in the previous two years. Therefore, it is necessary to accept that in the current situation, poverty has become chronic both for low-income groups and has expanded by including the upper layers of wage labor. Although social protection expenditures have been at significant rates in the last decade, it is a matter of debate on how sustainable the insurance system and such expenditures are for an aging demographic.

In recent years, we have seen a result of negative indicators of inequality in data on life satisfaction. The rate of those who declared happy has decreased since 2017 and fell below 50% for the first time. On the other hand, the rate of those who stated they were unhappy has been increasing since 2017, and it seems to have reached its highest level in 2021. Young people aged 18-24 have the highest level of unhappiness compared to other age groups. The rate of unhappy youth, which did not exceed 10% until 2020, has increased rapidly in the last two years. Therefore, renewing the new generations' belief in social welfare and equity is an important challenge.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Unhappy Rate Among the 18-24 Years Old (%)	9.6	5.4	9.4	8.1	8.4	7.8	8.6	8.8	9.5	9.6	14.2	20.4	
Ratio of Active/Passive Insured	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.9		
Top 1%'s Share of Wealth (%)	47.3	49.1	51.3	52.3	54.3				54.4	42.5	42.8	40.7	
Top 10%'s Share of Wealth (%)	73.1	74.3	75.7	76.4	77.7				81.2	70.3	72.1	70.8	
Top 10%'s Share of Income (%)	30.9	31.3	31.1	31.3	30.3	30.9	32.1	32.5	32.6	31.2	32.5	31.5	
P80/P20 Ratio by Household Disposable Income	6.9	7	6.9	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.6	7	7.8	7.1	
Share of Labor Payments in GDP (%)	26.9	26.4	27.7	27.8	28.7	29.1	31.9	30.2	30.1	31.3	29.2	26.9	
Ratio of Annual Income at Main Job of Employers to Total Average	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	
Proportion of Population Covered by Social Security (%)	83.1	86.2	83.1	81.9	83.7	85.5	85.5	87.1	85.6	85.1	86.8		
Expenditures on Social Protection (Billion TRY)	148	172	196	220	147	280	337	383	449	542	656		
Rate of Permanent Poverty (%)	18.5	16.1	16.1	13.1	15.1	15.8	14.6	14.1	12.7	12.7	13.7	13.8	
Share of Income Received by the Poorest 20% (%)	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.4	5.9	6.1	
Share of Wealth Received by the Poorest 20% (%)	6.5	6.5	5.9	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.1	6.2	5.9	6.1	
The ratio of Total Social Expenditure to GDP	16.1	15.5	15.8	15.6	15.6	15.8	16.9	15.9	16.3	17.1	17.6	15.9	
National Poverty Rate (those below 60% of the median income, %)	23.8	22.9	22.7	22.4	21.8	21.9	21.2	20.1	21.2	21.3	21.9	21.3	
Ratio of Annual Income at Main Job of Wage Earners to Total Average	1.09	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.04	1.02	0.98	0.97	0.98	0.99	0.97	0.98	
Pre-tax Gini Coefficient	0.595	0.596	0.597	0.587	0.595	0.601	0.612	0.639	0.644	0.636	0.636	0.637	
Post-tax Gini Coefficient	0.381	0.383	0.382	0.382	0.379	0.386	0.396	0.401	0.403	0.387	0.402	0.391	
Poor Population (Million)	16.9	16.6	16.7	16.7	16.5	16.7	16.3	15.8	16.9	17.2	17.9	17.6	
Poverty Gap (%)	28.7	29.2	29.3	26.7	27.2	26.8	26.5	25.8	25.4	26.3	26.9	26.9	

Sources: TURKSTAT Poverty Statistics, Social Protection Statistics, Income and Living Conditions Survey, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, World Inequality Database




Figure 26. Annual Average Income by Employment Status (TRY, 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics




Figure 27. Level of Happiness (% 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Life Satisfaction Survey

Health

While the health system in Türkiye continues to expand, its structural problems are becoming more apparent. The Health Transformation reforms implemented since 2003 have succeeded in bringing physicians, hospitals, and medicines more easily to large segments of the public, whose access to health services has been restricted for many years. However, it also brought the workload on the health system and the handicaps of privatization. Moreover, as a country with both a large child population and an aging population, Türkiye's outlook in the health services field contains contradictions.

In fact, the public sector still bears the health system's heavy burden in terms of labor and expenditure. The sum of the public's current and investment expenditures in health has been over 100 billion TRY since 2017. It even reached a record level with 198 billion TRY in 2020 (10,3 billion USD). On the other hand, the share of private sector's health expenditures remained stable at 21%. We see the same situation in the number of hospitals. While the total number of hospitals has increased slowly since 2010, the share of private hospitals is around 33-36%.

Similarly, the number of physicians has exceeded 171 thousand, but only %17,9 of them work in the private sector as of 2020. This rate was 15% in 2002 and 20% in 2010. Therefore, it cannot be said that physicians have moved to the private sector in mass. However, it is necessary to investigate according to which branch and seniority the physicians working in private are mostly distributed.

Compared to other countries, less and less personal expenditure is made on the health sector, access to which has become more as a public service. The balance between increasing demand for health care and service supply is an essential issue in this current context. From 2019 to 2020, the number of physicians recorded the fastest increase in history for the first time and increased by more than 10 thousand. Every year, medical faculties produce around 15 thousand graduates. More than 70% of graduates turn to specialist training. Therefore, it is possible to predict that Türkiye will meet the need for physicians, especially specialist physicians, in the medium term. However, there is currently a mismatch between demand and supply.

In terms of the number of physicians per thousand population, Türkiye (2) is behind all OECD countries

(EU average 3.9; OECD average 3.6). On the other hand, in terms of the number of consultations to a physician per capita per year, it is 9.8 for 2019, well above the OECD average (6.6). In other words, although the number of physicians is deficient compared to the population, the high number of demand for physicians poses a question mark on the satisfaction, quality, and sustainability of health services for all. If Türkiye doubles the number of physicians in ten years, it can be predicted that many problems arising from the current workload will be alleviated.

Since the Ministry of Health has not yet announced the annual health statistics for 2021 as of November 2022, it is possible to evaluate the impact of the pandemic on 2020 as the closest date. First of all, one of the reasons why the dramatic scenes seen in hospitals in many European countries during the pandemic have been relatively rare in Türkiye is the steady increase in the number of beds per thousand people. Especially in adult intensive care beds, Türkiye ranks first in the world. However, the pandemic caused a serious decrease in consultations and surgeries. This decrease, which means a decrease in the tiring workload for healthcare professionals outside the COVID-19 clinic, means postponing vital diagnoses for patients, delayed operations, and even an increase of indirect loss of functions, organs, and lives. In this sense, it is necessary to investigate the consequences of the restriction policies implemented in the pandemic, which restricted access to health services excessively.

It can be said that the number of both young and old suicides has been within a certain range since 2010, and there has been no significant increase or decrease in this number. How the pandemic affects suicide rates is a vital issue. However, this issue can be evaluated once the TURKSTAT's 2020 and 2021 death statistics are published, possibly in the coming period. It should be said that the situation is negative in work accidents and work deaths, which are such an important issue. Occupational accidents per worker have been on the rise since 2013. There has been no significant decrease in the number of deaths due to work accidents since 2010. In 2021, more than 511 thousand work accidents occurred and 1382 workers lost their lives due to work accidents. Considering that access to health does not start and end in the hospital, it is clear that a structural struggle is needed on occupational health and safety.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Public Health Expenditures (Billion TRY)	48	55	58	66	73	82	94	109	128	156	198	
Private Sector Health Expenditures (Billion TRY)	13	14	15	18	21	22	26	31	37	44	52	
Health Expenditure per Capita (TRY)	843	924	987	1,108	1,228	1,337	1,511	1,751	2,030	2,434	2,997	
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure per Capita (Real prices, TRY)	362	353	355	393	423	399	413	450	455	457	481	
Household Health Expenditure (Million TRY)	9,891	10,391	11,198	13,491	15,754	16,404	18,531	22,770	27,112	31,697	38,294	
Total Number of Hospitals	1,439	1,453	1,483	1,517	1,528	1,533	1,510	1,518	1,534	1,538	1,534	
Number of Private Hospitals	489	503	541	550	556	562	565	571	577	575	566	
Total Number of Physicians	123,447	126,029	129,772	133,775	135,616	141,259	144,827	149,997	153,128	160,810	171,259	
Rate of Physicians Working in the Private Sectors (%)	20.7	20.8	22.4	22.4	21.7	21.1	19.2	19.7	19.2	18.6	17.9	
The Number of Consultations with a Physician per Capita per Year	7,3	8,2	8,2	8,2	8,3	8,4	8,6	8,9	9,5	9,8	7,2	
Number of Surgical Operations (Million)	3,8	4,2	4,4	4,7	4,8	4,7	4,7	4,9	5,2	5,2	3,7	
Number of Suicides per 100 Thousand People	4	3,6	4,4	4,3	4,1	4,2	4	3,9	4,1	4,1		
Suicide in the Youth (aged 15-29 years)	1,023	900	1,104	1,141	1,090	1,109	1,043	1,049	1,066	1,094		
Suicide in the Elderly (aged 65+)	321	309	381	373	346	377	373	371	387	385		
Number of Occupational Accidents per 100 Thousand Workers	578.9	584.6	578.4	1,168.8	1,275.9	1,323.7	1,530.3	1,812	2,203	2,170	1,846	2,296
Number of Deaths Due to Occupational Accidents	1,444	1,700	744	1,360	1,626	1,252	1,405	1,633	1,541	1,147	1,231	1,382
Number of Occupational Accidents (Thousand)	62	69	74	191	221	241	286	359	430	422	384	511

Sources: Ministry of Health Health Statistics, SSI Statistics, TURKSTAT Suicide Statistics

Note: Since the Ministry of Health has not yet published the 2021 Statistical Yearbook, the relevant data could not be included here.




Figure 28. Number of Physicians, Nurses and Beds Per Thousand People (2010-2020)

Source: TURKSTAT, Health Statistics




Figure 30. Number of COVID-19 Cases (2020-2022)

Source: Ministry of Health, COVID-19 Information Platform

Note: The total number of cases was calculated in 3-month periods.




Figure 29. Total Number of Deaths from COVID-19 (Thousand People, September 2021)

Source: Our World in Data, Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19)




Figure 31. Number of COVID-19 Intensive Care Units (2020-2021)

Source: Ministry of Health, COVID-19 Information Platform

Note: The total number of cases was calculated in 3-month periods.

The legal system in Türkiye is one of the most controversial issues. As society's expectations from the judiciary are increasing daily, the workload, human capacity, and violation of rights in the judiciary constitute the important dimensions of the debate. Since the 2000s, the regulations and innovations in legislation and institutional mechanisms have facilitated access to justice to a certain extent. However, it is difficult to say that requests and complaints have reached a structural solution on certain issues, especially on duration and expenses of trials.

When it comes to the law, the workload in the judiciary comes first. It is observed that there has been a significant increase in the number of cases brought to the first-instance criminal, civil, and administrative courts during the year. Although there was a decrease for the first time in 2020 with the effect of the pandemic, the number of files brought to the courts of first instance in 2021 exceeded 8 million. It is doubtful how much the legal system can meet this workload today when conflicts in society are tried to be resolved with the legal system. The ratio of the number of cases decided to the number of incoming cases decreases in criminal, civil, and administrative courts. In other words, judges see more and more new cases despite their workload being lightened by the impact of the pandemic in 2021.

It is a positive development that since 2010, the average number of cases pertaining to first-instance court judges has gradually decreased. However, it is difficult to say that there is still a sufficient number of judicial professionals. We see an increase, not a decrease, in the average duration of investigations in the Chief Public Prosecutor's Offices. As of 2021, an investigation takes an average of 413 days. This number was 311 in 2010. In recent years, the average duration of file examination in criminal and civil courts has gradually approached one year. Despite the mitigating effect of conciliation and mediation mechanisms, one of the most challenging issues for the sense of justice in the conscience of society is the length of these trial periods. We see that 25% of the applications made to the Constitutional Court in 2021 are about the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The increase in the number of lawyers, who constitute one of the founding parties of the judiciary, reached a remarkable level. The number of lawyers has more than doubled in the last ten years. However, with the impact of inequalities within the profession, the new generation of lawyers is less likely to find a decent job, earn a satisfactory living, develop legal skills, and advance in their career. In 2021, 18,529 students graduated from law faculties, and most of them started their legal internships. The expansion of higher education triggers the effect of intra-professional status differences that have emerged since the 1990s on the axis of office capital, social capital, and work capacity. Considering the bar associations' serious weaknesses in controlling the working conditions and developing the channels of competence, it can be said that a new stratification has occurred within the profession.

Feminization is an important dynamic in the field of law. As of 2021, the proportion of women among newly enrolled law school students has exceeded 50%. The proportion of women among lawyers has increased steadily since 2010, reaching 46%. We see the same rate among judges, but the rate of women among prosecutors is still only 16%. On the other hand, we can say that the new generation of female lawyers is concentrated in wage labor, they continue their profession with relatively low autonomy instead of opening their own offices, and the employment of female lawyers has increased, especially in large offices. Therefore, feminization is not only a dynamic to be considered through quantitative increase but also a development that has multidimensional results in terms of working conditions and relations and should be closely examined.

As of 2021, nearly 300 thousand people are in prison. The increase in high school and university graduates among convicts is mainly due to the increase in the enrollment rate in these two education levels. When we look at the crime types, we see that the rate of the most committed theft crime has decreased, and the rate of those convicted of murder has decreased below 3% for the first time. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the rate of those convicted of wounding was 15.7% in 2021.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Number of New Cases During the Year (Criminal+Civil+Administrative) (Million)	6,6	6,6	6,5	6,3	6,5	6,6	6,7	6,8	7,2	7,5	6,9	8,2	
Number of Cases per Judge in First Instance Courts	1,064	1,057	1,022	903	814	854	829	864	748	754	671	756	
Number of Judges and Prosecutors	11,612	12,097	12,201	13,666	15,012	14,993	15,304	16,074	17,167	20,719	21,772	22,820	
Percentage of Female Judges and Prosecutors (%)			24.8	26.1	26.1	26.2	27.1	31.8	33.2	35.8	36.2	36.4	
Percentage of Female Lawyers (%)	37.1	37.7	38.5	39.2	40.5	41.4	42.3	43.3	43.9	44.8	45.7	45.9	
Total Population in Penal Institutions (Convicted + Detainees, Thousand)	120	128	137	144	159	177	201	232	265	292	267	298	
Percentage of Women in Penal Institutions (%)	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	4.2	4.3	3.9	3.9	4.1	3,9	
Proportion of Those Convicted of Theft (%)		8	10.4	13.8	17.5	17.8	16.9	17.3	17	15.2	15.2	14,7	
Proportion of Those Convicted of Murder (%)		4.3	5.6	4	5.2	4.9	4	3.7	3.5	3.4	2.4		
Proportion of Those Convicted of Wounding (%)		9,8	13,2	18,4	14,5	14,1	12,5	12,3	12,4	12,4	15,6		
Number of Juveniles Driven to Crime in Files of Criminal Courts (Thousand)	133	141	159	182	179	173	135	121	118	131	99	111	
Number of Individual Application Files to the Constitutional Court			1,342	9,897	20,578	20,376	80,756	40,530	38,186	42,971	40,402	66,121	
Number of Individual Applications the Constitutional Court Found at Least One Violation of Rights				75	768	1,827	1,282	1,025	2,167	1,225	5,658	11,830	
Number of Individual Applications from Türkiye to the ECHR (Thousand)	5,8	8,6	8,9	3,5	1,5	22,0	8,3	25,9	6,7	7,2	9,1	9,5	
Number of ECHR Violations of Türkiye	228	159	117	118	94	79	77	99	140	96	85	76	
Number of Femicides	203	129	145	231	290	293	289	350	405	421	408	421	

Sources: Ministry of Justice Justice Statistics, Forensic Statistics, The Department of Human Rights, Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Union of Turkish Bar Associations, TURKSTAT Penal Institution Statistics, anitsayac.com




Figure 32. Number of Lawyers and Number of Graduates from Law Faculties (2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Household Statistics




Figure 34. Average Investigation Time in Chief Public Prosecutor's Offices, Criminal Courts and Civil Courts (Day, 2010-2021)

Source: Justice Statistics, 2021




Figure 33. The Ratio of the Number of Cases Adjudicated in the Courts of First Instance to the Total Number of Cases (2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Household Statistics




Figure 35. Proportion of Convicts by Education Level (% , 2010-2021)

Source: Justice Statistics, 2021

Cities

As a result of internal migration from villages and towns to cities since the 1950s, the rate of the population living in urban districts and centers reached to 93% as of 2021. Therefore, many components of urban life, such as infrastructure, transportation, housing, environment, architecture, and public spaces, become matters of the public debate. It can be said that the multi-layered and rapid social change brought by the urbanization that has spread over the last 70 years underlies many economic and cultural debates in Türkiye.

As a constitutional social right, housing is a vital issue in Türkiye. In this sense, it is a rising social demand that people can live in healthy and reliable housing suitable for their basic needs. Moreover, one of the most basic expectations of families participating in education and working life, especially in big city centers, is to own a house. As a result, construction is an emerging industry. However, the housing supply is not planned according to a fair price range from which lower and middle classes can benefit. Therefore, the proportion of luxury buildings is increasing.

In this context, house sales have increased continuously over the years. Since 2010, more than one million houses have been sold every year. In 2020 and 2021, this number approached 1,5 million. However, we see that the rate of the homeowners does not increase. On the contrary, it is gradually decreasing. Ten years ago, the rate of tenants decreased to 20%, yet approaching 27% by 2021. This rate is higher in the poor population at 32%. Significantly newly married lower and middle-income groups have to experience tenancy more than they did ten years ago. From this point of view, the housing supply produced does not coincide with the housing need in society. Therefore, it is not difficult to guess that housing sales are not evenly distributed among the different strata in the social structure. Although the newly launched social housing projects bring the possibility of positive development and hope, they are on a narrow scale that does not match the demands of society. It can be said that it is not comprehensive enough, especially for those living in big city centers where rental prices are rising.

Urbanization also means massive energy consumption. Electricity and natural gas used in households constitute essential expenditure items in this sense. We see that the consumption cost of these two forms of energy in homes is gradually increasing throughout Türkiye. The unit price of electricity increased by 54% in the short period from the second six months of 2021 to the first six months of 2022. The rate of increase in the unit price of natural gas is 36%. In other words, electricity and natural gas prices, which showed relatively small increases throughout the 2010s, have been rising at a rate that exceeds household budgets in the last year. According to İGDAŞ data, as of August 2022, the price per cubic meter of natural gas in Istanbul is well above the average of Türkiye.

Urban sociology proposes considering the phenomenon of the "city" together with the natural elements around it. In today's world, where the issue of climate change is the main agenda, institutions are collecting more and more data on waste and recycling issues. We see that the rate of municipal waste sent for recycling and the rate of water in treatment plants are on a small but steady increase. Over the years, there has been an improvement in the wastewater issue, which has been discussed recently, especially with the mucilage seen recently on the shores of Istanbul. Untreated wastewater discharged to seas, lakes, and rivers has decreased since 2010.

The last thing in this regard is satisfaction with municipal services. The least satisfied service subject of municipalities is green areas. There is a widespread belief that the short-term economic profit-oriented approach in zoning plans largely neglects the green areas open to common use in urban areas. As a result, the total green space in Istanbul is not constantly increasing, despite the new parks and gardens opened for use throughout the 2010s. In fact, according to IMM data, the amount in 2021 is also behind 2018. Along with the green area, road and sidewalk services are the second subject the municipalities are least satisfied with. Such problems require structural will and planning to achieve livable cities based on common benefits, health, and welfare.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Number of House Sales (Million Units)				1,2	1,2	1,3	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5	1,5	
Rate of Second-Hand House Sales (%)				54,3	53,5	53,6	52,9	53,2	52,6	62,1	68,7	69,1	
Rate of House Sales to Foreigners (%)				1,1	1,6	1,8	1,4	1,6	2,9	3,4	2,7	3,9	
Percentage of Tenants (%)	22,1	22,2	20,9	21,3	22,1	23,3	24,4	24,7	25,2	25,6	26,2	26,8	
Percentage of Houseowners (%)	60,1	59,6	60,6	60,7	61,1	60,4	59,7	59,1	59,1	58,8	57,8	57,5	
Tenancy Rate of Poor Population (those below 60% of median income) (%)	23,2	23,9	22,3	22,8	24,5	25,8	29,4	28,9	29,1	30,3	29,3	32,3	
Construction Cost Index						100,6	118,9	138,1	173,6	192,3	240,4	403,2	
Total Number of Houses with Occupancy Permits (Thousand Units)	139	101	107	121	139	125	134	161	104	55	96	138	
Average Price of Domestic Water (m ³ , chained prices, TRY)	2,5	3,2	3,4	3,8	4,1	4,1	4,2	4,7	5,2	4,0	4,5	5,6	
IGDAS Domestic Natural Gas Price (TRY/m ³ , Year-End)	0,6	0,7	0,9	0,9	1	1	0,9	1	1,3	1,5	1,6	1,9	
Proportion of Population Having Access to the Natural Gas Network (%)							68	76	80	79	81	81	
Municipal Waste Per Capita (Kg)	403		407		402		423		421		416		
Recycling Rate of Municipal Waste (%)							9,3		11,9		12,8		
Total Greenhouse Gas Emission (Million Tons)	399	428	448	439	459	473	499	525	523	506	524		
Average Water Usage Per Person Per Day (Liter/Person-Day)	216		216		203		217		224		228		
Ratio of Treated Water in Drinking and Potable Water Treatment Plants (%)	53		55		57		57		58		60		
Ratio of Wastewater Discharged to the Sea from the Municipal Network without Treatment (%)	10,1		6,8		8,1		4,8		3,4		2,4		
Total Amount of Green Area in Istanbul (Million m ²)	4,8	4,9	5,2	5,4	5,7	5,6	5,9	6,3	6,4	5,5	5,8	6,1	

Sources: TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey, ISKI, IGDAS, IMM, General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre




Figure 36. House Price Index Average prices per square meter in Istanbul and Türkiye (2010-2022)

Source: CBRT, House Price Index, 2010-2021




Figure 37. The Unit Price of 1 m³ of Natural Gas and 1 kWh of Electricity (TRY, 2012-2022)

Source: IGDAS, Retailing Price & TEDAS, Electricity Tariffs




Figure 38. Satisfaction Rate from Municipal Services (% , 2011-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Life Satisfaction Survey

Rural Areas

Country, rural population, and agricultural production in Türkiye are complex issues. As a result of rapid urbanization, the rural population is decreasing, and the density of the elderly population in the rural population is increasing. As the share of agriculture in employment has reached the lowest level and is 17%, the rural is a narrowing category regarding the labor force and participation in employment.

As of 2021, the number of children living in the villages has decreased to 1 million, and this rate has declined below 20% for the first time. Although the decrease in the fertility rate is faster in cities, it is clear that the rural population is also in danger of not being able to renew itself. There is a continuous decrease in the ratio of young people in rural areas. On the other hand, the ratio of older people in rural areas has increased continuously and approached 20%. It seems unlikely that this trend will deteriorate in the near future due to the limited employment and education opportunities in rural areas. The increase in the elderly population in rural areas means increased demand for health, care, cooperation, and socialization resources that are relatively more accessible in provincial and district centers. However, it is highly doubtful how much these resources are organized in terms of infrastructure and personnel in rural settlements and harmonized according to the citizens' demands. Therefore, Türkiye needs to challenge the issues of aging in place and active aging in the rural context as a social policy urgency.

Agricultural production is one of the first issues that come to mind regarding the country. While it is an important issue whether Türkiye's agricultural lands are sufficient or not, we see that the total amount of these lands has remained relatively constant over the years. The rural property regime, historically dominated by smallholders, is still effective today. The newly opened agricultural lands combined under large agricultural enterprises are at a very low level. At this point, official data, which do not yet exist, should be kept regularly regarding the number of agricultural holdings and the distribution of agricultural production lands to rural households.

Agriculture and animal husbandry do not lose their importance in domestic and foreign markets as sectors that provide basic foodstuffs. We have seen how essential access to basic foodstuffs through agricultur-

al production is crucial during the pandemic. Türkiye's agricultural production volume is constantly increasing. Regarding the value of agricultural production, we have seen a positive increase in grains, vegetables, and fruits in the last four years. The advantageous international position, which provides a faster response to the demands of foreign markets, is undoubtedly effective. The rapid increase in agricultural product exports during the pandemic process in 2021 confirms this.

The rate of vegetable exports increased continuously in quantity until 2021 but remained stable in terms of its ratio to total production. It is possible to predict that this rate will gradually increase. The prominent item in this regard is tomato. In 2021, nearly 2 million tons of tomatoes were exported. The fact that tomato is the most preferred product in geothermal greenhouse cultivation, which has become widespread in recent years, also has a share in this. With the greenhouse plant growing method, the total volume of vegetable production, which is done without being affected by the season, has reached 9.7 million tons. Tomatoes account for more than half of this production.

Another rural issue is livestock and related food products. There is a continuous increase in livestock. Accordingly, there is a relatively slow increase in red meat and chicken production. However, it is a fact that access to meat products is becoming increasingly difficult for low-income families under inflationary conditions. In other words, although there is more animal food production yearly, we cannot say that this increase facilitates the consumption of different social strata. In this sense, it seems essential to conduct detailed research on the processes and mechanisms that increase the price of these food items both in production and between production and consumption.

In the end, although the current exchange rate at the point of agricultural and animal production makes exports profitable, it is another fact that the population in rural areas is gradually decreasing. In this context, Türkiye should make the country a main agenda item as a social policy issue. Furthermore, bringing together agriculture and animal husbandry with the most advanced technologies is essential in terms of economic efficiency. But, of course, an important aspect of this policy should still be the lack of infrastructure elements such as natural gas and roads in some rural areas.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Rural Population Ratio (%)	23.7	23.2	22.7	8.7	8.2	7.9	7.7	7.5	7.7	7.2	7	6.8
Rural Child Population (Aged 0-14, Million)	4.7	4.6	4.5	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
Rural Youth Population (Aged 15-24, Million)	2.8	2.8	2.7	1.1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9	0.9	0.9
Rural Adult Population (Aged 25-64, Million)	8	8	8	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8	3	2.9	2.8	2.7
Rural Elderly Population (Aged 65+, Million)	1.9	2	2	0.9	0.9	1	0.9	1	1	1	1.1	1.1
Amount of Agricultural Area / Land (Million Decares)	39.0	38.2	38.4	38.4	38.6	38.6	38.3	38.0	37.8	37.7	37.8	38.1
Ratio of Exported Vegetables to Domestic Use (%)	8.2	7.1	7	6.8	7.4	7	7.1	7	7.1	7	7.6	11.5
Domestically Produced and Exported Tomatoes (Million Tons)	1.3	1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.9
Production Value in Grain and Other Herbal Products (Billion TRY)	28.5	35.8	33.1	39.1	42.2	49.5	47.9	56.1	62.2	79.1	98.1	133.8
Value of Vegetable Production (Billion TRY)	26.6	25.5	25.5	25.6	26.1	29.3	31.7	33.8	41.3	50.4	55.3	59.4
Value of Fruits, Beverage and Spring Crops Production (Billion TRY)	24.9	27.7	29.3	27.7	29.9	41.3	39.5	45.9	55.5	67.8	92.6	113.2
Greenhouse Vegetable and Fruit Production (Million Tons)	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.7	7.2	7.8	8.1	8.4	8.5	9.7
Number of Livestock (Million)	40.8	44.8	49.8	53.0	55.8	56.1	55.6	60.4	63.3	66.4	72.3	75.6
Number of Tractors (Million)	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5

Source: TURKSTAT Address Based Population Registration System, Herbal Product Tables, Agriculture Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry




Figure 39. Distribution of Rural Population by Age Groups (%), 2010-2021)

Source: Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS) Results




Figure 40. Annual Production of Milk, Red Meat and Chicken Meat (Million Tons, 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Animal Production Statistics, Red Meat Production Statistics & Poultry Production

Migration

Türkiye is a very dynamic society in terms of migration. On the one hand, internal migration continues with different aspects. On the other hand, it continues to receive immigrants from many countries. From 1975 to 2000, the number of immigrants from rural areas increased continuously. Between 1995 and 2000, 1 million 168 thousand 285 people migrated from rural to urban areas. Today, the rural population corresponds to a very low rate.

However, the mobility between the provinces continues intensely. In 2010, 1 million 360 thousand people migrated between provinces. This number reached its peak in 2018 with approximately 3 million people. There is a relative decrease in 2019 and 2020. It is possible to say that this has a direct explanation with the pandemic. In 2021, there was a 23% increase in the population migrating between provinces compared to the previous year.

One of the important targets of migration movements has always been the big cities where education and working life are developed. However, the direction of this movement is not as it used to be. The net migration rate in Istanbul has decreased continuously since 2019. The negative net migration rate indicates that the immigrant population in Istanbul is less than the emigrant population from the city. As of 2021, the net migration rate in Istanbul is -1.4. Indeed, increasing inflation and rental prices and the general difficulty of living conditions in the country have a role in this.

The population of foreign nationals who immigrated to Türkiye is about twice that of those who emigrated from Türkiye in 2016-2019. In 2021, 578 thousand 490 foreign nationals immigrated to Türkiye. The inflationary environment and the depreciation of the Turkish lira made living conditions difficult for the citizens. However, for the foreign population, it makes Türkiye a center of attraction for living and trading. In this sense, there is undoubtedly a need for multidimensional policies aimed at foreigners, from university students to investors.

The number of people living in Türkiye with a residence permit has increased approximately seven

times compared to 2010. In 2021, 1 million 340 thousand people came to Türkiye with a residence permit. A similar increase is seen in the number of work permits issued to foreigners. The foreign population granted work permits has increased seven times compared to 2010 and reached 123 thousand 570 people in 2020. However, this number also shows a decrease of 14.91% compared to the previous year.

As all these data show, the ratio of foreigners to the total population in Türkiye is constantly increasing from 2014 to 2019. In 2019, there was an increase of 70.7% compared to the previous year. According to the data of the Presidency of Migration Management, there were 3 million 424 thousand 237 Syrian populations in Türkiye under temporary protection in 2017. In 2021, this number reached 3 million 650 thousand. Except for 2019, the number of Syrians has increased continuously. According to the age distribution of Syrians in Türkiye in 2017, there are primarily babies and children between the ages of 0-4. In 2021, there were Syrian children aged 5-9 the most, followed by babies and children aged 0-4. The fact that the Syrian population consists mainly of children and young people reminds that multidimensional policies should be implemented in many issues, especially in health and education.

The number of irregular migrants caught by the operations of the authorized units of the government has increased significantly over the years. 2019 was a year in which irregular migrant smuggling stood out. It is seen that 454 thousand of irregular migrants were caught this year. There was a 73.13% decrease in irregular migrants in 2020, but this number increased again in 2021. There are similar increases and decreases in the number of migrant smugglers as organizers of irregular migration in similar years. Therefore, it is observed that irregular migration has weakened relatively in the last two years, and the ability of the government to monitor and intervene has increased relatively in the conditions of the pandemic.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Total Population Migrating Between Provinces (Million)	1.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	3.1	2.8	2.3	2.8	
Net Migration Rate in Istanbul	7.8	9	2.2	4.7	1	3.5	-4.8	-0.4	-13.9	7.8	-3.4	-1.4	
Number of Foreigners in Türkiye with Residence Permit (Thousand)	182.3	234.3	321.7	379.8	422.9	461.2	539.2	856.5	1101.0	886.7	1314.2	1340.7	
Number of Foreigners with Work Permit (Thousand)		17.5	32.3	45.8	52.3	64.5	73.6	87.2	115.8	145.2	123.6		
Ratio of Foreigners to the Population in Türkiye (%)					0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.7			
Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection (Million)			0.0	0.2	1.5	2.5	2.8	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	
Number of Caught Irregular Immigrants (Thousand)	33	44	48	40	59	146	174	175	268	454	122	163	
Number of People Smugglers Caught (Thousand)	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	4.5	3.3	4.6	6.3	9.0	4.3	6.9	

Sources: TURKSTAT Migration Statistics, International Migration Statistics, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management




Figure 41. Number of Migrants from Rural to Urban Areas (1975-2000)

Source: TURKSTAT, Migration Statistics




Figure 42. Immigrant Population (Thousand people, 2016-2019)

Source: TURKSTAT, International Migration Statistics




Figure 43. Age Pyramid of the Syrian Population

Source: Refugees Association, 2022

Life and Culture

Culture is an important indicator when it comes to social and economic development. Library and cultural education expenditures have the highest share of the general government culture expenditures in 2020. However, this rate corresponds to only 6.17%. It is a fact that the highest government expenditure in culture is devoted to architecture and then to audio-visual media works. As a result, it can be said that a higher share is allocated to cultural forms that are more visible and quickly consumed.

Culture is classified together with entertainment in the household expenditure data of TURKSTAT. We see that entertainment expenditures are gradually increasing within the household expenditures. This increase is significant despite the dominance of expenditures such as housing, education, food, and clothing. However, although the share allocated to entertainment culture by low-income households is the same as that of high-income households, they are weaker and more disadvantaged in terms of amount and content. It shows that there is inequality in access to cultural products and services.

The number of public libraries has increased continuously since 2017. Although the number of people using the library decreased in 2020, it increased to 15,8 million in 2021. Therefore, the pandemic should not be viewed as a mere medical or economic process. It also negatively affected people's access to the library. The number of books in the library showed a steady increase. In this sense, public libraries are important as institutions that enable the lower and middle classes, especially those living in relatively small cities and towns, to access information and a working environment, strengthening the democratic distribution of cultural resources.

Considering the data obtained from banderols, 438 million books were produced in 2021, a change of 1.26% compared to 2020, which is a very low increase. It was due to the rapid rise in printing costs and the worsening market conditions for small and medium-sized publishers. While the economic conditions are getting harder for the production of print books, an increase is observed in e-books. The number of e-books published in 2021 increased approximately 45 times compared to 2010. It can be said that the publishing industry closely follows digital transformation.

Considering that digital platforms are used intensively in education and culture during the pandemic, it can be predicted that the number of electronic books will increase rapidly.

There was a significant increase in theater plays until 2019. However, in 2020 and 2021, the numbers fell dramatically due to the pandemic. Similarly, the number of theater audiences has increased significantly since 2010, except the pandemic period. In this sense, the theater industry can be expected to rise again in the coming years. The difference between cinema and theater is that due to easier access, people prefer to watch movies and TV series more on digital platforms.

Thirty-three million visitors came to Türkiye in 2010 for touristic purposes. The number of visitors increased continuously until 2019 and reached its peak with 51 million 750 people this year. The ban on visits between countries due to the pandemic is the reason for the sharp decline in the following years. While the number of visitors from Türkiye was approximately 33 million in 2010, it was 51 million 860 thousand in 2019. The fact that the number of people going abroad from Türkiye is close to the number coming to Türkiye can be interpreted as an indicator related to the increase in purchasing power in general.

In 2019, Türkiye's total tourism income rose to 34,5 billion dollars, an increase of 16.95% compared to the previous year. Parallel to this, the ratio of tourism income to GDP increased to 4.6%. On the other hand, while tourism income decreased by 65.22% in 2020 compared to the previous year, the ratio of tourism income to GDP decreased by 63.04%. These rates show the negative impact of the pandemic on the Turkish economy. However, more tourists may come to Türkiye in 2022 due to the end of the pandemic and the depreciation of the Turkish lira against foreign currency.

There has been a significant increase in licensed athletes in both genders from 2010 to 2018. In general, professional participation in sports has increased in society. However, it is necessary to comment on gender here. While the rate of increase in women in the eight years is 235%, it is 156% in men. Although women still lag behind men in numbers, their rate of increase indicates that the gender gap will close in the next ten years.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Share of Library and Cultural Education in General Government Cultural Expenditures (%)					5.6	5.6	5.8	5.2	4.3	5.2	6.2		
Share of Entertainment-Culture in Total Household Expenditures (%)	4.9	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.8	6	6.3	6.1	7	
Number of Books Published (Thousand Pieces)				47.4	50.8	56.4	54.5	60.3	67.1	68.6	78.5		
Number of Electronic Books	305	1.037	2.617	2.299	5.245	6.389	2.697	1.767	5.177	6.072	8.917	13.673	
Number of Books Published Per Capita				7.2	7.4	8	8.8	7.8	7.2	7	7.6		
Number of Theater Plays (Thousand)	3.7	4.3	5.5	6.2	6.6	6.8	7.8	9.0	9.4	9.8	6.2	1.7	
Number of Theater Audiences (Million People)	5.2	5.4	5.6	6.2	6.1	5.9	6	7	7.8	7.9	4.5	0.7	
Number of Feature Films (Thousand)	36	37.9	37.6	40.4	41.5	49.2	53.4	58.2	65.5	68.4	26	26.5	
Number of Movie Theater Audiences (Million People)	35.8	37.4	39	45.1	55.4	57.1	55.3	68.5	64.8	56.5	17.2	12.4	
Number of Museums					392	409	417	438	451	467	494		
Number of Visitors to Museums and Archaeological Sites (Million Person)	25.9	28.5	28.8	29.5	29.8	28.5	17.5	20.5	28.2	34.8	8.9		
Number of Visitors to Türkiye (Million Person)	33.0	36.8	37.7	39.9	41.6	41.1	30.9	38	46.1	51.8	16.0	30	
Number of Visitors from Türkiye (Million Person)	33	36.2	36.5	39.2	41.4	41.6	31.4	38.6	45.6	51.9	15.8	24.2	
Total Tourism Revenues (Billion USD)	24.9	28.1	29	32.3	34.3	31.4	22.1	26.2	29.5	34.5	12	24.5	
Ratio of Tourism Revenue to GDP	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.7	3.7	2.6	3.1	3.8	4.6	1.7		
Number of Airline Passengers (Million People)	103.5	118.3	131	150	166.2	181.4	174.2	193.6	211.0	208.9	81.7	128.4	
Number of Touristic Facilities	3.5	3.7	3.8	4	4.3	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.9	5.4	
Number of Nights Spent by Visitors (Million)	98.2	106.5	121.2	122.7	130	133.9	112.6	116.2	144.4	159.2	64.8	123.7	
Average Length of Stay of Visitors (Days)	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.6	

Sources: TURKSTAT Cultural Economy and Cultural Employment Indicators, Household Consumption Expenditure Statistics, Cinema and Theater Statistics, Tourism Statistics, Print Media and International Standard Book Number Statistics




Figure 44. Number of Public Libraries, People Benefiting from the Library and Books in Libraries (Thousand, Million People & Million Pieces, 2017-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Library Statistics




Figure 45. Number of Licensed Athletes (2010 - 2018)

Source: Ministry of Youth and Sports, General Directorate of Sports Services

Media and Communication

Digital transformation completely shapes our individual and social lives and enables us to develop new behavioral patterns. The rate of internet users in the total population has reached 60% worldwide. At this point, praising the traditional communication world by ignoring the opportunities and conveniences of digital transformation causes many opportunities to be missed. For this reason, it would be a rational approach to read and understand digital transformation correctly and join the new order.

The use of mobile phones in Türkiye is ubiquitous. By 2021, the number of mobile cellular subscribers had reached at the same level with the total population. Along with smartphones, the mobile phone has become the main internet channel. While there were 1,5 million mobile internet subscribers in 2010, the number was close to 70 million in 2021. This indicates that a more personal relationship is now established with all kinds of digital contents and media. Access to information, media, entertainment, culture, and politics content and interaction with them are now individualized, as heating houses is no longer a common process thanks to the spread of natural gas infrastructure.

The widespread use of the internet also means the rapid growth of the information and communication sector. As a result, the net income of information and communication technology operators is increasing exponentially. Even from 2020 to 2021, the total net income increased by around 15 billion TRY to reach 92,4 billion. Of course, this is directly proportional to the increased infrastructure length and connection speed. Although Türkiye's IT infrastructure is still insufficient compared to similar countries, rising social demand generates a large turnover. On the other hand, the problems that arise in the relationship between telecommunications companies and customers are also diversifying. Paying relatively high and uncontrolled fees for a service that is not high enough compared to the world average has become a common complaint in society.

Along with the time spent on the internet and e-commerce, online consumption is increasing. While the supply of essential consumer goods via the internet has been growing for a long time, it

accelerated in 2020-21 with the effect of the pandemic. Firms and service providers are shaping their product content and wage policies in more detail to keep up with this increasing demand and make a profit. 70% of people shop online, even for items considered "can't be bought without trying," such as clothing. The increase in the rate of online food shopping seems just as significant. These increases have reduced employment in jobs such as warehousing, courier, and transportation. However, it has also changed certain shopping and behavioral patterns culturally. More formal relations are now established with manufacturers.

The internet is not just a medium for individual customers. Almost all public institutions and organizations, especially e-government, carry out processes such as making appointments through digital platforms and applications. While the rate of people using the internet for public communication was around 10% in 2010, this rate has now exceeded 59%. The fact that the e-trial and e-examination systems have finally been implemented seems to have relieved the professionals, the citizens, and the employees who bear the burden of the work in the public sector. It would not be wrong to say that Türkiye is well above the world average in digitalization of public affairs and state-citizen relations.

There is a decline in television and radio, which are now considered more traditional. Although the time spent watching television seems to have increased during the pandemic period, it is predicted that it will decrease again because viewers have started to watch a significant part of television content via digital broadcasting platforms. In the last ten years, the rate of those who listen to the radio for 1 hour or less on weekdays increased by 27.3%. However, the rate of those who listened for 2-4 hours decreased by 6.3% and the rate of those who attended for 5-8 hours reduced by 6.4%. In other words, people now listen to the radio for a much shorter period. It is undoubtedly a result of the widespread personal access to the Internet, allowing certain behaviors, especially listening to music, to be performed without needing a radio.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Number of Mobile Subscribers (Million)	61.7	65.3	67.6	69.6	71.8	73.6	75	77.9	80.1	80.8	82.1	86.3	
Number of Mobile Internet Subscribers (Millions)	1.5	4.9	10.3	22.5	31.0	37.5	50.5	56.1	60.4	61.7	65.1	69.6	
Net Income of Information and Communication Technologies Operators (Billion TRY)	27.2	30.1	31.3	33.7	39.6	45.2	51.2	59	66.7	77.1	92.4		
4.5G and Fiber Optic Cable Length in Türkiye (Km)				227	245	268	291	325	355	390	425	471	
Average Download Speed (Mbps) of Fixed Internet Connections								6.7	15.7	19.3	26	28.9	
Time Spent on Social Media Per User (Minutes)					152	176	152	181	168	166	171	177	
Rate of Individuals Ordering Goods or Services over the Internet	6.3	8.4	10.3	11.8	16.6	18.4	20.9	24.9	29.3	34.1	36.5	44.3	
Percentage of People Using the Internet for Personal Contact with Public Institutions/Organizations (%)	10.8	16.8	20.4	19.1	27.2	28.4	36.7	42.4	45.6	51.2	51.5	58.9	
Average Daily Time Spent Watching Television (Minutes)					258	266	263	263	261	258	254	277	

Sources: Information and Communication Technologies Authority Statistics, TURKSTAT Survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Usage in Households, TIAK Yearbook of Television Audience Measurement




Figure 46. Individuals using the Internet (% of population, 2010-2020)

Source: World Bank




Figure 49. Proportion of Internet Purchases (% of total, 2010-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Usage in Households, 2022




Figure 47. Proportion of Households with Broadband and Fixed Broadband Internet Access (% of households, 2011-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Usage in Households, 2022




Figure 48. Number of Social Media Users and Ratio of Users to the Population (A million people and %, 2019-2021)

Source: We Are Social Türkiye Report




Figure 50. Market Share of Digital Broadcasting Platforms in Türkiye (% of total, Q1 2021)

Source: JustWatch




Figure 51. 10-Year Change of the Time Spent Listening to Radio on Weekdays (% of total, 2009-2019)

Source: RTÜK, Radio Listening Trends, 2019




Figure 52. 10-Year Change of the Time Spent Listening to Radio on Weekends (% of total, 2009-2019)

Source: RTÜK, Radio Listening Trends, 2019





POST- PANDEMIC SOCIETY

Healthquake of the 21st Century: The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Lessons Learned

Abdullah Uçar

MD, Asst. Prof., Sakarya University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health

Introduction

Human being, who has been on a journey on the earth for 315,000 years, and proudly boasting of the mighty level of sophistication he has reached today, has succumbed to Sars-Cov-2. This virus is only slightly stronger than influenza. It was the third internationally dangerous coronavirus outbreak in the last 20 years, but the SARS and MERS outbreaks did not affect the world that much. This unexpected flood broke out in the Anthropocene, in geological times when man shaped the earth. When artificial intelligence, asteroid mining, quantum mechanics, transhumanism, and more were being discussed, humanity suddenly found itself in isolation and quarantine. People in panic remembered their experiences from history, opened the dusty notebooks of the last pandemic, the 1918 Spanish flu, and developed similar methods using their current advanced tools, as they had done to fight the pandemic before. They noted the better events in 1918 and carried the experience forward. While the virus crossed the continents, the cutting-edge technology of the 21st century proved itself sufficient merely to monitor the virus closely. Therefore, to act faster than the virus and prevent it remained a dream.

Finally, miraculously, a vaccine was developed in 15 months that could have taken 15 years otherwise (Ucar, 2021a). The virus has undergone hundreds of thousands of mutations during this time. Although wild variants at the beginning of the pandemic could not hold on to life because they killed too many, vaccines and social meas-

ures slowed its spread. Less virulent variants that emerged towards the end of the pandemic may have spread worldwide faster than vaccination, as expected, providing natural immunity, but we do not yet have any definite information on this subject (Ucar, 2022). The head of the WHO announced recently that we would have a solution soon (Reuters, 2022). As of November 2022, there were 6.61 million registered deaths worldwide. The number of registered patients has exceeded 635 million. When considered together with unrecorded deaths and diseases, it can be said that this pandemic is the biggest global health crisis experienced after the 1918 pandemic.

Structural Deficiencies

Despite all the advanced technology and the level of civilization humanity has reached, the pandemic has made our deficiencies on the most basic issues visible, made the global civilization face itself, and created an opportunity for us to review our flaws. Even in countries that represent the pinnacle of development and are called "developed countries," basic deficiencies in the health have become visible. The crisis went beyond health and revealed fundamental deficiencies in the economy, communication, governance, and many more areas. The weaknesses in the health can be examined under some specific headings.

Strategies to Cope with Pandemic and the side Effects

The biggest discussion at the beginning of the pandemic was the management strategy. The debate was between two main strategies: mitigation and suppression (Ferguson et al., 2020). The mitigation strategy assumed that since there is no vaccine or treatment for the virus, the virus would spread to the community anyway and would inevitably kill a certain number of people. Hence, it suggested that the virus should be released in a controlled way in the community. In this way, society would encounter the virus gradually, and those who would die would die over a longer period of time. In other words, each patient would be provided with as much health care as he needs, and the spread of the virus would be allowed by preserving the system's capacity before the health system collapses.

On the other hand, the suppression strategy suggested stopping the pandemic by taking drastic measures, closing schools if necessary, and forcing people to stay home. Meanwhile, it proposed to develop sustainable measures, prevention, or treatment options, minimize community deaths due to the virus, and gain time to find solutions. However, the cost to society of the latter approach has been enormous because closing businesses and schools, and confining people to their homes, could be implemented for a very short time. In summary, the mitigation strategy argued that deaths were inevitable and a certain number of deaths would to be tolerated. In contrast, the suppression strategy advocated mobilizing all means to prevent deaths and maintain strict measures until a cure or vaccine was found.

While these discussions continued some countries had hesitations and deliberate delays in taking strict measures. In England, Imperial College published its first and most reliable estimates of the number of deaths and cases and the extent to which the health system could collapse. After that, the gigantic dimensions of the pandemic caused the USA and the UK to end their indecision, and an urgent suppression strategy was started against the pandemic (Wired UK, 2020). At this point, the British parliamentary reports suggest that even developed countries like USA and England were

unprepared for such a pandemic. They could not decide, and their delay in taking strict measures apparently cost many lives (Parliament.uk, 2021).

In this process, along with the concern for life, the economic and social costs also caused concern. Each precaution had heavy consequences on social life. For example, closing schools meant violating one of the most basic human rights, the right to education. On the other hand, the economic costs have reached trillions of dollars, and the cost of the pandemic only for the USA has exceeded 16 trillion dollars (Bruns & Teran, 2022). The severe fluctuations caused by death and diseases in the health field also affected the economy and the community's mental health and social life. Since society was exposed to both pandemic and pandemic measures, both the effects of the pandemic and the effects of the intervention against the pandemic directly affected the community's mental health. The suicide rate has increased in society and among healthcare workers in particular (WHO, 2022). There was an increase in domestic violence due to families spending time being together for a long time at home; 45% of women were exposed to violence in the first year of the pandemic (Piquero, Jennings, Jemison, Kaukinen, & Knaul, 2021).

Inadequate and Unprepared Health Systems

The WHO European Office states that European countries have the most developed health systems in the world, but no country has the necessary preparation and sufficient resilience to combat the pandemic (Van Ginneken et al., 2022). Hence, it can be said that even though the pandemic action plans of the countries were available before the pandemic, they were unsuccessful in the execution of these plans and the management of the crisis. Health systems were not built to respond to such a sudden and intense demand. Türkiye also had a plan for a possible influenza pandemic, but these plans alone were not sufficient to manage the pandemic.

Since the human mind cannot make a sound assessment in times of disaster or crisis, disaster or crisis preparation plans are documents that can be applied without requiring intense intellectual activity and intellectual capacity, revealing what a per-

son in panic should do in the middle of that crisis with the simplest directions. Pandemic plans, on the other hand, should have been drafted in the form of guidelines that would algorithmically express what the administrators in all organs of a society in panic should do step by step, when and where they should stand, and what kind of infrastructure should be developed. However, these plans failed due to insufficient infrastructure and poorly funded health systems, especially the disdain of the gov-

*Key indicators in
health
→ p. 36-37*

ernments of the developed countries about the gravity of the pandemic as suggested by scientific warnings, protection of the population

at the highest economic risk, and public distrust of scientists and those managing the pandemic (The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, 2022).

An index has not yet been developed to measure the damage or success of countries in dealing with the pandemic, and there are no agreed common indicators yet. However, we can clearly say that one

of its most important indicators is the number of deaths from COVID-19 in the unit population. At this point, I compared Türkiye's data with other OECD countries. However, in this comparison, I ranked the number of COVID-19 deaths per unit population of countries by proportioning them according to the Human Development Index (HDI) values and calculating how much loss would occur if all countries were at a similar level of development (HDI=1). The resulting sequence is shown in Figure 53.

According to this ranking, it can be clearly said that Türkiye has suffered a very low number of losses compared to many OECD countries and that it has shown a similar level of success in dealing with the pandemic to the Scandinavian and South Asian countries. Nevertheless, it can be seen that Türkiye ranks 8th among 38 countries. Even when the number of deaths per unit population is directly compared without any HDI correction, Türkiye is in the 10th rank. The most important factor behind this success is our country's implementation of the suppression strategy despite its high costs,




Figure 53. COVID-19 Deaths (Per Hundred Thousand People When the Human Development Index of OECD Countries is Adjusted to 1 Point




Figure 54. Annual Consultations Per Physician, 2019 (or sooner)

Source: OECD Health Statistics 2021.

Note: Denominator data for Chile, Costa Rica and Greece include all physicians with a work permit.

not mitigation. In addition, the high hospital bed capacity, the solid basic health services, pandemic management infrastructure, the effective contact tracing work, and the presence of human resources in the health sector put all these infrastructure and managerial decisions into practice with extreme professionalism and efficiency (Guerin, 2020; Ucar, 2021b). Even before the pandemic, emergency (disaster) relief was available in hospitals and polyclinics in our country, and our health personnel worked with an extraordinary effort (OECD, 2021). Therefore, it can be said that the fact that the health system in Türkiye is already accustomed to working far above its capacity has made it possible to have less loss of human lives during the pandemic. However, it is doubtful whether the existing workforce in health, especially physicians, would be able to handle the heavy workload in the long run.

Governance and Science in the Pandemic

Apart from preparing health systems against the pandemic, it was observed that the planning for the multi-stakeholder and sectoral management of the pandemic was insufficient. For example, scientists in the scientific committee established in England left their duties due to reasons such as the

non-implementation of their recommendations by the government, manipulation by politics, and distrust of society, and formed an independent scientific committee and independently shared their views with the public (Carrell et al., 2020; Independent SAGE, 2021). In many countries, scientific committees consisted only of healthcare professionals. However, taking into account the multisectoral impact of the pandemic, a scientific committee should have been established for each sector, and the central scientific committee for health should have coordinated with these committees and directed them regarding the health threats.

Although the prevention and management of pandemics in the community is precisely the field of study of epidemiology specialists,

*On the hierarchy of professions
→ p. 81*

who fall in the sub-branches of the public health department, the scientific committee in Türkiye is mainly composed of infectious disease specialists. Therefore, only one public health expert could participate in the scientific committee (Memurlar.net, 2020). Although the "Social Sciences Board," which was established afterwards, eventually gave more space to field experts, the existence and work of this committee did not receive sufficient credit in the eyes of decision-makers. However, when

adopting strict measures such as school closures and lockdowns, it was necessary to benefit from the expertise of social sciences, which closely examine the structure, motivation and health behaviours of society. It has been observed on a global scale that the pandemic should be managed not on the axis of hospitalization but on the axis of public health policies. It has been experienced at a high cost that no health system capacity can survive in pandemic-level epidemics and that the key to combating epidemics is preventive public health services.

In this process, the circulation of scientific knowledge also accelerated. For example, Chinese scientists had to publish information about detecting the genetic code of the virus and then set up the necessary PCR testing infrastructure based on this information. While this process would normally take about one year, it has been reduced to one week through preprint publishing. Studies were published on BioRxiv.org and MedRxiv.org without peer review, but after being examined by the scientific committees of these organizations, they were shared with the public within a week at the most. Many journals have adopted similar preprint publishing paths, but this has also highlighted the dangers of uncontrolled preprint publishing and declining scientific quality (Kodvanj, Homolak, Virag, & Trkulja, 2022). Although peer review takes a long time, it forms the backbone of scientific pub-

lishing processes. However, this process has been bypassed in the name of public benefit. Evaluating the opportunities created by preprint publishing and the side effects seems to determine the fate of scientific publishing after the pandemic.

The Unequal Consequences of Health Service Interruptions

The intensity of the pandemic led to the collapse of many healthcare systems. This situation caused the system to postpone non-urgent healthcare services, increase patient waiting periods, and an accumulated demand for healthcare services. Another factor that increased this burden was the complications that developed due to the unmet health needs of the population who abstained from receiving health services. Strategies for dealing with this accumulated burden after the pandemic are still being discussed. We witnessed the prolongation of the waiting periods of the patients, the increase in out-of-hospital deaths during the pandemic and many other effects that are being examined under the concept of Long-COVID.

The direct opinion of experts in the field of medical ethics was required to distribute limited resources such as medical supplies, intensive care beds, and vaccines to the society in need, to determine the risk groups in the society, and to prioritize them ac-




Figure 55. Rate of Unavailable Health Services, 2021

Source: Eurofound, 2021

Note: Data shows the percentage of respondents in the EU in spring 2021.

cording to their health needs. However, the effect of these ethical codes was ignored in the decisions taken and social measures. At the very least, WHO's technical documents warned that ethical violations should be considered.

During the pandemic period, many essential health services, especially vaccines and cancer treatments, were interrupted (Van Ginneken et al., 2022). A study conducted with 356 healthcare institutions from 54 countries showed that 88.2% of institutions had difficulty providing services (Jazieh & Kozlakidis, 2020). According to the WHO report, at the beginning of 2021, 47% of hospital care and 27% of dental health needs could not be met in EU countries. A study in Italy showed that cancer cases detected in 10 weeks in 2020 were 45% less than in previous years. Of course, this does not mean that people do not have cancer. The 45% decrease indicates that existing cancer cases could not be diagnosed (Ferrara et al., 2021). Another study in England showed that 27% of patients for whom emergency treatment was recommended after early cancer diagnosis could not be treated; that is, they were driven to death knowingly (The Nuffield Trust, 2022). A study conducted by WHO in countries where health services were interrupted revealed more service interruptions in low-income countries. It indicates that social stratification is also effective in public health emergencies (WHO, 2020).

The interruption of some basic health services directly costs the lives of vulnerable segments of society. For example, it is estimated that there are more than one million additional infant deaths due to insufficient provision of maternal and child health services, which are the most fragile type among the health services that were interrupted (Moynihan et al., 2021). This demonstrates the importance of maintaining the most fragile services, no matter what kind of crisis is experienced. So, it is vital to allocate an independent capacity that will provide independent and minimum service within the total health capacity in public health emergencies. Moreover, the most fragile services, such as maternal and infant health, cancer treatments, and vaccination services, are non-substitutable health services. Therefore, ensuring their continuity under all circumstances is of great importance.

Inefficient Use of Digital Technologies

The pandemic has also tested advanced digital technologies and their usefulness. For example, in the era of cloud computing and cloud objects, a scandal emerged that the UK public health agency transferred the information of test subjects using excel documents. Since the maximum number of rows in the Microsoft Excel is limited to 1,048,576, when the data of more patients than this number were tried to be transferred with Excel, the data outside the maximum limit were lost. The fact that this situation was experienced in England, not in a country from the third world, revealed the helplessness of all humanity in its field in the face of the pandemic (Hearn, 2020). Similarly, the fact that negative values are included in the table of case and death numbers of all world countries published daily by the European Center for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) showed that we are incapable of even counting deaths and cases (Ucar, 2020). These situations also point to a panic in the most basic managerial reflexes and that the use of advanced technologies in times of crisis is not practical enough, even if it is at a sufficient level.

The widespread and even compulsory use of mobile technology and the internet in the fight against the pandemic also caused the victimization of segments of society who did not adapt to this technology. In cases where mobile applications were made obligatory, especially older people suffered. In our country, mobile applications (HES codes) provide access to many public spaces. Still, the issue of adaptation of the elderly population to this technology remained in the background. While the elderly, who were the target of the pandemic, were mostly the victims, they were also the biggest victims of the measures taken. There were also accreditation, licensing, and financing problems for new technologies emerging during the pandemic. In particular, the obligatory collection of large amounts of patient location information brought along the issue of protecting the confidentiality of this information.

The process has shown that public health surveillance systems, that is, the monitoring of health

*Key indicators
of the elderly
population
→ p. 24-25*

problems in the community, are not at the desired level. The fact that the surveillance rate lagged behind the spread of the virus did not leave the possibility of intervening in the spread of the virus. Mobile technology has been at the center of the pandemic struggle. The critical role of this technology in collecting information on public health and monitoring health risks has come to the fore. According to traditional data collection methods, it can be clearly said that direct communication with individuals via mobile applications brings public health surveillance to a new era. This mandatory experience has also shown that surveillance with mobile applications can now be a key component of the post-pandemic period (Jazieh & Kozlakidis, 2020).

Infodemic

WHO stated that they are fighting the pandemic and the equally dangerous infodemic. The fact that there was little information about the virus during the pandemic period provided the ideal spreading environment for false information that caused panic and fear in society. The infodemic, which spread from political leaders who recommended their own people to drink detergents to people with academic titles who claimed that wearing masks was harmful, could be limited by the increase in information about the virus. In this process, the critical role of fact-checking sites came to the fore because the spread of false news was greater than the spread of the virus (Patel, Kute & Agarwal, 2020).

While tackling the infodemic, it was seen how critical risk communication is; the communication between decision-makers, scientists, and the public. It became clear that risk communication should be a central component of pandemic containment plans. In addition, the necessity of cooperation between social media companies and behavioral sciences in the infodemic struggle came to the fore (Jazieh & Kozlakidis, 2020). In this regard, the development of software by social media companies that automatically prevent sharing a conspiracy theory or false information has also brought social media technology to a new level. In addition, advertisements to spread the infodemic were also approved by social media organizations and entered circulation (Facebook Consumer Reports, 2020).

The infodemic has also shown how weak the health literacy of society is. The inability of individuals to distinguish between true and false information, conspiracy theories, and reliable information created an opportunity for the spread of the infodemic. This situation revealed that health literacy is an important public health problem. In the same period, the participation of people with medical expertise in the public debate with different and even opposing views, and the irresponsible presentation of these discussions to the public by media outlets, also undermined society's trust in the experts and laid the groundwork for an infodemic.

Health in Restoring the Post-Pandemic World

Restoration of health systems has emerged as an important necessity after the experience of the pandemic that shook not only health but also all components of life. As a result, health systems have faced an accumulated health demand burden after the pandemic. To cope with this burden, a policy brief prepared by WHO recommends three basic strategies: 1) Increasing the health workforce through employment, 2) Managing productivity, efficiency, capacity, and health demand, 3) Increasing investment in health system infrastructure, developing new service models (Van Ginneken et al., 2022).

The strategy announced by WHO includes separating emergency and non-emergency services, extending service hours after working hours, and increasing bed capacity by cooperating with the private sector. In addition, it includes measures such as dissemination of telemedicine applications, prioritizing health service demand, stretching insurance coverage to private hospital services, and referral of patients abroad. Furthermore, creating a new service model by increasing capital and infrastructure investment includes supporting health institutions' debts and financial conditions, providing patients' home treatment as much as possible, developing digital infrastructure, and developing virtual consultation environments.

Increasing the health workforce includes increasing the number of employees and creating new professional roles within working models. In ad-

dition, the working conditions of health workers should be improved, as human health resources are very expensive. It is a luxury demand to expect a numerical increase in such a resource after not using it efficiently. This improvement should not be perceived only as financial support, minimizing the drudgery on health care workers in the flow of health services, and providing mental health support for burnout in health care workers. Otherwise, it means a significant loss for the health worker who is in burnout to quit his job or to work unwillingly and unproductively even if he works. In Türkiye, the burnout of healthcare workers, especially physicians, has been revealed by the catalytic effect of the pandemic, indicating that the workload above the capacity needs to be evaluated urgently.

Conclusion: The Possibility of a New Paradigm

Muallim Naci's statement, "Human memory is afflicted with forgetting," can also be attributed to the fact that the suffering experienced during the pandemic can be forgotten after the pandemic. While waiting for the transition to the "new normal" with the lessons to be learned from the pandemic, the practices made a point of returning to the "old normal." While the pandemic points to the restoration of the health system to protect and improve public health, on the contrary, it is impossible for health systems that rise based on outpatient clinic performance to meet the health needs of today's world. It is worrying that the policy focus has been on hospital services at the end of the process, which is mostly overcome by public health studies and primary health care services.

In this context, the success of combating the pandemic in Türkiye should be largely attributed to the success of the country's primary healthcare services and infrastructure. In this respect, loyalty should be shown to primary health care services. Furthermore, even if the primary care service does not generate an immediate and direct economy, as in the treatment and rehabilitation services, it creates an indirect and larger economy as it protects the society from the great risks that may upset the economy and social life.

However, the "health intervention"-based, that is, treatment and rehabilitation-based health management paradigm, has undergone a great test in the pandemic. It has been revealed once again that the basic strategy in the fight against public health problems is not treatment but prevention. In summary, the post-pandemic paradigm must be designed to manage health, not disease.

It cannot be expected that any health system that builds the basis of its existence on society's sickness essentially wishes healing to the patients. It is unthinkable that health systems, whose revolving funds depend on the society's illness, will survive, support economic growth, and encourage sustainable development. The health system's performance should be measured by how much healthcare workers protect the health, how many lives they save, and how many health problems they prevent. There are also quite advanced measurement methods in this regard that are applied in developed countries. In this context, the pandemic should be considered an opportunity to re-discuss our system's philosophy.

One of the most important issues is disrupting regular, transparent, and useful registration systems in crises. Each crisis offers an opportunity to prevent another crisis in the future, as long as the data records are kept well. In this context, to prevent the loss of pandemic data and valuable analyzes in our country, rapid action should be taken to record. The recorded data should be quickly shared with the public, and these data should be quickly transformed into information and action plans by scientists. At this point, the TURCOVID-19 project is promising in keeping records of pandemic data in Türkiye and sharing these data as open data. Otherwise, the result of withholding data from society is the loss of life and blood.

TURCOVID-19
project
→ turcovid19.com

Because in an environment where data cannot be transformed into information, interventions will not be based on evidence, and rational management will not be provided. Just as the history of aviation is written in blood, so is our health history written at the cost of our life. In this context, good health management returns to society as saved lives.

Pandemic and Family: Old Trends, New Challenges

Mahmut Hakkı Akın

Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Sociology

Introduction

The COVID-19 outbreak caused the normal course of the world to change and the start of an extraordinary period. During this extraordinary period, restrictions such as lockdowns for certain periods and a break from working in some sectors were introduced in many countries. As a result, there were breaks in the routine continuity of social life. Historical experience has shown that natural disasters, epidemics, wars, and economic and political crises affect all social institutions that make up society. A similar effect has emerged in the spread of the COVID-19 virus worldwide. The continuity of social life was interrupted, and all social institutions were affected by the new conditions created by the pandemic.

One of the institutions where the most important effects of the pandemic were seen was the family. It is accepted that the family is the first and founding institution based on sociality in the history of humanity. Accordingly, the family is the most basic institution where the economy, politics, education, and religion come together. Meeting the family's food, drink, and shelter needs is the economy; the distribution of roles and superior-subordinate relations depending on authority is politics; the source of socialization is education, and the source of spiritual attachment and solidarity is religion. The family is an institution that contains and sustains society as a whole, and this feature is not found in any other social institution. Although the comparisons made on the functions of the family in agricultural and industrial societies indicate that the duties of the family were transferred to other institutions

and social units, and there were some differentiations over time, the family continued to exist.

The crises experienced in the modern period also affected the family. Working in factories and mines for a long time with all working families in the transition period from the agricultural society to the industrial society has the process in which the family was most affected and underwent a structural change. For this reason, those who have an understanding of producing solidarity according to the new conditions in society have sensitive views on the protection of the family because the destruction experienced by the family did not only remain within the private borders of the family but also affected other institutions and society as a whole.

If societies had completely regular structures, it would have been sufficient to define the family as an institution involved in social integration through socialization. Because in such a case, it would be expected that the transfer of established norms and values of societies to generations and the distribution of roles would continue in their own continuity. Moreover, in such a case, social change could be regarded as an exceptional event and even a deviation. The family is an institution in which the effects of social change respond in different ways. While adaptation to change may occur between generations, conflicts may also arise. These effects can be followed through many measurable and unmeasurable issues, such as the decrease in the number of children in the family, the emergence of new family types, the change in the average age of marriage for women and men, the change in divorce rates, the diversity of reasons for divorce, and domestic violence. The extraordinary period

caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which lasted for about two years, had different effects on the family as a social institution.

Family Dynamics in the Lockdowns

The pandemic caused a large part of society to spend most of their time at home, as it caused a general social quarantine. It was an extraordinary situation in terms of human history. Because throughout history, there have been certain limitations for each of the family members in the house, which is the place where the family maintains its existence. With the transition to settled life, it has been accepted that women have a larger role in the home due to the fact that they devote more time to caring for children. Despite this, it is an exceptional situation for all family members to stay at home. This state of exception has caused families to spend more time together with all other members and experience a new situation. This situation caused by the pandemic can be defined as a new family socialization opportunity for both children and parents. Because the family, which stayed in the house with all its members, had to rearrange their lives in the house. Even if this experience is thought to be temporary, it is an important change

and has the potential to produce problems in itself, as in every change process.

At the beginning of the pandemic, the rhetoric that the pandemic equated everyone through lockdown decisions was especially frequent in the media. The pandemic is an extraordinary process that has produced new types of inequalities as well as perpetuated existing inequalities. The pandemic experiences of those with a higher income but no decrease in their earnings due to the lockdown and those with low income or those who lost their jobs or whose wages were cut because they could not work regularly were different.

Different experiences emerged between the sectors that had the opportunity to work remotely in business life and the sectors that directly depended on the production, transportation, or sale of commodities.

Income inequality analysis → p. 85

In addition, the continuation of education from primary school to university over the internet has been experienced in different ways depending on the inequalities in terms of having access to the internet. Therefore, the reorganization of the roles of all family members due to the lockdown continued depending on a complex process produced by macro and micro effects. These complex effects




Figure 56. Statement of "My family relationships have become stronger" by income group (min. 1 – max. 5)

Source: Şentürk and Bozkurt, 2022, p. 192.

and the resulting uncertainty had to be managed within families.

Although macro data confirm the general situation through measurable values, it can be accepted that extraordinary situations' conflict and tension produce some solidarity patterns. For this reason, it is necessary to pay attention to alternative situations rather than judgments that can be completely generalized about social institutions, including the family. There may also be effects that strengthen the family, such as trying to overcome the tension created by the extraordinary situation within the family, making the family a source of primary relationships, thus bringing them closer and binding each other. Here, the potential of the family to produce solidarity with a protective understanding of itself and its members stands out.

This situation can be followed in some studies conducted during the pandemic. For example, in a study conducted on a sample of 5,338 people in April 2020, when the effects were initially experienced after the lockdown due to the pandemic, 35.1% said "I agree," and 19.5% said "I completely agree" to the statement "My family relationships have become stronger." However, in the same study, the rate of those who answered "I completely disagree" to the proposition

"Communication problems increased in my family" was 28.7%, and the rate of those who said "I disagree" was 35% (Şentürk & Bozkurt, 2022, pp. 185-7).

In addition, in a large-scale study conducted with university students who returned to their homes, 52.2% said, "Our family relations have not changed," while the rate of those who said, "Our relations have improved even more" is 35.9% (Barış & Taylan, 2020, p. 26). Despite varying rates, similar trends can be detected in studies conducted on limited samples (Özyürek and Çetinkaya, 2021, p. 100). Therefore, it would be wrong to say that the effects of the pandemic on the family are only negative and to generalize in this way.

The research conducted by Şentürk and Bozkurt showed that positive and negative changes in family relations differ significantly according to income distribution. It is noteworthy that during the pandemic period, high household income positively affected communication within the family, and the highest average of intra-familial communication belonged to the "middle-upper" income group. A linear average decrease is observed from the lowest income group to the highest income group in those who say that communication problems within the family have increased. In the same study, it is observed




Figure 57. Statement of "Communication problems within the family increased" by income group (min. 1 - max. 5)

Source: Şentürk and Bozkurt, 2022, p. 193

that the data about intra-familial communication in the families of those who have anxiety about their profession and income have negative average values (Şentürk and Bozkurt, 2022, pp. 194-5).

Children

The new socialization due to the pandemic has also caused changes in the relations between children or young people and their parents in the family. Although children were not severely affected biologically by the COVID-19 virus, they were exposed to the social and psychological effects of the process. Due to the spatial limitation of life at home has risks in terms of the socialization of children, it is impossible for children in the family not to be affected by this uncertain and extraordinary situation. It has been reported in the news sources that the psychological impact of the pandemic in England is very high, and the number of children with mental health problems has increased 1.5 times compared to 2017 (Triggle, 2021).

In the research conducted by the Human Rights Association on children, domestic violence against children, the reflections of gender inequality, problems in accessing education, and the risks of impoverishment were noticed during the pandemic period. In addition to these risks, the inability to socialize, increased anxiety, and difficulties in conflict with parents or caregivers were also found in the study (Sevinç et al., 2021, p. 33-4). The uncertainty caused by the sudden interruption of life causes some difficulties in managing the attitudes and actions of children and young people who have weaker social abilities. Furthermore, the provision of school

education, an important element of child socialization, on the internet has caused interruptions in general education. These interruptions may cause social and cultural distances between children and their peers a few years older or younger. Especially for children who do not have access to internet resources and whose parents' education level is low, the compelling effects of the pandemic have been more evident.

The research and observed in the last years records kept by TURKSTAT provide an opportunity to comment on children during the pandemic period. For example, in the TURKSTAT Life Satisfaction Survey data in Table 1, the pandemic years draw attention as a period in which the rate of considering children as a reason for happiness increases. The rate of those who consider his/her children as a reason for happiness decreased to 12.8% before the pandemic and increased to 15% in 2020 and 16.8% in 2021. This rate is the highest rate. One of the most important events affecting children during the pandemic is divorce. The number of children given custody in divorce, which we will discuss in detail in the next subsection, is remarkable. There has been a serious increase in the number of children given custody during the pandemic. While 141 thousand children were given custody due to divorce proceedings in 2019, it decreased to 126 thousand in 2020 due to the disruption of the proceedings but increased to 166,000 in 2021. It is seen that the pandemic period, which is an extraordinary period, causes an increase in divorce rates and, therefore, the number of children given custody. During the pandemic

*Key indicators
of the child
population
→ p. 24-25*

Table 1. Persons Seen as Sources of Happiness (%)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Whole family	73.3	72.3	70.2	70.6	74.2	74.1	69.7	67.6
Children	13.4	13.1	15.1	14.3	12.9	12.8	15.0	16.8
Spouse	5.0	5.3	4.7	5.4	3.6	3.7	3.5	4.1
Parents	3.1	2.8	3.6	3.2	2.7	2.5	3.6	4.0
Himself/herself	1.9	2.7	2.7	3.4	3.3	3.8	4.2	4.0
Grandchildren	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.6	2.2	2.1
Other	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.9	1.5

Source: TURKSTAT, Life Satisfaction Survey

period, the increase in children being seen as a reason for happiness and the increase in the number of children given custody due to divorce are also unique to this extraordinary period.

Marriage and Divorce

One of the first indicators that come to the fore about how a general social crisis will affect the family is divorce. Divorce, which occurs for various reasons, means ending the ongoing unity of the family. Marriage is the sub-institution that establishes the family and determines its social legitimacy. The dissolution of a marriage, except for the death of one of the spouses, often indicates that the husband and wife have not been able to establish a harmonious family. Cultural, moral, and religious teachings agree that divorce can negatively affect community cohesion. For this reason, while divorce is prohibited in some faiths to protect the family, it is not appreciated in others, and conditions produced by divorce are difficult. There is a direct or indirect emphasis on the sanctity of the family in all of the teachings and understandings in which divorce is considered negative. However, extraordinary periods experienced by societies cause changes in family structure and, therefore, an increase in divorce rates.

It is a situation that is generally emphasized that divorce rates increase more with modernization. It would not be wrong to suggest that modernization has changed the roles of men and women, the workforce and family structure, and the household population. However, when looking at the details, a different situation draws attention. Therefore, while interpreting the increase in divorce rates, one should not be mistaken that there is a regular increase and should consider the periodic variations. It is observed that periods of war and economic crisis as extraordinary situations are directly reflected in divorce rates.

For example, during the 20th century in the USA, there was a change in marriage and divorce rates depending on the meaning that new generations ascribe to family and marriage institutions during periods of war and economic crisis (Wilson, 2019). Of course, these rates and trends can be explained by the effects and reasons in their own periods. For example, the downward trend in divorce rates in the United States in the 2000s is associated with a decline in marriage rates, changes in lifestyle, and other factors. Similar data are available in the UK. In particular, the years of the World War II as a period of social anomie and depression, caused a serious increase in both divorces and the number of chil-




Figure 58. Crude Divorce Rate in Türkiye (%)

Source: TURKSTAT, Marriage and Divorce Statistics




Figure 59. Crude Marriage Rate in Türkiye (%)

Source: TURKSTAT, Marriage and Divorce Statistics

dren out of wedlock in England. It is observed that the decline in marriage rates and divorce rates is similar to that in the USA (Thompson et al., 2012).

According to the data in Türkiye, the family is clearly in a very different situation from the West regarding marriage and divorce. Family is one of the most important and valued institutions in Türkiye. According to the 2018 data from the World Values Survey, the rate of those who care about their family in Türkiye is 91.8%. Along with the decrease in marriage rates in the USA and many European

countries, there is a decrease in divorce rates compared to the past. Even if a partial decrease in marriage rates is observed in Türkiye, this rate is still very high compared to Western countries. Despite the partial increase in divorce rates, the divorce rate in Türkiye is at a low level compared to many countries in Europe and Asia.

During the pandemic period, changes are noticed in the number of marriages and divorces. Figure 58 and 59 show the crude marriage and divorce rates between 2011 and 2021. The refraction in the indicator

Table 2. Cities with the highest and least increase in the number of divorces from 2020 to 2021

10 cities with the highest increase (%)		10 cities with the least increase (%)	
Bayburt	105.71	Bilecik	10.54
Gümüşhane	67.06	Kırıkkale	10.90
Muş	62.61	Isparta	13.02
Karabük	59.51	Muğla	17.86
Hakkâri	56.34	Niğde	17.96
Karaman	54.91	Zonguldak	18.13
Bitlis	53.08	Kırşehir	18.18
Çanakkale	48.39	Sakarya	18.56
Diyarbakır	47.88	Mersin	18.56
Çorum	47.65	Trabzon	18.61

Source: The table is prepared and calculated using the data of TURKSTAT.

that occurred within the two years that the pandemic started and continued is remarkable. The decline in marriages and divorces increased in 2021. The effect of the pandemic on the decrease in the number of marriages can be estimated for some reasons.

For example, the prohibition of weddings and entertainment has led to the postponement of marriage for many families. It can be estimated that the crises produced by the pandemic period caused a partial increase in the number of divorces because the pandemic affected family life socially, psychologically, and economically beyond just the disease. Despite everything, it should be noted that the proportional increase in divorces is not very high.

The crude divorce rate was 1.9 in 2019 and approached 2.1 in 2021. Although the pandemic has a relatively small effect on the divorce rate in this sense, it would be more appropriate to think about this issue in the long term. Considering the increase in the number of divorces by the province during the pandemic period, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between the top ten cities with the highest and lowest percentage of increase in terms of being big or small cities or regional disparities.

Violence

Violence is a negative emotional state that can occur differently due to a lack of communication within the family and many other problems. One of the two most common types of violence in the family is psychological violence, and the other one is physical violence. Unfortunately, it is impossible to detect both types of violence through measurable data fully. However, incidents of violence can be tracked if family members who have been subjected to violence inform the relevant departments.

An extraordinary situation such as a pandemic will likely increase domestic violence rates. The uncertainty created by the pandemic is in itself a worrying event. It can be seen that those who experience job and income loss have increased anxiety and other psychological problems with this uncertainty. In addition, the fear and anxiety produced by the disease itself should be considered because, in this

process, those who were worried about their health and their relatives, those who were quarantined, and those who lost their relatives had to manage many psychological tensions simultaneously. Depending on the factors noted, it can be expected that the probability of encountering psychological or physical violence in the family during the pandemic period is higher than in ordinary periods.

The World Health Organization reported that the number of women who reported that they were exposed to violence in EU member countries during the pandemic increased by 60% (Viero et al., 2021, p. 5). A similar situation applies to children. During the pandemic, the number of those who applied to the relevant departments due to violence or abuse against their children increased (Tar et al., 2022, pp. 374-5). In a study examining domestic violence incidents experienced in different parts of the world during the pandemic period, it was stated that there was an increase in the incidence of psychological, physical, and sexual violence in all countries, although the rates vary, and that the most common type of violence was psychological violence (Yıldız and Erbil, 2022, p. 229). In this research, it has been shown through data and reports that women in different parts of the world have had to quit their jobs more often than men, and they are exposed to gender inequality during the pandemic period.

During the pandemic period in Türkiye, some studies were conducted on domestic violence. In a study that analyzed the situation before and after the pandemic through newspaper reports, it was observed that jealousy was predominantly the cause of domestic violence before the pandemic, but this rate partially decreased. In addition, it is noteworthy that in a number of cases, violence is the reason that leads to a desire among women to leave their husbands (Şahin et al., 2021, p. 7355). The survey titled "Working Life and Domestic Violence During the Pandemic" conducted by Sabancı University in June and August 2020 showed that 62% of female employees were exposed to at least one type of violence during the pandemic. The most common type of violence was psychological violence (57.6%). The rates of physical violence (12.2%) and sexual violence (8.6%) are lower than psychological violence. 5% of the men who participated in the survey claimed that they inflicted violence on their wives

and that it happened due to economic problems and problems related to their children (Ararat et al., 2021, p. 18).

Conclusion

One of the institutions where the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are observed in many ways is the family. During this period, the family faced new economic and educational situations. In addition, during the lockdown periods, all family members re-socialized within the family. Therefore, the pandemic period has been experienced differently in different family types. Accordingly, while the ties of solidarity within the family were dissolved for some, others strengthened the family ties during this period.

Extraordinary periods throughout history have caused some reactions in the family unit. Divorce and violence have been seen as the consequences of the negative effects of extraordinary times. Loss of income and the triggering effects of uncertainties about the future come to the fore more than health problems. In addition, the sudden interruption of ongoing life requires a transition period to redefine the roles and define new boundaries. This transition process produces many risks. For example, if the problem of burnout and the need for spiritual satisfaction are not resolved within the family, violence and dissolution of family unity will become more likely. This assumption is confirmed in one aspect in official sources and field research in Türkiye.

Undoubtedly, some family members are more connected to each other and strengthen the bonds of solidarity within the family in this difficult and uncertain period. Indeed, field studies have revealed that the pandemic and other variables positively affect the family. Here, it is reflected in the studies whether the resources available to the families play a decisive role or not. Moving the working life to the home environment has led to a complex situation in family relations and roles. This situation affected children as well as working women and men. In addition, house facilities and limitations were also decisive in managing the process.

Children had to receive education online during the pandemic period. Therefore, access to the internet emerged as a primary issue. In addition, all the posi-

tive and negative experiences of the families during the pandemic process were reflected in the children in some way. As a result, there has been a serious increase in the number of children taken into custody, especially due to the increase in divorce rates.

Türkiye is a country where the number of households has decreased, the number of children and young people has decreased, and the elderly population has increased. Despite all these changes, it is a country with high marriage rates and low divorce rates compared to many Western countries. For the majority of society, the family as an institution is still an institution that is considered important and even sacred. During the pandemic period, the family also used the opportunities to resist despite the problems produced by the extraordinary period. It has been seen that strong family structures are more experienced in overcoming the risks produced by the extraordinary period. It can be predicted that the family's functions of providing spiritual satisfaction and being a source of solidarity will reflect positively on the functioning of other institutions. For this reason, promoting the continuity of family existence is also in favor of society.

Especially during the pandemic, providing economic security to family members, improving housing conditions, facilitating access to education opportunities, and the existing material and moral support units become more important. Local and civil actors should play a more active role in maintaining solidarity. Since there is no single type of family, the regional, class, and local characteristics of family structures should be determined for policy-makers, and it should be taken into account that the expectations of each family are different. Moreover, families differ regarding factors such as culture, education, and economy. Therefore, the continuity of the family requires the identification of the unique situations of different family types. Here, too, national and local, official, and civil decision-making management mechanisms must act with awareness of the family realities of their regions. It would be beneficial to increase detailed and focused research for due diligence for policy implementations. In particular, examining demographic changes is also crucial for the family institution.

Education After the Pandemic: Opportunities, Risks and Inequalities

Taner Atmaca

Assoc. Prof., Düzce University, Faculty of Education

Introduction

The world had a very important and unexpected experience due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the schools closed as a result almost simultaneously showed us the total effects of globalization in education. Undoubtedly, the people most negatively affected by the pandemic have been those with the most vulnerable and disadvantaged socioeconomic status. The emergence of the pandemic has significantly reduced the capacity of governments, families, or organizations to support education. COVID-19 has also caused some established habits related to education to change. With the sudden closure of schools, the disruption of modern society's school-oriented daily life planning (for example, the inability of working parents to find reliable people to take care of their children, etc.) has led to many new and radical decisions.

As a result of the sudden interruption of face-to-face education during the pandemic process, parents and children who did not have plans for how to continue education had a hard time. The urgent and distance education initiatives implemented by countries as a way out have led to the popularity of online platforms and the change in some established practices of education. On the other hand, some inequalities and opportunities, as well as risks, have emerged regarding education in this process. Therefore there is a need to look beyond these immediate concerns about what is possible in educational practice. Considering its multiple effects in terms of economic, social, and political welfare, we are in a convenient period to discuss education systems.

Compensation for learning losses, especially in disadvantaged social segments due to the pandemic, seems possible only with strong and inclusive public education practices.

The Pandemic and the Rising Inequalities in Education

Even with 1-1.5 billion students going to school at the beginning of 2019 all around the world, there was a global consensus that education systems in many countries could not provide quality and effective educational opportunities for all students, and inequalities were rising. According to the report of UNESCO (2020a), the proportion of students who moved away from classical education and stayed away from school during the pandemic reached a size that corresponds to 91% of all students in the world. When we look at OECD countries, the countries that kept their schools open the longest during the COVID-19 pandemic were the USA, Austria, Sweden, Iceland, and Japan, while the countries with schools closed for the longest time were Mexico and Türkiye (ERG, 2021). During this period in Türkiye, between March 2020 and March 2021, primary school 1st graders went to school for 15 days, while 2-3 and 4th grades went to school for only ten days. Other classes hardly ever went to school.

As expected, the poor were the most victimized by these inequalities. While most children in low-income countries are victims of economic inequalities already existing, education disruptions during

the pandemic have deepened inequalities. In addition, the stress that emerged due to the pandemic's psychological, sociological, and economic effects caused some children to be more exposed to domestic violence (Save The Children, 2020). Furthermore, with the closure of schools, some children who did not have sufficient access to digital technology or the internet have been deprived of basic literacy and have not developed enough socially and emotionally. Considering the socialization aspect of the school, the lack of peer learning and interaction is seen as an important deficiency. It also indicates that the phenomenon described as learning loss is experienced more deeply by disadvantaged groups. According to UNICEF (2022), these learning losses caused by COVID-19 have reached almost unbearable levels for some groups.

As a result of the long-term closed schools and the interruptions in distance education in Türkiye, no large-scale study was conducted on the level of learning loss after the pandemic. However, studies in different countries show that learning losses significantly reduce the achievement rate among students. For example, a recent study conducted in Belgium, where schools were closed for approximately nine weeks, revealed that students' learning loss increased by 17% in mathematics and 20% in foreign languages. Moreover, related losses are

more severe in schools with more disadvantaged students (Maldonado & De Witte, 2020).

In Germany, there is some evidence that learning losses due to school closures in the wake of COVID-19 are quite high, as suggested by data. The results of a large-scale online survey of parents of children attending school after the first term of school closures in June 2020 are noteworthy (Grewenig et al., 2020). In this survey, the authors analyzed various data on how many hours per day students spend on various activities. These data belong to the periods when the schools were closed and before. The findings show that students' time on school-related activities decreased from 7.4 hours to 3.6 hours per day during school closures. In addition, more than one-third of the students stated that they spend 2 hours a day on school-related activities, and three-quarters of them spend 4 hours a day. In the report of ERG (2021), it is noteworthy that the number of countries whose schools were partially open during the pandemic period is quite low compared to the number of countries whose schools are completely closed.

Parental support and contribution have become more necessary in education and training, which was largely the responsibility of teachers and school administration before COVID-19. In this process,




Figure 60. Proportion of Countries with Support Policies for Parents in Home Learning in Income Groups

Source: UNESCO, 2020b

social segments that are advantageous in terms of economic, academic, and cultural capital were able to offer a supportive learning environment to their children at home. However, disadvantaged families in terms of economic and cultural capital could not provide this support sufficiently. It revealed a significant learning gap and the other side of inequalities. Since many families and parents do not know how to support their children, online professional pedagogical support has been provided for families, especially in developed countries that act proactively. In Türkiye, the process was carried out with the EBA platform and TV channels. Still, there were constant disruptions in places where access to the internet is limited and in segments with low purchasing power for technological devices or high-speed and high-capacity internet subscriptions. According to MEB data, EBA was among the most clicked websites during the pandemic.

There were also some important problems in academic studies at the higher education level. For example, according to the report of YÖK (2022), it was difficult to communicate with students during the pandemic process, and extracurricular academic studies were disrupted. Another group that felt the most inequality and deficiency was faced by students receiving special education and their families.

*Key indicators in
higher education
→ p. 26-27*

The education of children with special needs, who needed to continue their education mostly with professional support and accompanied by teachers, stopped, and families did not know what to do about it. Child labor and school dropouts in COVID-19 have led to other important risks and inequalities. According to the Education Evaluation Report of TEDMEM (2020), the risk of dropout is 2.8% in preschool, 0.28% in primary education, and 1.48% in secondary education. This risk group includes children working as seasonal workers, immigrants, individuals with special needs, or children who lost their jobs in the pandemic and supported their families.

According to the joint report of ILO and UNICEF (2019), it is estimated that most of the progress in combating child labor in the last two decades has been reversed during the pandemic process, and

every one-point increase in the poverty level has resulted in a 0.7-point increase in child labor. Furthermore, in this report, it is pointed out that the number of poor and vulnerable groups with no regular income is quite high worldwide; hence children may leave school early and start working informally.

Post-Pandemic Education Opportunities: Learning is Everywhere

In the COVID-19 pandemic, some new habits have emerged that education no longer has to be school-centred and can take place anywhere and at any time due to radical steps taken in education and various internet-based applications. In this process, although education continued in online spaces through academic institutions, students began exploring interactive and highly engaging learning environments in virtual laboratories, museums, libraries, etc., through virtual tours and lectures. It seems likely that the COVID-19 pandemic will have a lasting impact on the design of courses. The pandemic's constraints have allowed educators to consider new strategies for teaching their targeted concepts. While rethinking teaching approaches has been imperative and rushed, this experience seems to have served as a rare chance to rethink the strategies that best facilitate learning within the possibilities and constraints of the online context (Lockee, 2021). This unique online learning experience has shown that teachers can also design their lessons with a different method technique. In later processes, it seems possible to individualize education and diversify it with personalised models and designs.

Digitalization in education has enriched and diversified individual learning. However, digitalization is not possible to replace various values and cultural transfer, informal learning and socialization, and various educational and sports activities at school. A school also provides every child with an important opportunity to be accepted, feel valued, and interact. It is not expected that the digital transformation in education will meet children's social learning and social needs. In addition, digital mobility in education also offers each child the oppor-

tunity to access content not included in the school curriculum but suitable for their self-learning, in line with their interests and abilities. It can be considered an important opportunity to experience the pleasure of learning even outside of school.

Of course, online learning alone cannot completely replace a school. Schools worldwide immediately opened their doors to children as the impact of COVID-19 waned, and students physically re-filled the classrooms. However, the understanding that will dominate from now on should be a blended learning style in which teachers manage online and offline classrooms. This compelling factor will pave the way for teachers to follow technology and education more closely, adapt digital technology innovations to education, and design the lessons in a more interesting and easy-to-learn way.

Online and flexible learning need not replace the traditional campus/school-based education experience. On the contrary, it means preparing scenarios for the next possible big problems and making the education system resilient. Online and flexible learning has enabled and will continue to provide productive learning experiences where students are empowered to choose how they want to learn and interact with learning and teaching environments and institutions. Furthermore, adopting open and flexible learning can provide us with comparable opportunities to build learning and teaching operations and operations that do not leave anyone behind, whatever their specific circumstances. In this case, education will continue to serve as a liberating force.

The growing adoption of open, flexible, and technology-enhanced learning in the education sector has made available large datasets about students' interactions and interactions with learning environments. The opportunity to examine this data to enhance students' educational experiences further has led to learning analytics as an entirely new field of educational research (Naidu, 2022). In addition, some of the topics that we will discuss further in education in the future are openness for diversity and inclusion, openness to flexible learning opportunities, collaboration, and competition, and openness for the adoption, use, and sharing of open educational resources.

Teachers tried to reach students through online platforms such as Google, Zoom, Moodle, Hangout, and Skype during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, designing digital materials with enriched content with Web 2.0 tools enabled technology literacy to become widespread. Various research findings in the literature show that enriched materials increase students' interest and curiosity in the lessons and facilitate learning (Ayaz, 2016; Kaya, 2006; Şahin, 2014). Universities are at the forefront of their global studies in higher education, and some academics and researchers have made their courses accessible to everyone online, thus creating an important opportunity for access to quality and international education. It is thought that this will also contribute to the internationalization of universities.

In the post-COVID-19 period, measurement-evaluation processes in education will likely take place with digital content and product designs instead of classical exams. Many educators have developed ways to measure student achievement by eliminating homework and changing assessment strategies completely. In this context, strategies that use the online presentation mode, such as interactive discussions, student-led teaching, and games to increase motivation and attention, came to the fore. Specific changes that are likely to continue to include flexible or extended deadlines for homework completion, greater student choice in learning criteria, and unique experiences that include meaningful application of newly learned skills and knowledge. For example, many creative team-based projects that include social media tools that support collaborative problem-solving can be counted among the applications we may encounter in education in the post-COVID-19 period.

On the other hand, a strong technological infrastructure is needed first to obtain a better online education experience in this process. Then, access to this infrastructure should be provided equally and fairly to all segments of society. In addition, it is necessary to increase the digital technology literacy of educators, develop their skills to produce effective virtual content, and strengthen online measurement-evaluation alternatives. Finally, it may require redefining the process with a more innovative perspective in education. All these devel-

opments necessitate the revision of the curricula of especially teacher training institutions.

Education 4.0 and 21st-Century Skills

It is generally accepted that there are four different periods in the industry's evolutionary process. The first is Industry 1.0, which expresses the mobility in production with steam power. While Industry 2.0 means massproduction based on electricity use, Industry 3.0 is when computer and automation systems are integrated into working life. Industry 4.0, on the other hand, refers to digital technology-based working and production life, such as artificial intelligence, the internet of things, networks, and cyber systems. Each industrial revolution has forced the understanding of education in its own period to change. Thus, to keep up with these developments outside of the schools, there has been a compulsory change in the content, teacher training, pedagogical practices, and perspective on education.

Today, a large part of working and production life takes place with advanced and digital technology. This situation has diversified and changed the quality of the workforce trained by schools and the skills they should have. Industry 4.0 shows that there should be a new setup and vision in education. Many developed countries have implemented educational designs suitable for existing industrial processes. We have begun to see skills such as information-communication technologies literacy, innovation, critical and innovative thinking, networking, speed and harmony, accessing and processing information, and adapting to competition considered among the 21st-century skills, within schools and as part of education.

Media and communication indicators
→ p. 48-49

In the Industry 4.0 period, school and education should be on the same track; that is, Education 4.0 should come to life. Otherwise, the incompatibility between school and working life will be inevitable

and will become anachronistic. In this context, radical changes are inevitable in terms of redesigning and updating the education given in schools in Tür-

kiye, following the needs of the age and providing the necessary skills after COVID-19. Since knowledge is an open power and the producer of knowledge also establishes hegemony, it has been a controversial issue how compatible schools are with this reality in their current form. In addition to being good technology users, educators should also strengthen schools with high technology. Children must become technology literate and content creators. Educational practices that strengthen digital skills and creativity should become widespread, and the classical curriculum should be subjected to structural reform with educational technologies over time. The fact that families take responsibility for a significant part of education together with the school during the pandemic seems to have led to changes in their perspectives on education in the classical sense. In this process, parents will try to help their children more in the future by improving their own digital skills.

Post-Pandemic Education Policies

The COVID-19 process seems to have created a crisis management experience for those who produce macro-level education policies. Although this experience has positive results for countries that act proactively and have the opportunity to take some measures quickly, it has led to serious pedagogical and social problems in other countries. For example, it is difficult to manage unexpected situations and crises in education in Türkiye, which has a large student and teacher population and is administered by the central government. However, this negative experience should be a learning practice for the next process. It should provide crisis management at a macro level, flexibility, and spread learning everywhere. In addition, teachers should be equipped with new competencies and skills, and continuous learning should be made a culture. From now on, updating the curriculum according to new developments and keeping up-to-date competencies in the training of teachers should become an integral part of education policies.

The World Bank (2020) stated that the shock of school closures during the pandemic led to learn-

ing loss, increased dropouts, and increased inequality. In addition, the World Bank reported that the resulting economic shock would worsen the damage by suppressing the demand and supply of education as it harms households. To reduce the damage after the pandemic and even turn this damage into an opportunity, three main things are suggested to be implemented in education policies: 1) The ability to cope with the crisis, 2) Ensuring continuity in education, and 3) Accelerating and improving problem-solving. However, the Ministry of National Education should enhance its cooperation with relevant institutions to prevent or shorten the duration of education restrictions that may occur in the future and eliminate regional inequalities. It should produce a flexible, multiple, and durable strategy and policy. The vulnerable groups, individuals with special needs, and the poor, all groups that are victims of inequalities, should be protected, the most negatively affected by natural, social, and medical phenomena with mass effects such as the pandemic. A proactive organizational structure needs to include an emergency action plan on the agenda so that these groups are primarily affected by this process in the least possible way. In addition, professional support units that will support students' social and emotional well-being should be strengthened and actively operated. It would be beneficial to keep expert support on the agenda, which will enable the use of technology with a learning focus instead of negative habits such as the internet, games, and phone addiction.

Considering that every crisis or unexpected situation creates opportunities for new developments and innovation, it can be predicted that there will be a paradigmatic transformation in education both in Türkiye and the world. For example, in the report prepared by the European Parliament (2021), it is underlined that not only ministries but also all education stakeholders should be conscious and willing to make investments that will strengthen the digital infrastructure in education while discussing the measures that need to be taken in education after the pandemic. Again, some new practices at the higher education level may become permanent. For example, thesis defense, extracurricular academic activities, and acquiring various academic skills from online platforms established by different faculty members or researchers seem

to be among the applications that will show themselves much more in this process.

Education is now one of the strategic fields both in Türkiye and in the world, and education management is a field that requires separate professionalism and interest. To manage education well, especially in times of crisis, both institution leaders and educational policymakers are expected to be more careful and disciplined. It can now be seen that new leadership competencies are necessary and inevitable in post-pandemic education management. However, within the scope of organizational learning, all educators, regardless of age and seniority, should be provided with the opportunity to adopt new competencies by adopting the understanding of continuous learning. The active use of these competencies in lessons should be paved. The technological empowerment of schools and the widespread use of new technology applications in lessons will also help increase the digital learning culture among students.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has made its effects felt very closely in education and all areas of social life. It has accelerated the emergence of some short- and long-term changes. This global crisis can be regarded as a precursor to some opportunities, as well as the cause of drop-outs, inequalities, school closures, disruption of education, and some other risks in the education sector. There is no doubt that the long-term deprivation of education for the poor, children in underdeveloped countries, and disadvantaged groups have brought along a serious loss of learning. This situation led to the deepening of already existing social inequalities. However, on the other hand, distance education and various platforms that came into play in education life through an emergency solution have gained a nature that can support school-based education even if it is not an alternative. In addition, this experience has helped lay the foundations of a lifelong, flexible, and skill-based education approach.

This crisis process can be considered the precursor of an important paradigmatic change in education. Situations such as designing the courses in a different way and with digital platform support, real-



izing remote learning at any time, providing access to more comfortable and easy-to-learn resources, and multiplying alternatives have become situations that are considered more consciously in this process. The indisputable place and importance of digital skills in today's production life indicate that the skills and gains in 21st-century education should be developed in this direction. The fact that such skills, which cannot be acquired in schools due to limited opportunities, are now available through different platforms showed that it is possible to develop academic or vocational-intellectual skills without being affiliated with the school. Governments should provide human resource working in the education sector with renewed and strengthened training to meet current needs.

However, especially in the education of pre-service teachers, it is necessary to increase practices based on skills that can flexibly manage today's crises and future situations instead of skills suitable for the needs of the past century. In short, it seems that the motto of post-pandemic education will be flexibility, learning everywhere, acquiring new skills, and individuality in education. In this process, Türkiye will achieve extremely beneficial results when it acts swiftly, assertively, and agilely and by taking lessons from the experience, it has gained by activating educational policies that will design the future. Considering the fact that the teacher and student population is quite large, Türkiye should act as soon as possible with other non-educational stakeholders that produce advanced technology in the transformation of this process. Thus, it should implement transformation in education on the basis of common needs, participation and equality.

Work and Professions in the Pandemic

Elyesa Koytak

Asst. Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Sociology

Professions are transforming in Türkiye. The reputation, social status, income level, working conditions, and demographic structure of professions are going through a multidimensional transition process. On the one hand, with the expansion of higher education, new generations are joining almost every occupational group, which in turn is getting crowded. On the other hand, the old gains of professions are decreasing at the intersection of wage labor and marketization. Therefore, the expectation of vertical social mobility imposed on professions, especially on high-level professions that require a diploma, ironically results in the social position and benefits of occupations evolving to a less satisfactory point.

We have seen that this transformation has accelerated and has become more obvious with the pandemic. The groups that have felt the effects of the pandemic on working life in the most difficult way have always been the more vulnerable youth, women, low-income people, those working in "dirty jobs," and informal employees. Working life has been severely disrupted in many countries as the lockdown is prolonged and new variants surface. Curfews have rendered many lines of work inoperable. Many businesses have stopped operating, especially unskilled jobs that are manual and require physical strength. It has increased the burden on vulnerable groups in their work. As of the end of 2022, it still does not seem possible to determine the extent to which people's work has been damaged.

The effect of the pandemic on work life is intertwined with macroeconomic dynamics. To what extent the increasing global inflation has made strict lockdown measures possible is a matter of

debate. It seems that the recovery of work in developing countries will take a long time and will be more inconvenient. The fact that working conditions are more irregular, the rate of informal workers is high, and the existing deep inequalities have the potential to perpetuate the impact of the pandemic on these countries. Countries such as Türkiye, where the export of labor-intensive commodities and tourism income stand out, were among the countries most severely affected by the lockdown during the pandemic. The manufacturing, procurement, transportation, education, and tourism sectors were directly affected. From 2019 to 2020, employment in the manufacturing sector contracted by 11.8 percent in lower-middle-income countries and 7.4 percent in upper-middle-income countries (ILO, 2022, p. 19).

As a result of the long-term closure of schools students suffered a lack of education, and mostly women took on the burden of housework. Again, those who worked in home care, child care, patient care, private courses, and education, which were largely informal before the pandemic, could not continue their work for a long time. In addition, small businesses suffered greater losses in terms of working time and were more unprepared financially for the shock of the pandemic. According to the ILO report, between 2019-20, workplaces with 1-4 people lost their working time by 12.1 percent, while workplaces with more than 50 personnel experienced a loss of 8.7 percent (ILO, 2021). On the other hand, business branches such as information and communication, logistics, and e-commerce expanded.

This article will focus on how the structural dynamics of working life in Türkiye became evident during

the pandemic. First, it is important to remember that the working life in Türkiye has evolved into a structure in which the number of wage earners has increased rapidly since the 1980s. According to TURKSTAT labor force statistics, 7 out of 10 people working in Türkiye are wage earners. This situation has multiple effects, as employment shrinks during crises such as the pandemic. Secondly, the education level of the workers and the general population in Türkiye has increased very rapidly in the last two decades.

It requires us to put the relationship between education and working life at the center. Later in this article, I will explain how the established material and symbolic hierarchy between professions manifested during the pandemic. In addition, I will focus on how the relationship between the medical profession, which was at the center of the medicalized "nature" of the pandemic, and society has been affected.

The Bottleneck of Increasing Wage Earners

Labor force participation was directly impacted by the pandemic. The closure of workplaces for indefinite periods and the interruption of new hiring affected the employment participation of the younger generations in particular. Furthermore, due to the narrowing down of their income sources, businesses primarily chose to limit their labor costs, thus deepening the need to create new employment

opportunities. As a result, according to TURKSTAT labor force statistics, the labor force participation rate, which has been above 50% since 2014 and increased to 53% in 2019, was 49.3% in 2020 and 51.4% in 2021. In other words, the pandemic hindered the slow but steady rise of labor force participation and, more importantly, lagged behind the rapid growth of the active population. On the other hand, the unemployment rate increased during the pandemic years and was recorded as 13% and 12%, respectively. In this sense, the pandemic has deepened the structural difficulties of working life.

While the number of wage earners increases intensively and rapidly in the working life in Türkiye (Özatalay, 2014), on the other hand, it is evolving into a more competitive structure thanks to the general increase in educational capital and especially the expansion of higher education (Gür & Yurdakul, 2020). There is no longer a labor force in which one in two working people is a primary school graduate, as it was twenty years ago. As of 2021, more than 8 million students are still enrolled in a higher education program, and the proportion of professional occupations with a university degree in employment exceeds 12%. The total increase in educational capital also raises expectations from the job and its returns. In the current context, where an increasing number of wage earners and educational capital issues come together, doubts and uncertainties about the status and value of qualified labor in employment markets are also increasing (Kurnaz Baltacı & Özaydın, 2020).




Figure 61. GDP Shares of Employees and Businesses (2018-2022)

Source: The figure is created by the author from TURKSTAT Periodic Gross Domestic Product data.




Figure 62. Ratio of Individuals' Annual Income at Main Job to Average Income by Education Level (2006-2021)

Source: This figure is created by the author using data from the TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey.

According to TURKSTAT data, the share of labor payments in the gross domestic product has decreased rapidly since the first months of 2020, when the pandemic started. It fell below 22%, with a second wave of decline from the third quarter of 2021. In other words, the share of labor in the economic value produced in the country experienced a rapid decrease. On the other hand, the economic value of businesses has increased since the beginning of 2020, when the pandemic started. In this sense, the pandemic has reduced the value of labor in working life. The impact of the current economic policies and the inflationary environment, intertwined with the pandemic, should not be forgotten in this decrease in value. Although the macro indicators reflected in Türkiye's export and growth figures seem positive at first glance, behind this situation there is the dynamic of the progressive impoverishment of the wage-earner groups.

Another indicator of the income loss of wage earners is available in the TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey data. In 2020, when the pandemic hit working life most severely, we saw a serious change in income at main job. The annual average income at main job increased between 2019 and 2020 at varying rates depending on the employment status. Waged and salaried employees' income at main job increased by 23% in the first year of the pandemic, while self-employed income increased by 22%. In contrast, employers' income at main job increased by 32% in one year. There was a similar result in incomes at main job by professional groups. The income at main job

for executives was 2.6 times more than the total average income in 2020 and 2.3 times more than it was in 2021. On the other hand, the income at main job of those working in professions such as medicine, law, engineering, etc., with a higher education degree gradually approached the average income: While it was 1.7 times the average in 2012, it decreased steadily over the last ten years to 1.4 in 2021. All these facts indicate that the shock in working life with the pandemic has favoured employers while the over-remuneration of those with educational capital has begun to disappear.

An important policy tool against the possible decrease in employment rate during the pandemic was the short-time working allowance. However, the suspension of working hours in many sectors due to the pandemic caused the possibility of the dismissal of employees and a rapid increase in unemployment. Indeed, in the context of shrinking production and consumption, unemployment had devastating consequences for low-income households and families with no savings. To prevent this even to a certain extent, the short-time working allowance was implemented as a quick application as of March 2020. The implementation was carried out in the form of payment of 60% of the average daily earnings of the worker by the state in case the workplaces are closed for at least four weeks. The short-time working allowance, implemented as of March 2020, was extended multiple times by Presidential decisions and

Key indicators of work → p. 32-33




Figure 63. Registered Unemployed by Education Level (Million people, 2017-2021)

Sources: The figure is created by the author using İŞKUR Statistics.

continued until June 2021. According to the official statement, 3 million 773 thousand employees from 506 thousand 624 companies benefited from the short-time working allowance, and a total of 36 billion TRY was paid (T.R. Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2021).

On the other hand, short-time working allowance did not cover informal employment, which has a high rate in Türkiye. According to TURKSTAT estimates, the percentage of informal workers in the second quarter of 2022 was almost 28%. It means that roughly three out of ten employees are unregistered and had no personal or union rights. It is known that informal work is concentrated especially in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, and the migrant labor force has a significant share in this. While informal employment provides financial benefits to businesses in the short run, it deepens chronic unemployment and labor quality problems in the long run. The number of people registered with İŞKUR to look for a job and benefit from unemployment benefits in 2021 was 3 million 171 thousand. The decrease in the number of registered unemployed individuals in 2020 with the pandemic indicates that people's motivation to seek a job in an environment of uncertainty decreased, as well as the policies to prevent mass dismissal.

Among the registered unemployed population, both the steady increase of higher education graduates and the increase in the ratio of the total reg-

istered unemployed workers with the pandemic draw attention. The registered unemployed rate of higher education graduates was 27% in 2020 and 26% the following year. The fact that one out of every four registered unemployed is a university graduate indicates that sufficient jobs have not been created to meet the rising educational capital in the employment markets. İŞKUR's on-the-job and vocational training programs mainly focus on manufacturing sectors such as textiles and unskilled jobs in the service sector. As a result, we see that jobs such as sales staff, garment workers, hotel staff, security guards, waiters, and retail sales staff are in first place in job placements made through İŞKUR (İŞKUR, 2021, p. 9). However, these jobs fall short of higher education graduates' financial expectations and career aspirations. Data suggests that among those who find a job through İŞKUR, those with low educational capital experience a shorter waiting period. According to the annual statistics of İŞKUR, 14% of primary school graduates expect to be employed for one year or more, while this rate is 26% among undergraduates and 29% among graduates.

Therefore, there is no alternative for higher education graduates, who are increasingly crowded, except for the lower strata of the service sector, which means a deep crisis in the relationship between education and working life. It is not surprising in this sense that during the pandemic, the young labor force with a university degree was the most hopeless section of the working groups. Be-




Figure 64. Young People Neither in Employment nor in Education or Training (aged 15-29, %, 2017-2021)

Source: The figure is created by the author using Eurostat, OECD, and TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics.




Figure 65. Education Level of Young People Neither in Employment nor in Education or Training (aged 15-24, %, 2021-2022)

Source: The figure is created by the author using TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics.

tween the increase in the number of wage workers and unemployment problems, jobs suitable for and improving the qualifications of the new generations with rising educational capital should be at the base of active employment policies. This issue, which emerged with the pandemic, is one of society's most important issues after the pandemic.

Youth of the Pandemic

An important problem of Türkiye in the context of working life is the fate of the young population between the ages of 15-24, who do not participate in

the working life but are not in the education process, classified as “neither in employment nor in education or training” (NEET). Türkiye has always had the highest NEET rate among OECD countries. This rate was 27.5% in 2017, that increased to 32% in 2020. In this sense, it is necessary to consider the multiple effects of the pandemic together: In 2020, the restricted period of working life with the closures limited the opportunities for young people in terms of jobs, as well as vacant quotas in higher education. The first reason for this was that people were hesitant to take the risk of studying at a university in another city in the uncertainty brought about by the pandemic.

The gender distribution of young people who are neither in employment nor in education or training also reveals the depth of this Türkiye-specific problem. In a situation where women's participation in employment is already low, the rate of young women who are neither in education nor employment is 44%. We know that higher education gives women an advantage in finding a job. Yet, a significant number of young women have to drop out of school at the high school level or do not have the opportunity to continue their education after high school. It is worth mentioning that the transition from education to work is also an important step towards gaining a social position. In that case, it is clear that Türkiye needs to devise policies to increase its active employment of the young female population.

In any case, there seems to be a high proportion of higher education graduates among young people who are neither in employment nor in education or training. The NEET ratio of higher education graduates was above the total NEET ratio in the first quarter of 2021 and 2022. In the first quarter of 2021, the rate of higher education graduates among young people aged 15-24 who were away from education and working life was 37%. Considering that the age range for higher education in the literature is 18-22, it is necessary to say that the participation of the young labor force with a diploma in business life has been postponed. The inability to create new jobs in sufficient numbers and quality with the pandemic mostly undermines

the hopes and expectations regarding the material and social gains traditionally promised by the university diploma. This situation destroys the belief in the meritocratic functioning of the social world on the basis of education.

The issue of young people neither in employment nor in education or training, has just started to appear on the agenda in academic research in Türkiye and is now frequently emphasized in the international literature. According to the research conducted by the ILO Ankara office with a sample of 1250 people (250 immigrants) who are neither in employment nor in education or training, young people between the ages of 15-24 mostly prefer the phrase "I did not like school and dropped out" as the reason for dropping out. However, the main reason is the family's inability to meet the educational expenses due to their financial situation (ILO Ankara, 2021, p. 37). It shows that young people are mostly forced into low-level jobs with low education and qualifications and enter working life in the most disadvantageous way. They are doomed to the cycle of poverty. The belief that the material and moral investment in education, especially in families from low socio-economic status, will not have a meaningful and satisfactory return reinforces this situation.

According to the same research, young people are on a ground of great uncertainty. 74% of them did not get a paid job after leaving their education, and even if some of them get a job, it won't be




Figure 66. Monthly Employment and Unemployment Rate of Young Population (aged 15-24, %, 2017-2022)

Source: The figure is created by the author using TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics.

permanent and secure (ILO Ankara, 2021, p. 47). I discussed above that the rate of higher education graduates has increased in the unemployed data registered with İŞKUR. According to the ILO research, 82% of the young people covered by the NEET state that they are not registered with İŞKUR as "unemployed." Negative experiences of young people about their employment processes discourage them, and university graduates see İŞKUR as inadequate in finding a job suitable to their qualifications. As a result, it is impossible to ignore the fact that a youth group is largely dependent on the family in terms of income. Therefore, if the family is in the low-income group, they are trapped in an inextricable cycle.

It is possible to say that young people who are neither in employment nor in education do not find the vocational courses and on-the-job training offered by İŞKUR, NGOs, and local administrations functional and worth participating in because, in the ILO research, 90% of young people state that they do not attend such a course (ILO Ankara, 2021, p. 40). Although reasons such as refraining from participating in such programs due to the risk of illness under pandemic conditions are dominant, the low hope of finding a job is also very effective in this timid attitude as a structural problem. In addition, it is necessary to mention the inadequacy of skill development and career planning programs for the young labor force of trade unions, employer groups, chambers of commerce, and industry. There is an expectation among young people that the government and public institutions, in general, will be more active such as increasing credit and granting support to develop or start businesses.

Ultimately, it comes down to rethinking the relationship between education and working life. According to TURKSTAT data, although the employment rate of the population between the ages of 15-24 decreased to 25% in March-April 2020, it always increased relatively afterwards and reached 35% in October 2022. The unemployment rate in the same age group also decreased from 28% to 20%. Although this is again a very high unemployment rate, it means that the situation did not get worse during the pandemic. Again, according to İŞKUR data, 461 thousand 671 people attended vocational and on-the-job training courses in 2021.

However, it is possible that such macro numbers will gradually lose meaning as access to higher education expands and the proportion of the labor force with higher education degrees increases. Therefore, there is a need to establish more efficient links between education and employment in the current period, which makes higher education valuable and attractive for working life.

New Representations of Professional Hierarchy

With the pandemic, we have seen that the hierarchy between professions based on education, earnings, and status has become clear as a naked truth. Occupations that do not require qualifications, such as cashier, porter, courier, postman, driver, transporter, and sanitation worker, had to work with the risk of catching the disease during the times when the whole society was in lockdown. These occupations, which are generally seen as "dirty jobs" in a both physical and social sense (Sever & Özdemir, 2022), have also become the occupations most vulnerable and close to the infection during the pandemic. The fact that these jobs, which provide people's most basic needs, such as food and cleaning, are often called "unskilled" jobs in the literature has also been discussed in this context. The already intense stress level of those working in these unskilled but indispensable jobs, the fear of being fired, the strategies to fight the risk of disease, and the struggle to live on the minimum wage brings a negative cumulative effect.

A major deprivation of those working in vital jobs called "unskilled" was that they had as much access to technical knowledge of the virus and ways of protection as anyone else. In other words, a cashier had to come into contact with people with the virus, on average, perhaps more often than a nurse. However, the cashier did not have the opportunity and possibility to take individual precautions against the virus as much as the nurses or physicians did. However, the working conditions of healthcare professionals, especially in 2020, were appreciated. Health workers were applauded in Türkiye as well as in many other countries. However, it should be said that everyone who is not able to work from home in sectors such as food, security,

transportation, infrastructure, and health creates a fragile but vital situation in this process.

Daily cleaners, caretakers, ironers, and mine workers faced the risk of infection intensely during this process or could not continue their work (Güler, 2021). At this point, it should be remembered that working life is intertwined with basic social institutions such as family, education, and housing. Low-income workers, who could not care for their children at home because they had to work, and

Health system
analysis
→ p. 56

were afraid of losing their jobs rather than getting sick and therefore afraid of the virus, who could not stock a large stock of food

and cleaning products at once, who did not have room to isolate their elderly parents, were the most affected by this process. Therefore, the pandemic was not experienced only as a medical problem; it also brought with it the experience of existing inequalities such as unemployment, loss of livelihood, and loss of dignity.

Of course, remote work has become commonplace. It is possible to define remote work (telework) as fulfilling the job's requirements from outside the workplace and mostly from home, thanks to electronic devices and digital infrastructure. In particular, sectors such as information and communication, finance and banking, education, research, and media quickly switched to this mode because they were suitable for it. Remote working became effective in the public sector with the Presidential Circular in August 2020. However, working from home or remotely, especially for private sector employees, increased working hours. Employers and managers have come to prefer to work remotely, thanks to software that enables digital control and time tracking of employees. In addition, the burden of working in the office in terms of transportation and food has decreased for the employer. Therefore, remote working brought contradictory dynamics, and we realized that face-to-face communication, peer learning, and on-site learning are indispensable, especially in education and at university.

A Controversial Profession Now: Physicians

With the pandemic, the most discussed professional group was undoubtedly physicians. The pandemic has had an impact on this reputable profession in basically three dimensions. First, by defining the relationship between the virus and humanity through the notion of war, physicians came to the fore as altruistic experts fighting on the front lines. Indeed, we had seen physicians work by giving up their own families, especially during 2020, when the strictest closure rules were applied and the most intense cases were observed. However, the reduction of both the pandemic and the fight against the virus to a medicalized level by the authorities has also strengthened our tendency to satisfy our need for information and interpretation of the disaster through physicians. Medical experts often talked about new developments in their sub-fields on television. Everyone followed all kinds of physician accounts in the chaotic and uncontrolled world of social media. We have witnessed physicians' opinions from different fields and countries on issues such as the structure of the virus, drug treatment, vaccine studies, and companies, and the end of the pandemic, many of which conflict with that of others. In this sense, the pandemic has turned medical knowledge inside out. We have listened to physicians more, but precisely for this reason, at the same time, a tendency to be more careful about the expertise of this professional group has become widespread in society.

A second impact of the pandemic on the medical profession has been to bring to light the contradictory nature of the working conditions of physicians. Indeed, if there were fewer deaths in Türkiye than in many similar countries, one reason was the relatively strong infrastructure of the health system in terms of items such as beds, devices, etc. The other reason was that physicians and health workers were already prone to excessively intense working tempo in the so-called normal times. As a result, the pandemic has revealed an asymmetry between the social demand for healthcare services and the work capacity of healthcare providers in Türkiye. For example, before the pandemic, the average number of doctor visits per person per year in 2019 was 9.8, while it was 7.2 in 2020. This num-

ber is above all OECD countries (the OECD average of 6.6). On the other hand, Türkiye, which has two physicians per thousand population, lagged behind many other OECD countries in this indicator (OECD average of 3,6). This asymmetry is also deepened by the unequal distribution of workload in the internal division of labor of the medical profession in terms of both seniority and branches. In this sense, the pandemic has accelerated the tiring relationship of physicians with their profession. As the sense of collective duty in the first period of the pandemic became routinized over time, the tendency to re-view one's relationship with their profession, which they had felt as a burden for a long time, became widespread among physicians (Altınışık Ergur et al., 2021).

The third prominent development in the medical profession during the pandemic was the wave of unionization in late 2021. There have always been unions in which physicians have been members for a long time. Still, in the current period, three unions, Hekim-Sen, Tabip-Sen, and Hekim Birliği, have come to the fore in terms of rapidly increasing number of members and public visibility. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security union data, the total number of members of these three unions has exceeded 30 thousand. It corresponds to a significant rate among the current over 160 thousand physicians. During the pandemic, the three unions developed joint actions and discourses on occupational problems, especially the salary level of physicians, violence, and working conditions. Especially since January 2022, it has organized several strikes. Another feature of these three unions was their distance from more established formations, such as the Turkish Medical Association, whose ideological aggression overshadowed the profession, and their focus on professional problems. It is important because the professional members stop playing the role of political actors and put their own professional conditions on their agenda. In this process, Health Minister Fahrettin Koca promised many reforms on violence in the health sector and on salary issues. Acts of violence against healthcare workers were included in the catalogue of crimes, as a reason for pre-trial detention, with the legislative amendments made between May and September. In cases filed due to malpractice, it was decided that the state would undertake the compensation

if there were no intent. Finally, physician salaries were improved through a fixed supplement.

All these show that the pandemic was a catalyst for the problems accumulated with the dynamic increase in the number of wage earners in the medical profession for a long time and made the problems obvious and open to discussion. Physicians' publicization of their professional problems and demands by fighting as a union is a sign that the long-established public authority and status of the profession are no longer functioning. The government's regulations seem to have taken a short-term measure against the eroding social position of the profession, especially concerning salary. However, issues such as the asymmetry between health service demand and capacity, the inconsistency between the expectation and expression schemes of healthcare professionals and the established action schemes of healthcare professionals, as well as inefficiency and cost in healthcare services, especially when it comes to the use of emergency services, have not been resolved. In this context, the pandemic made the internal structures and contradictions of the medical profession visible and debatable for the first time hence should be seen as an opportunity to think about the profession-society relationship on the basis of more transparency, participatory practices, and common benefits. It is doubtful to what extent the intimacy, hierarchy, and privilege-oriented professional predispositions rooted in the profession's past will allow this. Today, when the lockdowns are over, it is imperative that the public discussion about the structure and functioning of the professions should not experience a lockdown again, both for the profession itself and for the spread of health-based welfare to the society.

Conclusion: Change is Accelerating

With the pandemic, the transformation of working life has accelerated, and its sharp aspects in the crisis have been revealed. Unemployment and employment issues are particularly alarming for the educated younger generation. This situation clearly shows that the decline in the social value of the diploma is not due to the high number of diploma

holders but to the fact that the job and employment markets do not produce valuable positions that will attract the young population with degrees. It suggests that the belief and enthusiasm for both finding a job and getting an education have weakened with the pandemic. Hence pandemic has exposed yet another structural weakness.

Differences in prestige and symbolic hierarchy among professions do not change overnight in society. To the extent that the prestige and position of professions are rooted in long historical processes, they require long-term change. However, in an acute social crisis such as a pandemic, the differences between professions become clear and sharp. We have seen that the occupations that sustain social life during the lockdown are seen as "dirty jobs," defined as "unskilled," and draw a minimum wage. However, no significant reform or policy was considered from the working conditions to the wage level for these occupations and business lines. On the contrary, while the share of labor in GDP is gradually decreasing, the current economic trend worsens the earnings of workers in labor-intensive sectors.

On the other hand, high-level professions are also under intense testing. Not only physicians but also lawyers, engineers, and academics are going through the processes of loss of wages, loss of status, and erosion of identity. Ironically, as the demographic profile of these occupations diversifies and new generations from the wider public enter these occupations more dominantly, the traditional advantages of the professions are shifting in favour of employers and managers. The medical profession became highly valued during the pandemic and developed collective support for the difficulties it faced in terms of working conditions.

Ultimately, Türkiye now needs to find a solution to its unemployment problem and make employment and vocational markets suitable for the rising education capital. Besides a fundamental debate about the value of waged labor, we now have to rethink what the place of educated labor, the skilled professions, will be in society. Redefining the public benefit and social value of labor, craft, expertise, and professional skills based on justice and equity is one of the main tasks that the pandemic reminds policymakers, capital owners, and researchers of.



Socioeconomic Inequalities in Türkiye

Lütfi Sunar

Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Sociology

Socioeconomic inequalities are a very important issue in modern society. In this context, the debate on inequality never ends and continues to maintain its place on the agenda in every period (Sunar & Güneş, 2020). Furthermore, Türkiye is defined as an unevenly developing country in global reports. Therefore, it is critically important to analyze socioeconomic inequalities to understand the dynamics of Turkish society and the formation of post-pandemic society.

Social inequality, one of the main working titles of sociology, is closely related to many social facts and issues. Today, significant debates and studies reveal the relationship between socioeconomic inequality and social problems. On the other hand, it is frequently stated that the most important and primary effect of the pandemic, which has affected the world and Türkiye since 2020, is that it has increased socio-economic inequalities and disrupted the social balance. In this analysis, socio-economic inequalities worldwide and in Türkiye will be examined in the context of incomes, wealth, and working styles. This analysis will also discuss the externalities of income inequalities on social structures and other related issues.

Income Inequality in the World

With the rise of capitalism in the 19th century, socioeconomic inequality peaked. Although it decreased with the welfare state practices after the Second World War, it started to rise again with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies after the 1970s. The Gini coefficient used in the measurement of inequality developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912, and the Inverted-U hypothesis developed by Kuznets (1955) for economic growth

and income inequality forms the basis of income inequality research. These debates expanded empirically after the 1980s, when the inequalities were reshaped by new economic policies. Today, important studies are carried out about income inequalities based on comprehensive data sets. These studies reveal that the main problem in inequalities is related to the global and national income distribution and fundamental changes in working life rather than development, population, or growth.

Socio-economic inequalities have seen an extraordinary increase in recent years. As international organizations such as the World Bank, OECD, ILO, World Inequalities Database, Oxfam, and many international organizations have explained in the light of data and research, income and wealth inequalities are on the rise globally. Today, research on socio-economic inequalities mainly focuses on three areas: 1) The change in the share and proportion of income and wealth of the marginal (usually 10% and 1%) top and bottom groups (Alvaredo et al., 2019; Milanovic, 2018; Credit Suisse, 2022; Andrew, 2019; Stiglitz, 2016; Collins, Ocampo & Paslaski, 2020); 2) Improvement and reduction of absolute poverty in the bottom groups through social transfers (UNDP, 2020; Alvaredo et al., 2019) 3) Disadvantages and loss of position experienced by the middle class in the distribution of income and wealth (OECD, 2022; ILO, 2022; Sunar & Akkuş Güvendi, 2020).

The exponential increase in the share of income and wealth of the top income groups, which started with globalization, has accelerated with the global pandemic process as of 2020. Alvaredo et al. (2013) show that the share of the top 1% income group doubled between 1900-2010 in many high-income countries. Piketty (2014), on the other hand, thinks

that an increase in wealth will be a more accurate indicator for long-term analyzes rather than an increase in income. Using Piketty's data, Jones (2014) states that today wealth inequality is higher than income inequality in different societies. However, wealth inequality is also a factor that increases income inequality.

Income Inequality in Türkiye

Although not commensurate with the course and depth of the global debate, Turkey is also characterized by high levels of income inequality. According to the Gini coefficient, one of the most basic measurement methods that measure income inequality, Türkiye is the third most unequal country

among OECD countries (OECD, 2022). Although long-term analyzes cannot be made for the smaller groups at the top and bottom due to the lack of data for Türkiye, data show that income and wealth are piling up towards the top.

Inequalities in Türkiye, which were quite high in the 1990s, fell rapidly in the first half of the 2000s, increased again in 2009 as a result of the 2008 crisis, in which the economic recession was experienced, and then decreased until 2014. After 2014, a rapid increase in inequalities has been observed. As seen in the figure, the fluctuations in the Turkish economy are also reflected in income inequalities. In this sense, the negative effects of economic and political crises are obvious. The inequality coefficient, which rose with the effect of the global pandemic in




Figure 67. Gini Coefficients of Countries (2021)

Source: OECD, 2022




Figure 68. Change of Gini Coefficient in Türkiye

Source: TURKSTAT and World Inequality Database, 2021

2020, has subsequently entered a downward trend through the social policies that followed. However, Türkiye seems to maintain a high level of inequalities, as reflected by its Gini coefficient figure.

Income Distribution

Individual income distribution refers to income distribution among individuals, households, and social groups, that is, how income is shared among people living in a country. Although the data of studies on income distribution in Türkiye give general information about income inequality, they have significant differences in terms of method and scope, and it isn't easy to make comparisons using this data. There is also a methodology problem in the studies carried out by TURKSTAT, which is one of the first institutions that come to mind when measuring income. While the studies conducted in 1987 and 1994 were based on national income as income, the fact that disposable income was taken as the basis in studies conducted in 2002 and later makes it difficult to compare. Figure 69 shows the inequality in income distribution in Türkiye despite the difficulties in the calculation method.

Looking more closely at the periods and the change in the rates of the income groups by quintiles, the share of the poorest 20% decreased continuously from 1963 to 1986, and the difference between the richest and poorest groups increased twenty-one

times during this period. In 1987, while the share of the poorest increased rapidly, the share of the richest decreased in a similar manner. The first income distribution survey conducted by TURKSTAT to collect income distribution data began in 1987. According to the first income distribution data set results, the ratio of the share of the richest 20% of the national income to the poorest 20% was 9.6. According to this calculation, the richest 20% had almost half the national income. According to the 1994 income distribution research, the share of the poorest 20% in national income decreased to 4.86%, while the share of the richest 20% increased to 55%. These rates indicate the periods when the difference between different income groups in Türkiye was the highest.

The 2001 crisis led to a decrease in income and widened the total gap between income groups. The income group of the highest 20% was most affected by this crisis. For this reason, the income gap between the highest and lowest income groups narrowed. We see that the income share of middle-income groups increased from 2002 until the 2010s. According to TURKSTAT data, it is seen that the general ratio stabilized with very slight decreases and increased after 2010.

Between 2010 and 2012, there was no significant change in the ratio of the richest 20% and the poorest 20%. However, after 2014, there was a slight improvement in the poorest 20%, especially




Figure 69. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable income by ordered quintiles in Türkiye (% , 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics




Figure 70. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable income by deciles ordered by equivalised household disposable income (% ,2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

with the increase in social transfers and minimum wages above inflation. In this sense, when we look at the income distribution in terms of the share of income groups by quintiles in the last two decades, the share of middle-income groups increased until 2010, and the share of the lowest-income groups increased after 2010. The top group, on the other hand, remained the largest shareholder.

Analyzing the population's share of income by quintiles is an important indicator of following the change in income inequalities. It may be appropriate to divide the population into deciles or 20 groups to get a more detailed picture and clearly see the difference between those at the bottom and those at the top. The smaller the groups, the more striking the results regarding income inequality. Figure 71 shows the share of the top and bottom 10% of income in Türkiye after 2000. As

seen in this figure, although the general course does not change, there are significant fluctuations in the groups' shares by deciles. While the

share of the lowest group in income was 1.8% in 2006, this share increased steadily over the years and rose to 2.3% in 2021.

The share of the highest income group from income, on the other hand, remained above 30%, al-

though it followed a fluctuating course from 2006 to 2021. In 2006, the highest income group earned about 18 times more income than the lowest group, while this rate decreased with the increase in the income of the lowest group, and it was almost 14 times the income of the lowest group in 2021. As can be seen from the figure, the improvement in the lowest income groups is balanced by the decrease in the share of the seventh, eighth, and ninth income groups. In this sense, although it is seen that the income distribution in Türkiye has not deteriorated further, it is also observed that the distorted income distribution continues.

We can see the details more clearly when we evaluate income distribution in 5 percent groups. The income share of the bottom 5% income group increased from 0.7% in 2006 to 0.9% in 2021. The income share of the top 5% income group remained constant from 2006 to 2021. While the share of income increases from the second 5% to the eleventh 5%, it decreases from the thirteenth 5% to the twentieth 5%. While the share of income increased by 0.3% from the second 5% to the sixth 5%, the biggest income decrease was in the nineteenth 5% income group with 0.9%. These numbers show that a very small improvement in income distribution has been achieved in Türkiye.

Key indicators of inequality
→ p. 34-35




Figure 71. Distribution of annual equivalised household disposable incomes by vigintiles ordered by equivalised household disposable income (% 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics




Figure 72. Ratios of Top and Bottom Income Groups' Shares of Income to Each Other in Türkiye (% 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

Functional Income Distribution

Individual income distribution is determined together with the functional income distribution resulting from the production process. Therefore, changes in the functional income distribution over time directly affect the individual income distribution. Functional income distribution is the distribution of income among factors of production such as labor, capital, entrepreneurs, and natural resources. In other words, it expresses the sharing of the income created in the economy in a certain period between the factors of production, namely wages, interest, rent, and profit.

These components are important in terms of showing what the sources of income inequality are. Publishing data on the distribution of income among production factor owners in household income distribution surveys, TURKSTAT classifies incomes as labor income, real estate rent, dividend income, and entrepreneurship income. It deals with the payments made without any goods or production factors (retirement salary, widow, orphan, and disabled pensions, scholarships, etc.) under the name of transfer income.

When we look at the change in income types in Türkiye, it is seen that the share of salary-wage and

daily wage in total income has increased. As seen in Figure 73, while the share of these two types of income in total income was 44.5% in 2006, it increased to 49.5% in 2021. The meaning of this rise becomes even clearer when we look at the data on the change in population by job situation in the next figure. We see that the rate of employees working for a salary-wage or daily wage in the employed population increased from 58.9% to 69.9% in the specified period. This data shows us that although the number of employees working for a salary-wage or daily wage increased by 10% in the specified period, the income from these jobs increased only by 5%. Therefore, we see that the share of wage earners from income has decreased.

On the other hand, we see that the rate of income of entrepreneurs decreased from 24.5% to 17.5% from 2006 to 2021. The rent income increased from 3.1 to 3.4, and the dividend income decreased from 6.1 to 2.1 in the specified period. Evaluating these data together with the rates of self-employed and employers in the employed population will give us further insight. While the rate of self-employed among the employed population was 22.3% in 2006, it decreased by almost one-third to 16% in 2021. Similarly, there is a decrease in the ratio of employers in the employed population. While this rate was 5.1% in 2006, it decreased to 4.6 in 2021. The proportion of self-employed and employers expected to generate entrepreneurial income de-

creased from 28% to 20.7% from 2006 to 2021, declining by 7.3%. In addition, their share of income decreased by 6.7% in total. Therefore, it is seen that although this group has shrunk in number, they have preserved their share of income.

However, we see that the main factor affecting socio-economic inequality in terms of sources of income is the change in social transfers. So much so that while the share of social transfer incomes in total income was 17.8% in 2006, this rate increased by 6.1% and reached 23.9% in 2021. In other words, transfer incomes generated by inter-household transfers and social transfers reached one-fourth of the total income. The increase in social transfers, especially in 2021, is remarkable. The negative reflections of the pandemic on socioeconomic inequalities were balanced by increasing public social assistance and transfer payments in 2020.

One of the important components of income distribution is wages. In fact, behind the appearance of socio-economic inequalities discussed above are wage policies and the qualification differentiation of the workforce. As seen in the table above, from 2012 to 2021, the annual average main business income of household members according to the occupational groups in the main business increased by 3.16 times (316%) from 15,157 TRY to 47,886 TRY. In this sense, as can be seen in Figure 75, the highest increase is in non-qualified jobs, whose main business incomes have increased by 3.35




Figure 73. Distribution of Household Disposable Income by Income Types in Türkiye (% , 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

Note: In the figure, social transfers and inter-household transfers are combined in the transfer category, and real estate rental and dividend incomes are combined in the rent category.




Figure 74. Distribution of Labor by Employment Status in Türkiye (% ,2000-2022)

Source: TURKSTAT Labor Force Statistics

Table 3. Annual Average Income at Main Job of Household Members by Main Occupational Groups (2012-2021)

Professional group (ISCO 08)	2012 (TRY)	2021 (TRY)	Increase in Last Ten Years (%)	Difference from Average Increase in Last Ten Years (%)
Managers	35,452	111,734	315	-1
Professionals	26,866	70,552	263	-53
Technicians and Associate Professionals	18,286	52,368	286	-30
Clerical Support Workers	15,537	43,853	282	-34
Service and Sales Workers	13,513	37,658	279	-37
Skilled Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Workers	11,103	34,560	311	-5
Crafts and Related Trades Workers	11,131	35,924	323	7
Plant and Machine Operators And Assemblers	12,595	38,655	307	-9
Elementary Occupations	8,073	27,039	335	19
General Average	15,157	47,886	316	
Annual Net Minimum Wage	8,646	33,911	392	76
Ratio of Minimum Wage to Annual Average Income at Main Job (%)	57.04	70.82		

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

times (335%), while the least increase is in professional occupations, whose main job incomes have increased 2.63 times (263%). As can be seen in the figure below, the main job incomes of technicians and associate professionals in the service sector, clerical support workers, and service and sales workers from large occupational groups in the service sector experienced an increase below the average income.

As can be seen in the figure below, the rate of increase in the main business income of the occupa-

tional groups between the years 2012-2021 differs from the general average. In this sense, the rate of increase in the income of those working in jobs that do not require qualifications is 19% higher than the general average. On the other hand, the rate of increase in the income of mostly self-employed craftspeople is 7% above the general average.

While the main business incomes of the managers have increased at the average level, the increase rates of the remaining occupational groups are below the average. While the income at main job of




Figure 75. Change in Income of Occupational Groups (2012-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics




Figure 76. The Variation Ratio from the Average of Income Increase Rate by Occupational Groups (% , 2012-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

professionals increased 53% less than the average, the growth rates of other educated white-collar jobs were also 30-37% lower than the average. These data provide a picture of the profound change in working life. Based on this graph, it is understood why the members of the professions, which require advanced education and specialization, are not satisfied with their income in recent years. Of course, the reason for this appearance is the minimum wage policies. As stated above, one of the important elements of combating socio-economic inequalities in Türkiye is social policies that support low-income groups. In this sense, it is seen that there is a similar trend in wage policies and that the trend of increasing the lowest wages continues. As seen in the figure below, the ratio of the average minimum wage to the average income at main job has constantly been increasing over the years. While the annual minimum wage income was 57% of the average income at main job in 2012, it has increased over the years and reached 70.8% in 2021.

As can be understood from these data, the fact that the income of high-earning occupational groups increased less than the average has been effective in the reduction of income inequality. Considering the increased number of paid workers, this outlook can be seen as a tendency to proletarianization and loss of expertise. The fact that the average level of managers has increased and the increase in capital income is higher than the average increase in main job income indicates

that the decrease in income inequality is due to the lower-than-average income increase of upper-middle (professionals) and middle (white-collar) occupational groups. These data also reveal the devaluation of education. While reducing income inequalities on the one hand, preserving the value of a qualified labor force on the other hand, and not putting the burden of combating inequalities on the middle-income group are also important in terms of economic development.

Distribution of Wealth

Inequalities in the distribution of wealth are more noticeable. As in the rest of the world, the distribution of wealth in Türkiye seems more uneven than the distribution of income. Because the transfer of wealth between generations and the fact that wealth is a source of income are also important conditions for the continuation of structural inequality, as stated above, after 2000, while the share of labor in income decreased, capital income increased. With the temporal effect of this increase, wealth was also concentrated in the hands of higher groups.

Although there is no comprehensive and accessible data on wealth in Türkiye, the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Reports prepared by the Paris-based Global Inequality Laboratory and published every year both present the distribution of wealth within the country and create a global comparison opportunity, ac-




Figure 77. Ratio of Minimum Wages to Average Income at Main Job (% ,2012-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living Conditions Statistics

According to these reports, the average value of wealth per capita in Türkiye in 2021 was 39,100 Euros.

In this sense, when we look at the distribution, the 1% privileged group at the top receives 36.9% of the total wealth with an average wealth of 1,442,500 Euros per person. The lower 50% (half the population) owns only 3.7% of the wealth, with an average of 2900 euros per person. In other words, they don't actually own an asset. The average wealth of the 40% group that follows this group at the bottom is 28.200 Euros, and its share in the wealth is 28.9%. It is also remarkable that 67.5% of the total wealth is in the hands of the top 20% group. The top 10% have 18 times more wealth than the bottom 50%, while the top 10% have more than twice the wealth of the remaining 90%.

As can be seen in Figure 78, when we look at the distribution of wealth between those at the top and the rest, there are some striking changes. In 2000, the top 10% owned 66.7% of the wealth. After fluctuations over the years, it changed to 72.1% in 2021. In this sense, the trend of accumulation of wealth in the hands of the top class, which showed a sharp upward trend from 2000 to 2018, seems to have been suppressed somewhat after this date. Wealth inequality peaked in 2018, with the top 10% holding 81.2% of total wealth. However, as of this date, stabilization has been observed in favour of 90% of the population.

In this sense, it would be appropriate to focus on the change of the top 1% group. As can be seen in the data of Credit Suisse (2022), while the wealth

Table 4, Share of Income and Wealth Groups

Groups	Average Income (PPP €)	Total share (%)	Average Wealth (PPP €)	Share in total (%)
Total Population	27,400		39,100	
Bottom %50	6,500	11.9	2,900	3.7
Middle %40	23,100	54.5	28,200	28.9
Top 10 %	149,400	18.8	263 800	67.5
Top 1%	516,700	36.9	1,442,500	36.9

Source: World Inequality Report, 2022




Figure 78. Division of Wealth between the Richest 10% and the Remaining 90% in Türkiye (2000-2020)

Source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook (2014, 2018, 2019, 2022)

held by the richest 1% in Türkiye in 2000 was 38% of the total wealth, it increased continuously until 2018 and finally reached 54%. Afterwards, it showed a serious decrease and reached 42.8% in 2020. In this sense, it can be said that tax policies and economic policies implemented in recent years have had an impact. In addition, the fact that the wealthy have transferred their wealth abroad in recent years is thought to have an important effect on the change in these rates.

How Did the Pandemic Affect Socioeconomic Inequalities?

Inequalities that significantly affect all areas of social life have even more dramatic effects in times of crisis. Socioeconomic inequalities have become more evident with the COVID-19 pandemic, which has deeply affected the world. In this sense, socioeconomic inequalities have two dimensions. First, groups with different socioeconomic levels were affected unequally by the pandemic, and the measures taken within the scope of the pandemic also effectively increased socio-economic inequalities between these groups. Because people do not have equal vulnerability or resilience to diseases biologically, and they do not have equal opportunities in protecting their health, work, employment, income, treatment, and rehabilitation due to socio-economic reasons. Although the measures such as staying at home, which were implemented at the first stage, seem especially meaningful for the middle classes with fixed incomes and job guarantees, numerous studies have shown that the pandemic has caused many tradesmen to struggle, workers to lose their jobs, and those who work in irregular jobs to be completely deprived of their income. Socio-economic inequalities seriously affect access to health and the probability of getting sick for different segments, and this cycle has increased exponentially during the pandemic process.

According to an analysis by the ILO (2020), full or partial work holidays due to the COVID-19 pandemic have affected approximately 2.7 billion workers, currently representing about 81% of the world's workforce. The equivalent of 195 million full-time workers was lost worldwide during 2020

when pandemic restrictions were the most severe. Although this loss was subsidized from public resources in the short term, it was thought to be borne by large segments of the public with the effect of public borrowing in the medium and long term. In the sectors at "serious and devastating" risk due to the pandemic, there are 1 billion 250 million workers worldwide. Similarly, self-employed small traders and craftspeople, as well as small business owners, have suffered and will suffer great losses.

Policies such as part-time working and remote working, which have come to the fore with the pandemic, cause great job and income losses, especially for the population working with low wages and where a majority of work is unsuitable for remote working. According to calculations made by Uğur Aytun and Cem Özgüzel (2020) based on the official data, only 24% of employment in Türkiye are jobs that are suitable for working from home. In this sense, the epidemic resulted in long-term income and job loss for almost 40% of the working population. However, the global pandemic accelerated the automation and digitalization processes in the business and radically affected the business areas. Especially with the differentiation of production and distribution chains, the pandemic led to the disappearance of the business models of small tradespeople and, as seen above, caused the self-employed and middle-income groups to become workers.

Even when the effects of the pandemic decrease over time due to the decrease in purchasing power, there has been a stagnation in consumption due to uncertainty and insecurity concerns. Small and medium-sized businesses had to abandon their business for high-capital ventures as they suffered financial crises and market problems. Rising input costs, damage to the supply chain, and instability of sales slowed the growth rate of economies. Thus, unemployment increased. On the other hand, the high inflation rate all over the world, but the extra rapid rise in Türkiye made it difficult to balance the incomes and seriously undermined the welfare of the working people. As a special type of inflation, the rise of rent inflation to the level of 200% led to a serious contraction in the incomes of fixed-income households.

The most important effect of the pandemic was seen in the contraction or decrease in growth rates




Figure 79. Economic Growth in the World and Türkiye (%)

Source: OECD

in these economies. At the beginning of 2020, it was predicted that Türkiye would end 2020 with a significant growth rate. While the IMF (2020) expected growth of 3.4% for the global economy and 3% for Türkiye, the IIF (2020) predicted a growth of 2.7% for the global economy and 2.2% for Türkiye. The World Bank, on the other hand, expected 2.7% growth for the global economy and 3% growth for Türkiye. Unfortunately, the growth rates of the world and the Turkish economy were low due to the pandemic. However, it is also seen that Türkiye's economic recovery is faster than the rest of the world.

The IMF (2020) predicted that there would be a decrease in per capita income in 170 countries, and the total loss caused by the pandemic in GDP would be 9 trillion dollars. According to Oxford Economics (2020), the number of people living below

the \$1.90 extreme poverty line has increased by 434 million worldwide and has reached 922 million. The number of people living below the \$5.50-a-day income threshold also increased by 549 million, approaching 4 billion. According to the ILO, the number of people living on less than \$3 a day increased by 500 million after the pandemic.

However, despite the growth in the Turkish economy, especially in 2020 and 2021, the per capita income decreased significantly due to the excessive mobility and deterioration in the exchange rate. In this sense, while the per capita income was 9195 dollars in 2019, it decreased to 8600 dollars in 2020 and increased to 9592 dollars in 2021. In this sense, it is seen that the pandemic has seriously affected the income and consumption potential of households in Türkiye.




Figure 80. Per Capita Income in Türkiye (USD, 2000-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Annual Gross Domestic Product, 2021




Figure 81. Poverty Rate Calculated Based on Equivalent Household Disposable Income (Living Below 60% of Median Income, %, 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Income Distribution and Living

It is known that poverty rates in Türkiye are constantly falling. In the global literature, those living below 60% of the median income are considered poor individuals living below the national poverty line. From 2006 to 2021, the poverty rate calculated according to the equivalent household disposable income on the basis of the TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey decreased from 25.4% to 21.3%. Although this rate decreased slightly in 2020, it is seen that it decreased to the 2019 level in 2021 again. But, of course, although this decrease is positive, it also shows that more than one-fifth of the population lives below the poverty line. According to this, it is seen that more than 17 million people were below the poverty line in 2021.

Unemployment rates, one of the important indicators of socio-economic inequalities, have been fluctuating in Türkiye since 2006. Unemployment rates, which were high in 2007 and 2019, fell to their lowest level in 2011. During the pandemic period, while all global forecasts expected unemployment to rise excessively in Türkiye as in the world, it showed that unemployment tends to decrease in 2020, 2021, and 2022 through measures and incentives. In this sense, it is also important that the labor force participation rate, which was 43.6% in 2006, increased to 54% by 2022. The increase in labor force participation and the decrease in unemployment are important indicators for reducing socioeconomic inequalities. However, when considered together with the poverty rates above,



Figure 82. General Unemployment Rates (% , 2006-2021)

Source: TURKSTAT, Labor Force Statistics

Note: Rates show year-end figures.

there is an increase in employment that does not produce welfare.

Current Outlook of Socio-Economic Inequalities in Türkiye

In Türkiye, income and wealth inequality are parallel to the global trend. With the stabilization program implemented after the 2001 crisis, fiscal discipline was ensured, and the budget balances were re-established. In addition, the decrease in inflation and interest rates and high growth rates contributed to reducing inequalities in individual income distribution. While the Gini coefficient, a basic indicator of inequalities, was 0.44 in 2002, it decreased to 0.38 in 2007 but increased to 0.41 again after 2014. When we look at the distribution of national income among income groups, the share of the bottom 20% increased, the share of the middle groups decreased, and the share of the top group remained stable with small fluctuations. In terms of the distribution of wealth, the trend, which was quite negative after 2000, has turned into a somewhat positive trend since 2019.

Another important indicator of inequality in income distribution is functional income distribution. In this analysis, in which households are separated according to their sources of income, we can roughly divide the income into four groups: laborers (salary-wage and daily wage), entrepreneurs (capital income), rentiers (real estate rent, dividend income) and those who receive assistance (social income). When we look at these groups over the years, it is seen that while the rate of wage earners and those who live on social assistance has increased, the rate of those who live on entrepreneurship income and rents has decreased. However, the share of these groups from income is differ-

ent. For example, while the ratio of entrepreneurs and rentiers who live with their income decreases, their share of income decreases by only half of the ratio.

It means that fewer capitalists and rentiers earn more income, and the number of wage earners has increased. In this sense, there is a concentration of unskilled workers. For this reason, although employment has increased and unemployment has decreased in Türkiye, welfare has not spread to the base. Especially in the service sector, there is a strong relationship between the expansion of wage earners and income polarization. The proletarianized segment is concentrated along the lower job market segment and receives a smaller share of income and wealth. On the other hand, the share of the private sector elite, entrepreneurial, managerial, and professional groups from income and wealth is gradually increasing.

On the other hand, it is seen that the effects of the global pandemic felt in 2020 and 2021 are balanced with social policies. The increase in minimum wages in recent years and the increase in the rate and amount of social transfers, unemployment benefits, and employment incentives show that the socioeconomic inequalities that are expected to increase with the effect of the pandemic on the labor markets have been restrained. In addition, tax reforms carried out in recent years are expected to reduce inequality. Therefore, these policy arrangements should be completed with economic policies, and the positive course should be made permanent. In this, it is essential to regulate the structure of labor markets and to move from labor-intensive employment to an employment structure with a higher rate of employment with high added value.

Conclusion

The pandemic has been the common agenda of the world from the beginning of 2020 until the summer of 2022 and is now slowly disappearing from the social outlook. From now on, we will discuss what remains after the pandemic and, more importantly, what needs to change. Using relevant data, this report aims to evaluate which social dynamics emerged, became evident, and were intertwined during the pandemic. In the first section, 16 categories were analyzed based on basic data and indicators. The main section, titled “Post-Pandemic Society,” includes analyzes and findings of experts on health, family, education, working life, and inequality. Ultimately, a multidimensional and layered perspective emerged, reminding us that social reality is never one-sided.

We have seen that the so-called developed countries, in terms of health systems, were deeply unprepared for the pandemic. However, compared to many OECD countries, Türkiye was quite successful in the medical dimension of the pandemic. The large hospital bed capacity, the prevalence of primary health care services, strict filiation work, and the health workers’ tendency to work at an intense pace were the reasons for this success. Exactly for this reason, it is an important issue how the health system will evolve after the pandemic. The asymmetry between societal demand for health services and labor force capacity requires reorganizing the delivery and organization of health services for the benefit of all.

During the pandemic, science, scientific data, scientific suggestions and warnings, and scientific delegations were more prominent than ever. The fact that only one public health expert took part in the advisory scientific committee in Türkiye, as well as the “secondary” position of the social sciences committee, resulted from the historical hierarchies

between the disciplines. However, the pandemic and its management required social, economic, psychological, and legal dimensions as well as medical aspects. Therefore, in the post-pandemic society, the old dysfunctional hierarchy rooted in the 19th century among the faculties of science should be set aside. Then the institutional and methodological grounds must be established for producing common and public knowledge. The branches of science now have to talk to each other on every subject.

As the circulation of scientific knowledge accelerated, the internal differentiation and contradictions of the scientific discipline were also revealed during the pandemic. In the recent history of humanity, many examples can be found of how science has been instrumentalized by power and capital. Moreover, sociological studies of science show that scientific knowledge is never free from social interests, conflicts, desires, and relations. While transitioning to a post-pandemic society, it is necessary to pay attention to how science can function on the basis of public benefit, transparent and auditable information, and mutual trust with society. The transition period to the post-pandemic period is an opportunity for Türkiye to rethink the professions that produce public services by using scientific knowledge most intensively, especially medicine, and to identify problems and dilemmas.

The pandemic has brought an intense challenge for family dynamics, especially during the lockdown period. Domestic role sharing, parent-child relationships, and household economy were the prominent dimensions of the challenge. However, this challenge was experienced at different levels and qualities according to the income level of households. The closure was more tiring for the disadvantaged classes regarding housing type

and access to urban facilities. Both marriage and divorce rates fell at the start of the pandemic but rose again in 2021. Therefore, in the transition to the post-pandemic period, the transforming structure of the family stands out, as well as its solidarity and protection function. In an urbanized society with increased participation in education and employment, it is necessary to think of it calmly as a multidimensional phenomenon without stigmatizing the prominence of smaller family types with fewer children as a moral deterioration.

Education has been one of the issues on the agenda during the pandemic. With the restrictions and lockdowns, there has been a serious loss of learning, especially for lower classes. It was felt deeply that the school included not only curriculum transfer but also vital social functions such as peer learning, socialization, value and role sharing, as well as the curriculum. In this process, the short-term benefit of digital media has become indisputable. However, both the inequalities in access to digital products and infrastructure and the situation of institutional functioning and personnel not sufficiently inclined to use digitalization effectively draw attention in the transition to the post-pandemic period. While education in Türkiye at all levels has been opened up to all segments of society intensively in the last decade, traditional notions of education, measurement and evaluation, competition, and success should also be revised through inclusiveness, flexibility, skill development, and equity.

Türkiye is in a multidimensional transformation in three main areas: education, health, and law. The social demand for these services is increasing rapidly, the socio-demographic structure of the professions that provide these services is diversifying, and the inner world of these professions is witnessing the dynamics of marketization and an increase in wage earners. An anomie has become evident in these three areas with the effect of the economic crisis with the pandemic: We have recently seen a lot of news about violence against physicians and lawyers. There is a structural connection between the murder of a physician and the inability of a contracted teacher to make a living or the deprivation of qualified professional development of a young lawyer. In all three areas, the profession's status, income level, trust, and public security are

severely affected. Bureaucracy is prone to save itself against distortions in all three areas. At the same time, capital is prone to exploiting expert labor and turning the service receiver into a customer. Beyond ideological rent, bureaucratic conservatism, and capitalist exploitation, it is necessary to ensure the unity of common benefit, value, knowledge, and trust in health, law, and education.

The transforming position of professions based on scientific background and legitimacy is gaining more importance when it comes to increasing wage earners and stratification. For a long time, professional jobs meant privileged status, with the effect of restricting the participation of large strata of the population in higher education. Today, both material and symbolic privileges are disappearing: the income level of top professional jobs with a higher education diploma has been approaching the average main business income since 2014. From 2012 to 2021, income at main job increased by 3.2 times in all occupational groups, while professional occupations formed the group with the lowest increase rate, with an increase of 2.6 times. In addition to income, new generations are at a cumulative disadvantage in other key aspects such as career, skill development, and autonomous work.

One of the most important issues of Türkiye in the transition to the post-pandemic period should be to establish links between the educated labor force and employment that ensure the harmony of qualifications. The proportion of higher education graduates among the unemployed increased in 2020 and 2021: One in four registered unemployed individuals has a university degree. The fact that there is no other option for the increasingly crowded higher education graduate workforce outside the lower strata of the service sector means a deep crisis in the value of education. Behind the rhetoric of "merit," which has recently been used as material for cynical political debate, there is the problem that the new generations who join the university and employment face the established inequalities in the occupational markets. The rate of higher education graduates among young people aged 15-24 who are neither in employment nor in education or training has exceeded 30%. The expansion of higher education was a deferred necessity until the 2000s. In the post-pandemic 2020s, it is necessary

to discuss the skills that higher education should give to the younger generations and the transfer of these skills for a fair and prosperous working life.

Inequalities have been the main social phenomenon that manifested themselves during the pandemic when uncertainty was dominant. According to the Gini coefficient, which expresses income inequality, Türkiye is the third most unequal country among OECD countries as of 2021. Moreover, income inequality has been on the rise since 2014. The share of labor payments in GDP suffered a huge loss during the pandemic. This share, around 30% until the beginning of 2020, fell below 25% at the end of 2021. On the other hand, the share of the business surplus increased. While the income at the main job of salaried employees or wage earners increased by 23% in the first year of the pandemic compared to 2019, the income of employers increased by 32%. In the current labor regime, where seven out of every ten workers are wage earners, the relative decrease in the share of labor is remarkable in this sense.

On the other hand, we see a slight improvement in the share of the lowest-income groups. The share of the highest income group in 2021 is not higher than it was in 2006. The minimum wage increased by 3.9 times from 2012 to 2021, and the income of those working in non-qualified jobs increased by 3.4 times. Considering that the total average income has increased by 3.2 times, these are quite high rates. In addition, the minimum wage is getting closer to the average income at main job: The ratio of the minimum wage to the average income at main job was 57% in 2012, 64% in 2020, and 70% in 2021. Although the current minimum wage policy contributes relatively positively to income inequality, it is not enough to compensate for consumption inequality in the face of inflation.

Therefore, when interpreting inequality, it is necessary to see these two facts: First, there is a convergence between the minimum wage and the highest-paid professionals in terms of income rather than differentiation. It indicates that the provision of education capital in the employment market has

begun to fall short. The depreciation of the skilled labor force also undermines expectations and confidence in the social structure. Second, the rapid increase in social transfers over the past decade delays the deepening of inequalities. The proportion of income through social transfer within the disposable income of households exceeded 25% in 2021. We see that relevant ministries and public institutions have increased these expenditures to protect low-income households from the economic devastation of the pandemic. Still, it is doubtful how long-lasting will the prosperity it provides be.

Income inequality, of course, does not cover all social inequalities. Consumption inequality should be measured, as well as wealth inequality. At this point, it should be ensured that official data also includes disposable income. Wealth and consumption inequalities must be calculable to see how wealth does not spread to the bottom even as employment rises and unemployment falls. A prominent indicator in the pandemic was related to the banking system: Banks' assets increased by 86% in 2021, and their net interest income increased by 216% compared to the previous year as of September 2022. So, on the one hand, we see that the income at main job of wage earners converges around the average income. On the other hand, we see that those wage earners will pay the price of inequality in the medium term. In the transition to the post-pandemic period, policies related to taxes, minimum wages, and active employment need to be structured within the framework of wealth and consumption inequality.

To the extent that crises interrupt the self-affirming flow of the social structure, it reminds us of our will to think and change our circumstances. The post-pandemic society means that the social order, of which many dynamics have become evident with the pandemic, is not destiny. When we consider the dynamics emerging in every field, from family to education, from health to working life, it is clear that Türkiye has many opportunities with its own contradictions and weaknesses.

References

- Altınışık Ergur, G., Nuhoğlu, Ş., Çobanoğlu, C., Çetin, N., Bostan, P., & Ergur, A. (2021). Adanmışlıktan tükenmişliğe, tükenmişlikten vazgeçişe: COVID-19 Pandemisi'nde istifa eden/emekli olan hekimlerin çılgılığı. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 41(1), 73-102. <https://doi.org/10.26650/SJ.2021.41.1.0078>
- Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T. & Saez E. (2013). The top 1 percent in international and historical perspective. NBER Working Paper Series, 19075.
- Alvaredo, F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2019). World Inequality Report 2018 Executive Summary. World Inequality Database. Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf>
- Ararat, M., Bayazıt, M., Başbay, P. & Alkan, S. (2021). *Salgın sürecinde çalışma hayatı ve ev içi şiddet*. İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi. Retrieved October 30, 2022, from https://turkiye.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/badv_salginsurecindeevi-cisiddetvecalis-mahayati_2021.pdf
- Ayaz, M. F. (2016). Öğretim materyalleri kullanımının öğrencilerin derslere yönelik tutumlarına etkisi: Bir meta-analiz çalışması. *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 35(1), 141-158.
- Aytun, U. & Özgüzel, C. (2020). "Türkiye'nin evden çalışması mümkün mü?" Sarkaç. Geliş tarihi 04 Mayıs 2020 Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://sarkac.org/2020/04/turkiyenin-evden-calismasi-mumkun-mu/>
- Barış, İ. & Taylan, H. H. (2020). Küresel salgın sürecinde aile içi sorunlar. *Nosyon: Uluslararası Toplum ve Kültür Çalışmaları Dergisi*. (5), 13-32.
- Bruns, R., & Teran, N. (2022). Weighing the cost of the Pandemic. Knowing what we know now, how much damage did COVID-19 cause in the United States? *Institute for Progress*.
- Carrell, S., Pegg, D., Lawrence, F., Lewis, P., Evans, R., Conn, D., ... Proctor, K. (2020). Revealed: Cummings is on secret scientific advisory group for COVID-19. *The Guardian*.
- Collins, C., Ocampo, O., & Paslaski, S. (2020). Billionaire Bonanza 2020: Wealth, windfalls, tumbling taxes, and pandemic profiteers. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies. Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Billionaire-Bonanza-2020.pdf>
- Credit Suisse. (2022). Global Wealth Report 2022: Leading perspectives to navigate the future. Retrieved December 24, 2022, from <https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/global-wealth-report.html>
- ERG. (2021). COVID-19 etkisinde Türkiye'de eğitim. Retrieved from <https://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar/item/10820-tusiad-erg-covid-19-et-kisinde-turkiye-de-egitim>
- European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Dunajeva, J., Bankauskaite, R., Siarova, H., et al. (2021). *Education and youth in post-COVID-19 Europe: Crisis effects and policy recommendations*, European Parliament. Retrieved from <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/794039>
- Facebook Consumer Reports. (2020). Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/facebook-ok-approved-ads-with-coronavirus-misinformation-a1864110559/>
- Ferguson, N. M., Laydon, D., Nedjati-Gilani, G., Imai, N., Ainslie, K., Baguelin, M., ... Ghani, A. C. (2020). Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand. *Imperial College London*, 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.25561/77482>
- Ferrara, G., de Vincentiis, L., Ambrosini-Spaltro, A., Barbareschi, M., Bertolini, V., Contato, E., ... Saragoni, L. (2021). Cancer diagnostic delay in Northern and Central Italy during the 2020 lockdown due to the Coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic: Assessment of the magnitude of the problem and proposals for corrective actions. *American Journal of Clinical Pathology*, 155(1), 64-68. <https://doi.org/10.1093/AJCP/AQAA177>
- Grewenig, E., Lergetporer, P., Werner, K. Woessmann, L., & Zierow, L. (2020). *COVID-19 and educational inequality: How school closures affect low- and high-achieving students*. CESifo Working Paper 8648.
- Guerin, O. (2020). Coronavirus: How Türkiye took control of COVID-19 emergency. *BBC International Correspondent*.
- Güler, C. (2021). COVID-19 salgını döneminde ev işçilerinin derinleşen sorunları: İstanbul örneği. *Journal of Economy, Culture and Society*, 64, 1-24. <https://doi.org/10.26650/JECS2021-880507>
- Gür, B. S., & Yurdakul, S. (2020). *Yükseköğretime bakış 2020: İzleme ve değerlendirme raporu*. Eğitim-Bir-Sen Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi.

- Hearn, A. (2020). COVID: How Excel may have caused loss of 16,000 test results in England. *The Guardian*.
- IIF. "Sermaye Hareketleri Gelişmekte Olan Piyasalarda Ani Duruş Bildiriyor". Retrieved December 20, 2022, from https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/2_IIF2020_April_CFR.pdf
- ILO. (2020). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Retrieved April 26, 2020, from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_824092.pdf
- ILO Ankara. (2021). *Youth and COVID-19: Access to decent jobs amid the pandemic*. ILO Ankara. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_771425.pdf
- ILO & UNICEF. (2020). *COVID-19 ve çocuk işçiliği: Kriz zamanı, harekete geçme zamanı*. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_751230.pdf
- ILO. (2021). *ILO monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Eighth edition*. International Labor Office. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_824092.pdf
- ILO. (2022). *World employment and social outlook: Trends 2022*. Retrieved December 20, 2022, from http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/trends2022/WCMS_834081/lang--en/index.htm
- IMF. (2020). *World economic outlook: The great lockdown*. Retrieved April 26, 2020, from <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/we-o-april-2020>
- Independent SAGE. (2021). What is independent SAGE? Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.independentsage.org/independent-sage/>
- İŞKUR. (2021). İşgücü piyasası araştırması İstanbul ili 2021 yılı sonuç raporu. Retrieved from <https://media.iskur.gov.tr/51195/istanbul.pdf>
- Jazieh, A. R., & Kozlakidis, Z. (2020). Healthcare transformation in the Post-Coronavirus pandemic era. *Frontiers in medicine*, 7. <https://doi.org/10.3389/FMED.2020.00429>
- Jones, C. I. (2014). The macroeconomics of top income and wealth inequality. NBER Working Paper Series, 20742.
- Kaya, Z. (2016). *Öğretim teknolojileri ve materyal geliştirme*. Pegem Publication, Ankara.
- Kodvanj, I., Homolak, J., Virag, D., & Trkulja, V. (2022). Publishing of COVID-19 preprints in peer-reviewed journals, preprinting trends, public discussion and quality issues. *Scientometrics*, 127(3), 1339. <https://doi.org/10.1007/S11192-021-04249-7>
- Kurnaz Baltacı, I., & Özyayın, M. M. (2020). Eğitimin işgücü piyasasındaki rolü çerçevesinde uyumsuz eşleşme olgusu: Türkiye işgücü piyasasına ilişkin talep yönlü bir değerlendirme. *Üçüncü Sektör Sosyal Ekonomi Dergisi*, 55(1), 313-336. <https://doi.org/10.15659/3.sektor-sosyal-ekonomi.20.02.1290>
- Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. *The American Economic Review*, 45(1).
- Lockee, B. B. (2021). Online education in the post-COVID era. *Nature Electronics*, 4, 5-6. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41928-020-00534-0>
- Maldonado, J. E., & De Witte, K. (2020). *The effect of school closures on standardised student test outcomes*. Department of Economics, KU Leuven. Retrieved from <https://lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/588087>
- Memurlar.Net. (2020). Türkiye Bilim Kurulu Üyeleri Kimler? Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.memurlar.net/album/18297/turkiye-bilim-kurulu-uyeleri-kimler.html>
- Milanovic, B. (2018). *Küresel eşitsizlik: Küreselleşme çağı için yeni bir yaklaşım*. İstanbul: Efil Yayınevi.
- Moynihan, R., Sanders, S., Michaleff, Z. A., Scott, A. M., Clark, J., To, E. J., ... Albarqouni, L. (2021). Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on utilisation of healthcare services: A systematic review. *BMJ open*, 11(3). <https://doi.org/10.1136/BMJOPEN-2020-045343>
- Naidu, S. (2022). Reimagining and reengineering education systems for the post-COVID-19 era. *Distance Education*, 43(1), 1-5. doi: 10.1080/01587919.2022.2029652.
- OECD. (2021). Consultations with doctors | Health at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators | OECD iLibrary. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b088de1d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/b088de1d-en>.
- OECD. (2022). Income inequality (indicator). Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://doi.org/10.1787/459aa7f1-en>
- Oxford Economics. (2020). *WorldEconomicProspects April 2020*. Retrieved April 26, 2020, from <https://resources.oxford-economics.com/hubfs/WEP/ WEPM%20April%202020%20pdf.pdf>
- Özatalay, C. (2014). Türkiye'de ücretliler toplumunun başkalaşimleri. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 129, 130-151.
- Özyürek, A. & Çetinkaya, A. (2021). COVID-19 pandemi döneminde aile ve ebeveyn-çocuk ilişkilerinin incelenmesi. *Çağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*. 18(1), 96-106.
- Parliament.uk. (2021). Coronavirus: Lessons learned to date—Health and Social Care, and Science and Technology Committees—House of Commons. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmscte-ch/92/9205.htm#_idTextAnchor002

- Patel, M. P., Kute, V. B., Agarwal, S. K., & COVID-19 Working Group of Indian Society of Nephrology. (2020). "Infodemic" COVID 19: More Pandemic than the Virus. *Indian Journal of Nephrology*, 30(3), 188. https://doi.org/10.4103/IJN.IJN_216_20
- Pickett, Kate, & Richard Wilkinson. (2010). *The spirit level: Why equality is better for everyone*. New edition. London: Penguin.
- Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century*. (trans. Arthur Goldhammer). USA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Press.
- Piquero, A. R., Jennings, W. G., Jemison, E., Kaukinen, C., & Knaul, F. M. (2021). Domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic—Evidence from a systematic review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, C. 74. Elsevier Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2021.101806>
- Reuters. (2022). End of COVID pandemic is "in sight" -WHO chief. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/who-chief-says-end-sight-covid-19-pandemic-2022-09-14/> on
- Save The Children. (2020). The hidden impact of COVID-19. Retrieved from https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/the_hidden_impact_of_covid-19_on_child_poverty.pdf/
- Sever, M., & Özdemir, S. (2022). Türkiye'de mesleklerin kirlilik düzeyleri ve türlerinin sınıflandırılması. *İnsan & Toplum*, 12(2), 1-20.
- Sevinç, B., Seven, Ç., Çakan, H., Ramazanoğlu, M., Akboğa, M. & Mutlu, Y. (2021). *Pandemi döneminde çocukların durumu araştırması*. İstanbul: İnsan Hakları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi.
- Shirley, A. (2019). The Wealth Report 2019, Knight Frank, Retrieved November 20, 2022, from <https://content.knightfrank.com/resources/knightfrank.com/wealth-report/2019/the-wealth-report-2019.pdf>
- Solt, F. (2009). Standardizing the world income inequality database *Social Science Quarterly*, 90(2). 231-42.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2016). *Eşitsizliğin bedeli: Bugünün bölünmüş toplumu geleceğimizi nasıl tehlikeye atıyor?* (Trans., O. İşler). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Sunar, L. & Akkuş-Güvendi, M. (2020) "Ortadaki fili" görmek: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de sosyo-ekonomik eşitsizliklerin tezahürleri, *İnsan & Toplum*, 10(4), 1-40.
- Sunar, L. & Güneş Ü., (2020) Sosyo-ekonomik eşitsizlikler ve tabakalaşma araştırmalarının gelişimi: Bibliyometrik bir analiz, *İnsan & Toplum*, 10(4), 505-555.
- Şahin, H., Çakmak, A. & Erdem, Y. (2021). Pandeminin kadına yönelik şiddet üzerine etkisinin yazılı basına yansıyan olgular üzerinden incelenmesi. *Opus: Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 11(18), 7348-7367.
- Şahin, M. (2014). Öğretim materyallerinin öğrenme-öğretme sürecindeki işlevine ilişkin öğretmen görüşlerinin analizi. *Kastamonu Üniversitesi Kastamonu Eğitim Dergisi*, 23(3), 995-1012.
- Şentürk, Ü. & Bozkurt, V. (2022). Family in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Family ties and communication problems. *The societal impacts of COVID-19: A transnational perspective*. V. Bozkurt, et al), İstanbul: İstanbul University Press, 183-201.
- T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı. (2021, Temmuz 29). *Bakan Bilgin: "Kısa Çalışma Ödeneği, Nakdi Ücret Desteği ve İşsizlik Ödeneği Kapsamında 8 Milyon Kişiye 57 Milyar TL Ödeme Yapıldı"*. Retrieved from <https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/haberler/bakan-bilgin-kisa-calisma-odenegi-nakdi-ucet-destegi-ve-issizlik-odenegi-kapsaminda-8-milyon-kisiye-57-milyar-tl-o-deme-yapildi/>
- Tar, E., Çetintaş, B. & Atik, D. (2022). COVID-19 pandemi sürecinde çocuk istismarı. *Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sağlık Bilimleri Dergisi*, 11(1), 371-378.
- The Credit Suisse Research Institute. (2022), *Global Wealth Report 2022: Leading perspectives to navigate the future*, Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/research/publications/global-wealth-report-2022-en.pdf>
- The Lancet Respiratory Medicine. (2022). Future pandemics: Failing to prepare means preparing to fail. *The Lancet. Respiratory Medicine*, 10(3), 221. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600\(22\)00056-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600(22)00056-X)
- The Nuffield Trust. (2022). Cancer waiting times. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/resource/cancer-waiting-time-targets>
- Thompson, G., Hawkins, O., Dar, A. & Taylor, M. (2012). Olympic Britain social and economic change since the 1908 and 1948 London Games. House of Commons Library. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from <https://www.parliament.uk/contentassets/118c576e6da64ec68d8eebea-5a09306b/olympicbritain.pdf>
- Trigg, N. (2021, 30 January). COVID: Pandeminin çocuklar üzerindeki yıkıcı etkisi. BBC. (2021, 30 January) Retrieved January 30, 2021 from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-55870027>
- TÜİK. (2020). Ekonomik güven endeksi. Retrieved from <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Tuketici-Guven-Endeksi-Nisan-2020-33904>
- TÜİK. (2011). Yaşam memnuniyeti araştırması 2010. Retrieved from <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Life-Satisfaction-Sur-vey-2011-10770>
- Ucar, A. (2020). Gmail—RE_20-2967-1 FW_ About a bug on ECDC COVID-19 data_.pdf—Google Drive. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Fwq079_DH098xzOzdkpbHu4tS2hgng3G/view

- Ucar, A. (2021a). Kovid-19 aşılmasının rekor geliştirilme hızı ve arka planı. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ana-liz/kovid-19-asilarinin-rekor-gelistirilme-hizi-ve-arka-plan/2267239>.
- Ucar, A. (2021b). Contact Tracing in Türkiye's Struggle with COVID-19: Its Scope, Components, and Stages. *Anatolian Clinic the Journal of Medical Sciences*, 26(2), 141-142. <https://doi.org/10.21673/ANADOLUKLIN.848367>
- Ucar, A. (2022). Pandemide sona doğru: Ne öğrendik? - Fikir Turu. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://fikirturu.com/toplum/pan-demide-sona-dogru-ne-ogrendik/>
- UNESCO. (2020a). COVID-19 Educational disruption and response, Retrieved October 1, 2022, from <https://en.unesco.org>
- UNESCO. (2020b). What have we learnt? Overview of findings from a survey of ministries of education on national responses to COVID-19, Retrieved November 26, 2022, from https://tcg.uis.unesco.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2020/10/National-Educational-Responses-to-COVID-19-WEB-final_EN.pdf
- UNICEF. (2022, 24 January). UNICEF uyarıyor: COVID-19'un eğitimde neden olduğu kayıpların boyutu "neredeyse başa çıkılmaz" seviyelere ulaştı [Press release] <https://www.unicef.org/turkiye/bas%C4%B1n-b%C3%BCltenleri/unicef-uyar%C4%B1yor-covid-19un-e%C4%9Fitimde-neden-oldu%C4%9Fu-kay%C4%B1plar%C4%B1n-boyutu-neredeyse-ba%C5%9Fa>
- UNCTAD. (2020). Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global FDI, and GVCs: Update analysis.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008), World Drug Report 2008, Retrieved December 20, 2022, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf
- United States Department of Labor. (2020). Retrieved December 20, 2022, from <https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/wkclaims/report.asp>
- Van Ginneken, E., Reed, S., Siciliani, L., Eriksen, A., Schlepper, L., Tille, F., & Zapata, T. (2022). Addressing backlogs and managing waiting lists during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic Policy Brief 47 Health Systems And Policy Analysis. *WHO Regional Office for Europe*.
- Viero, A., Barbara, G., Montisci, M., Kustermann, K. & Cattaneo, C. (2021). Violence against women in the COVID-19 Pandemic: A review of the literature and a call for shared strategies to tackle health and social emergencies. *Forensic Science International*. (319), 1-8.
- WHO. (2020). Pulse survey on continuity of essential health services during the COVID-19 in (pp. 4-11) Maintenance of essential healthservices. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-EHS_continuity-survey-2020.1
- WHO. (2022). Mental health and COVID-19: Early evidence of the pandemic's impact: Scientific brief, Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/352189>
- WIRED UK. (2020). The science behind the UK's coronavirus strategy. Retrieved November 18, 2022, from <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-uk-suppression-response>
- Wilson, O. (2019, 30 Haziran). *How the divorce rate has changed over the last 150 years*. Breakup Angels. Retrieved from <https://breakupangels.com/lifestyle/divorce-rate-changes-over-time/>
- World Bank. (2020). *The COVID-19 Pandemic: Shocks to education and policy responses*. World Bank, Washington, DC. Retrieved from <https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/covid-19-pandemic-shocks-education-and-policy-responses>
- Yıldız, G. ve Erbil, N. (2022). COVID-19 Pandemisi ve kadına yönelik aile içi şiddet. *Androloji Bülteni*, (24), 228-233.
- YÖK. (2022). Pandemi sürecinde online eğitimin verimliliğine ilişkin öğretim elemanı anket raporu. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from <https://covid19.yok.gov.tr/Documents/anketler/ogretim-eleman-anket-sonuclari.pdf>

About the Authors



Lutfi Sunar. He completed his undergraduate education in 2002 at Istanbul Bilgi University in International Relations and Economics and his doctorate in 2010 at Istanbul University's Sociology Department. He has been working on sociological theory, history of sociology, Orientalism, Islamism, stratification, and inequality. He is faculty member in the Sociology Department of Istanbul Medeniyet University.



Mahmut Hakkı Akın. He graduated from Uludağ University, Department of Sociology, in 2003. He completed his master's degree in 2005 and his doctorate in 2009 at Selçuk University, Social Sciences Institute, Department of Sociology. He is currently a faculty member at the Department of Sociology at Istanbul Medeniyet University. His works and books focus on modernization, political socialization, Islamism in Türkiye, and contemporary Turkish thought.



Taner Atmaca. In 2005, he completed his undergraduate education at Sivas Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Education. He completed her master's degree in General Turkish History at Ankara University and Educational Administration and Supervision at Gazi University. He wrote her doctoral thesis at Eskişehir Osmangazi University, Department of Educational Sciences, in 2019. He is currently a faculty member at Düzce University, Faculty of Education. He has research and publications in educational sociology, educational administration, and educational history.



Abdullah Uçar. He graduated from Istanbul Faculty of Medicine in 2011. He practiced emergency medicine and family medicine. He completed his PhD at Istanbul University, Istanbul Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health in 2021. His academic studies focus on human resources planning in health, digital epidemiology, spatial epidemiology, big data in health, and pandemic modeling. Uçar runs Türkiye COVID-19 Pandemic Monitoring Screen (TURCOVID19) project. He is currently a faculty member of the Sakarya University Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health.



Elyesa Koytak. He graduated from Galatasaray High School and Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology. He wrote his master's thesis at Boğaziçi University, Department of Sociology, and his doctoral thesis at Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Sociology. His work focuses on the professions, social stratification, mobility, the sociology of medicine, law, and literature. He is a faculty member at the Department of Sociology at Istanbul Medeniyet University and director of TODAM, İLKE Foundation.



Büşra Özen. She completed her undergraduate education in 2017 and her graduate education in 2020 at Selçuk University, Department of Sociology. She is continuing her doctoral thesis in political sociology at the Department of Sociology at Istanbul Medeniyet University. In addition, she worked as a researcher at the TODAM, İLKE Foundation.

THE OUTLOOK OF SOCIETY 2022

POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY

The COVID-19 pandemic, which has been the overwhelming agenda of the world from the beginning of 2020 to the end of 2022, is gradually wiped off the face of the earth. While concepts such as lockdown, isolation, mask, distance, contact, and dose are left behind, it is now necessary to evaluate the pandemic's social, economic, and institutional dimensions in a multidimensional way, besides the medical dimension. The question is simple but challenging: In what direction is society moving in all areas, from marriage to aging, from law to urbanization, after the pandemic? What have we learned from the pandemic? What should we learn?

The Outlook of Society 2022 report was prepared in response to this question under the theme of Post-Pandemic Society. The experience of the pandemic and the dynamics that emerged in the transition to the post-pandemic period are examined through key indicators in 16 different categories. In addition, detailed analyses prepared by experts on health, family, education, working life, and inequalities sheds light on the multidimensional nature of the social reality. With its key findings and recommendations, The Outlook of Society 2022 report evaluates the post-pandemic transition from a data-driven perspective for researchers, policymakers, civil society, and industries.



Foundation for science, culture and education

📍 Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Mh. Türbe Kapısı Sk. No:13 Üsküdar / İst.

🌐 ilke.org.tr 📞 +90 216 532 63 70 @ bilgi@ilke.org.tr 📺 ilkevakfi